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Abstract
This thesis is based on research conducted between the summer and fall of 2021, and it
investigates the global garments industry from the perspective of local labour organizers and
activists in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is the second-largest producer of fast fashion and textile in
the world, employing millions of garments workers across the country. Moreover, the long
history of industrial disasters, such as the infamous case of the Rana Plaza collapse, make
Bangladesh a valuable site for unravelling the layers of exploitation and vulnerability associated
with wage labour in the global assembly line. The 2013 Rana Plaza collapse killed over a
thousand garments workers and left behind trails of loss and trauma. Given the rise of factory
disasters in the garments industry and the timing of this research being situated amidst the
COVID-19 pandemic, this thesis analyzes the challenges facing Bangladeshi garments factory
workers and their capacity to collectivize in the industry to claim their rights as citizens.
Additionally, the author investigates, how do local activists mobilize the sromik andolon (labour
movement) on the ground amidst continued corporate and state-led violence in this neoliberal
supply chain? Lastly, the author enquires, why is the localized labour movement essential for
Bangladeshi garments workers, and wage workers more generally? Exploring the experience of
industrial disasters as key moments for generating new forms of worker activism, this thesis
explores how garments workers and local activists develop a nuanced and critical understanding
of what the readymade garments industry means for workers in Bangladesh and argues for an
ethnographic approach of “listening to the local” as a vital source of understanding the lives of
workers and activists.
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Summary for Lay Audience
From factory collapses to the continued battle for adequate wages and rights for workers, over
the years, the Bangladeshi garments industry has witnessed many shifts and altercations. A few
matters became apparent while ‘listening’ to the narratives of local labour organizers who are
fighting for workers’ rights on the ground in Bangladesh. Local activists deem the Bangladeshi
labour movement as a fundamental tool for mobilizing wage workers’ rights in Bangladesh and
across the global garments industry. The intent of this research is to provide a richly detailed,
locally driven interpretation of how the garments sector in Bangladesh operates as part of the fast
fashion industry. Furthermore, by focusing on the knowledge and experiences of grassroots
activists, we not only gain a grounded perspective but also a critically important one, as locals
can describe and even theorize how global capitalism takes shape in the apparel supply chain.
Bangladeshi labour activists are aware of the abstract, top-down, and western-centric approaches
pursued by global and national players, which challenges their labour movement on the ground.
The aim of this research is to pursue a group-up approach and address the various initiatives
organized by the local labour organizers who have direct and detailed experience with the
Bangladeshi garments sector. The data collected from this research will reveal how informants
speak and think about the social, political, ethical, and economical aspects of the fast fashion
supply chain and the Bangladeshi garments industry.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Entering the Bangladeshi Garments Industry Amidst the COVID19 Crisis
“It feels like there is a FOR SALE sign on Bangladesh. People's rights, choices, and
interests are nowhere on the table. With the pandemic and everything that happened over
the last few years, it showed very clearly that the lives of garments workers, their health,
and their well-being is not at all of interest to the factory owners or even to the
Government of Bangladesh. The garments industry is one of the major areas which keeps
Bangladesh’s economy alive. However, we are basing it on the lives of these workers.
Basically—the female workers, unskilled, and uneducated—only coming to Dhaka or
suburbs with social networks of village relatives, living a very precarious life, a very
vulnerable life. And for the sake of just having their freedom of buying a purse and
lipstick, or, some chicken, someday.”
– Salma Apa
On March 26, 2020, the Government of Bangladesh announced a nationwide lockdown in
response to the first wave of the coronavirus. The employers’ organization Bangladesh Garments
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) immediately shut down all garment
factories following this announcement (Kabir et al. 2020, 48). Subsequently, due to the COVID19-related closures and layoffs, ten million garments workers headed home to their villages from
the outskirts of Dhaka city. This pandemic forth brought new concerns facing garments workers
and other wage workers while exposing the exacerbation of specific issues that existed in the
pre-pandemic era. Those preexisting issues include, but are not limited to, joblessness, zero
breaks, hunger, unstable employment, exposure to hazardous working conditions, gender-based
violence, unsafe travel routes to and from work—all, -in addition to fear of contracting and
spreading coronavirus (Kabir et al. 2020, 48; Sarker 2020). In Chapter One, I will begin by
addressing how the various bureaucratic actors including international corporations and
Bangladeshi national players responded to the initial challenges brought forth by the global
pandemic that directly affected the garments workers who are placed at the bottom of the global
supply chain. The COVID-19 crisis will be my entryway to inquire about the implications of
gendered, racialized, and classist violence and exploitation facing Bangladeshi garments workers
1

and the repetition and continuity of such experiences. Additionally, by presenting the case of the
coronavirus pandemic and the challenges it posed upon Bangladeshi garments workers, I will
address the visible and ongoing forms of systemic barriers and “ordinary violence” (cf. Beckett
2020), that have become normalized (Perrow 2004) in the garments supply chain. Furthermore, I
will highlight how these matters can be traced back to the historical and colonial forms of stateled, gendered, and racial exploitation that can be found “haunting” Bangladeshi workers who are
employed in this lucrative industry (cf. Kilroy-Marac 2018).
In 2022, the Platinum Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II was celebrated across the globe by
various supporters of the monarch. A few months following this event, the Queen passed away at
the age of 96, at the Balmoral Castle in the United Kingdom. This event too was solemnly
observed across the globe by the followers of Her majesty, especially those fifty-six
Commonwealth Nations that are made up of sovereign, “independent” post-colonial states such
as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Kenya, and other settler-colonial nations including
Canada and New Zealand. These events while memorialized by many, also led to several uprises
amongst Indigenous populations where I am situated in Canada, in South Asia, and across the
globe. The dynasty and impudence of the British Empire and the succession of violence
unleashed upon colonies (including the Indian subcontinent) and their inhabitants for several
centuries, for example, still resonates with the conditions of subjugation facing certain
populations in those regions today (cf. Chakrabarty 2018; Lowe 2015; Wolfe 2006; Stoler 2004;
Spivak 1988). It is said that most of the wealth acquired by the Crown was stolen from these
countries that are currently identified as suffering, impoverished, corrupt, or underdeveloped.
Black, Indigenous, People and Women of Colour continue to demand for acknowledgement and
repatriation for the colonial violence that was imposed by the British Empire. These matters are
relevant in illustrating a detailed story and to address some of the compelling historical traces of
violence and desolation that countries like Bangladesh have suffered due to colonization, where
matters of famine, flooding, poverty, and discrimination have become ‘commonplace’ and
‘ordinary.’ It is with this consideration and awareness of chronological events that have shaped
the conditions of peoples and systems, that I began my ethnographic research on the Bangladeshi
garments industry.

2

1.1. Getting Insight into Global Factories: Learning from Saira about
the COVID-19 Pandemic in Bangladesh
The unpreparedness of national and international governments and institutions in maintaining
their citizens during a global pandemic became evident in 2020. Meanwhile, the media and news
outlets became flooded with debates over vaccine hesitancy and mask regulations rather than
addressing the limitations of the state in mismanaging the spread of the coronavirus. The
pandemic brought forth many new beginnings, such as the adjustment to a virtualized lifestyle
with the increase of technological advancements making it simpler to live at and work from
home. However, the crisis did not affect everyone evenly. In certain parts of the world,
companies adapted to provide remote work opportunities to their employees, schools became
virtualized, and people switched to ordering their foods, groceries, household supplies, clothing,
and more, online. Meanwhile, other economies and communities suffered the pre-conditions of
an upcoming global recession. In Bangladesh particularly, the coronavirus pandemic exacerbated
already existing forms of precarity, adding an acute crisis to the already present chronic ones.
The COVID-19 crisis exposed the repetition of events from the past, particularly in the way
national and international governments overlooked the poorest regions, workers, and inhabitants
while overseeing the global emergency. In the next section, I turn to my conversation with one of
my informants to address what could be observed in Bangladesh on the ground during the
pandemic.
Following the initial spread of the coronavirus and lockdowns declared in March 2020,
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina responded to the economic crisis by announcing an
allocation of stimulus funds dedicated to the garments sector to cover unpaid wages. Allegedly,
these funds did not reach the garments sromik (labourers), which led to nationwide
demonstrations and protests organized by labour activists and workers (Kabir et al. 2020, 48).
The two trillion-dollar global garments industry witnessed brands canceling orders for at least
20-30% of pre-produced products, resulting in factory closures and affecting the livelihoods of
garments workers (Tanjeem 2021). Suddenly, during the summer of 2020, while Bangladesh
witnessed a peak in COVID-19 cases, the employers’ organization Bangladesh Garments
Manufacturing and Exporters Association (BGMEA) declared a reopening of factories to process
former orders while threatening workers to return to work if they wanted to keep their jobs
3

(Kabir et al. 2020, 48). To elaborate on the next part, I will refer to an interview with one of my
informants who shared with me their observations from the aftermath of the first wave of the
COVID-19 pandemic and its implications upon Bangladeshi garments workers.
Saira is a leading expert, and researcher in Bangladesh who has worked on projects supported by
local Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and research institutions on issues surrounding
gender equality. More recently, Saira began investigating the trade union movement in the readymade garments sector and the condition of women’s labour rights. In fall 2021, near the end of
September, I had the opportunity to interview Saira on Zoom where we engaged in a thoughtful
and enlightening conversation. During that one-hour call, she shared with me the intricacies of
the treatment that faced garments workers following the spread of the coronavirus in Bangladesh.
Saira told me that, “while the entire country was under lockdown, suddenly, the garments
factories were opened. The garments workers who were outside the city had to travel back. Here,
there was a major communication gap between trade union leaders and the workers—those who
are average labourers and cannot participate with any unions because the factories that they
work for prohibit it.”
Saira is a modern scholarly woman who works at BRAC, an NGO based and founded in
Bangladesh. She is a Research Coordinator for the NGO’s Division of Investigatory
Development. Saira expressed similar sentiments towards Bangladeshi garments workers’ rights
and women’s equitable access and lack thereof. She provided her input on the uncertainties of
labour organizing in the garments sector—along with interventions that could minimize the risks
and challenges facing garments workers. While working with a team and observing the trade
union movement in the garments sector during the coronavirus pandemic, Saira and her team
observed that negotiations about the reopening of factories were taking place at a national level,
where workers were unwelcomed. The matter of whether the factories would be opening was
appearing all over social media and on online news channels. The decision was made to reopen
the factories. Then later, based on the scrutiny surrounding the factories’ reopening that was
circulating on social media, factory owners agreed to delay the opening and keep their factories
closed for one more week. Saira exclaimed: “was there no way for the union leaders to inform
the garments workers who had gone back to their villages that they were trying to make these
negotiations? Could they not have informed the workers that they are trying to delay the
4

reopening at this time, so stay put as they work to keep the factories closed? But no.” As there
were no modes of transportation running at the time, thousands of workers resorted to taking
long and painful journeys to return to the suburbs. They walked through risky routes for
hundreds of miles to return to the factory towns located on the outskirts of the country’s urban
center—Dhaka city. Saira disclosed her skepticism toward the power and capacity of trade
unionists in Bangladesh as they failed to simply inform the workers about the delays in factory
openings.
At this stage in our conversation, I felt frustrated. This was my tenth interview, yet, it was
the first time I had learned that the COVID-19 lockdowns led garments workers to have to walk
for miles to return to the factories in fear of losing their jobs. Only for there to have been an
enormous miscommunication, causing workers to suffer in a loop of crisis. It became clear to me
from these encounters, the layers of challenges and limitations local labour organizing is in
Bangladesh where garments workers are prohibited by their employers from participating in any
unions. The news of factory openings being delayed appeared on social media before it made it
to the workers who are immediately affected by the decisions, which is both jarring and telling of
the weaknesses of transnational labour organizing (Kang 2021). There was a lot that I learned
from Saira, and from all my informants, about the strength, resilience, and prowess of local
labour organizing which received my full attention and analysis for the purposes of this research.
Shortly after, Saira summarized for me how the conditioning of the international
economy and the role of transnational corporations has influenced Bangladesh’s enlistment as a
global producer of fast fashions throughout the years:
In 2008, when the economic depression occurred, at that time, many people including
economists, speculated that the garments industry might crash. After the 1990s and since
the early 2000s this industry grew quite rapidly, therefore, during the depression, people
assumed that there would be a decline. But the reason the industry survived and “upore
uthe gelo” (drastically inclined) is because of the exploitation of cheap labour, that is the
only thing that made this possible. Now [in September 2021], the same thing is
happening with the overpacking of orders. During the first year of the coronavirus
pandemic, there was a lot of havoc over the lack of orders and cut downs by brands.
However, now the workload has gotten even heavier. The working hours used to be 8
AM-5 PM, now they are 8 AM-7 PM. Employees are not being compensated for the
additional hours that they are working at the factory.
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Saira highlighted to me that the struggles facing garments workers in Bangladesh are multifold.
Furthermore, during times of crisis like the pandemic, there is an exacerbation of violence
disrupting the lives of wage workers, whether due to budget under-cuts or overpacking of orders,
workers are regularly placed at the bottom of the barrel in the supply chain. While commenting
on the rapid growth of the garments industry in Bangladesh, Saira confided in me that most
researchers and academicians in Bangladesh are compelled to criticize these issues in a very
“hush-hush way.” Additionally, most activists and local labour organizers in Bangladesh
resonate with a sense of ‘broken democracy’ that prevents Bangladeshi citizens and global wage
workers from collectivizing. The government sees the garments industry as key to Bangladesh’s
nationhood and economic status, therefore, open, public criticism of the sector is systematically
proscribed. Labour activists and garments workers have limited room to mobilize on the ground,
and collective organizing is often framed as a threat to the national economy and the mode of
capital accumulation on which it is based. In this way, the system repeatedly violates, suppresses,
and attempts to silence workers.
The COVID-19 Crisis in the Bangladeshi Garments Industry
The timeframe of the pandemic heavily interceded with the timing of my research for this thesis,
which began in mid-2020. As such, this research was profoundly shaped by the context in which
it was conducted. Throughout the pandemic, Bangladesh steadily grasped onto its position as the
second largest producer and global exporter of fast fashion (Swazan and Das 2022). This
economic enfranchisement was beneficial for a select few players in the global supply chain. As
quoted by my informant Saira, the garments workers were placed in destitute conditions
throughout this lockdown. Scholars argued that the post-COVID-19 conditions were
significantly worse for wage workers as they are enduring an ongoing hunger pandemic,
alongside stolen wages, joblessness, and more (Sarker 2020; Kabir et al 2020). The coronavirus
aftermath has thus shone a new light on the difference in the distribution of wealth and access to
one’s full rights as citizens in post-colonial states like Bangladesh during the era of mass
consumption led by capitalism (cf. Brown 2010; Harvey 2006; Sassen 2002). Yet, such
disruptions in the global supply chain point to the structural issues that persist beyond moments
of crisis such as the pandemic. This thesis will explore how such moments of crisis and disaster
can mediate our understanding of those broader structures and relations, doing so from the
6

perspective of an ethnography of the garments industry from the standpoint of the main
producers of ‘value’ in this economy—the garments workers and the local labour activists who
are found forwarding workers’ demands (cf. Graeber 2001).
In this thesis, I will build on the anthropological works of Chloe Ahmann (2018) in
addressing moments of rupture and crisis, and apply the concept of crisis, disaster, and ordinary
violence by Greg Beckett (2020) to present a handful of events that occurred in the garments
industry that garnered national and global attention. Namely, the 1990s child labour accusations
facing the Bangladeshi garments industry, the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse and its
aftermath, and the COVID-19 pandemic and implications on garments workers, to highlight
levels of precarity facing average wage workers vs. how national and international players in the
supply chain respond to these events. I will pursue these events or “moments of crises” as a lens
to critique the overall structure of this neoliberal industry and its weaponization of capital to
exploit labour in the supply chain. Additionally, by referring to scholars who are experts on the
global supply chain (Siddiqi 2015; Chowdhury 2018; Anner 2019; Kang 2021; Tanjeem 2021),
and by engaging with the conversations I had with local informants, I will conclude on the
significance of listening to the voices of local players who are intrinsically familiar with the
conditions of the garments industry and global capitalism. I will argue that the Bangladeshi
garments industry and the global supply chain is sustained through the exploitation of racialized,
gendered, and colonized labour. This is systemically enabled through neoliberal control over the
capital that displaces labour in the supply chain, and ultimately eliminates Bangladeshi garments
workers’ capacity to unionize, compelling them to remain chained to cycles of poverty (Kang,
2021). Furthermore, outsourcing and ‘spatial strategies’ are manipulated by transnational
corporations that control capital to further fragment the transnational labor movement, in
Bangladesh and across the globe (Anner 2019). Currently, Bangladeshi garments workers are
struggling in a state where their labour rights are weak, the room for collectivizing is limited
(Kang 2021), and their employers prohibit them or threaten to fire them for speaking up about
their rights and demands. Nevertheless, garments workers are bound to return to the factory for
work to facilitate their survival and to feed their families.
This thesis is a story about the Bangladeshi garments industry, but it simultaneously tells
a story about the world, the global supply chain, and capitalism in the 2020s. It connects those
7

consumers who are online shopping or roaming around the malls in metropolitan cities such as
New York, Sydney, or Toronto, to the garments workers who are producing those products while
sitting in a sweatshop on the outskirts of Dhaka, in Savar, Ashulia, or Gazipur. I will demonstrate
the significance of ‘listening’ to local activists and workers on their demands for higher wages
and improved working conditions, to produce a theory of global capitalism from the ground up
(cf. McGranahan 2018). Today, the global supply chain connects garments workers to shoppers
around the world, although not always in visible or clear ways. Transnational corporations and
brands like H&M, Walmart, and Zara look for the lowest wages to gain the highest profits. That
means they seek out wage workers from the world’s most economically disenfranchised groups
and regions, which in turn means that garments workers are (and have historically been) from
racialized and gendered populations located in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Kang 2021;
Tanjeem 2021; Anner 2019; Chowdhury 2018; Karim 2014). The global supply chain produces a
distance between the producer and consumer, enabling corporations to manipulate the imagery of
“saving” the ‘vulnerable’ and ‘unskilled’ women workers by providing them with jobs while
hiding the exploitative profiteering mechanisms that corporations pursue (Chowdhury 2018;
Siddiqi 2015; Karim 2014; cf. Ong 2007; Freeman 2000). The global nature of the system makes
some of these struggles facing wage workers invisible, by deploying ‘spatial strategies’ and
manipulating ‘geographies of unevenness’ by maintaining a great distance between producers
and consumers (Prentice 2021; Lewis 2019; Karim 2014). That distancing permits corporations
to deny any responsibility for the millions of factory workers whose labour they extract (cf. Ong
2007). Throughout this thesis, I will weave in the historical underpinnings that have guided
Bangladesh’s current state-formation while outlining how Bangladesh became the second largest
producer of global garments and top exporter to the US (United States) and Canada.
Additionally, international corporations and national governments (in Bangladesh and in the
United States, for example) attempt to hide corporate exploitation by appealing to ideas of
national economic development, job creation, and capitalism and wage work as “saving”
vulnerable and or unskilled women workers. It is significant to trace the chronological events
and historical moments that have led to the recycled imagery of the vulnerable woman of colour
whose labour gets commodified to produce wealth for capitalist players in the supply chain.
In 2022, the Platinum Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II was celebrated across the globe by
various supporters of the monarch. A few months following this event, the Queen passed away at
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the age of 96, at the Balmoral Castle in the United Kingdom. This event too was solemnly
observed across the globe by the followers of Her majesty, especially those fifty-six
Commonwealth Nations that are made up of sovereign, “independent” post-colonial states such
as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Kenya, and other settler-colonial states including
Canada and New Zealand. These events while memorialized by many, also led to several uprises
amongst Indigenous populations here in Canada, and in South Asia. The dynasty and impudence
of the British Empire and the succession of colonial violence unleashed upon colonies (including
the Indian subcontinent) and their inhabitants for several centuries, for example, still resonates
with the conditions of subjugation facing certain populations in those regions today (cf.
Chakrabarty 2018; Lowe 2015; Wolfe 2006; Stoler 2004; Spivak 1988). It is said that most of the
wealth acquired by the Crown was stolen from these countries that are currently identified as
suffering, impoverished, corrupt, or underdeveloped. Black, Indigenous, People and Women of
Colour continue to demand for acknowledgement and repatriation for the colonial violence that
was imposed by the British Empire. These matters are relevant in illustrating a detailed story and
to address some of the compelling historical traces of violence and desolation that countries like
Bangladesh have suffered due to colonization, where matters of famine, flooding, poverty, and
discrimination have become ‘commonplace’ and ‘ordinary.’ It is with this consideration and
awareness of chronological events that have shaped the conditions of peoples and systems, that I
began my ethnographic research on the Bangladeshi garments industry.

1.2. From Colonialism to Capitalism: The Indian Subcontinent and
Bangladesh’s Neoliberal State Formation: A Brief History
Before I delve into the intricacies of lived experiences of the garments workers and the local
activists whose narratives empowered me to produce this thesis, I will briefly articulate a list of
key dates, years, and moments in history that have shaped and contributed to the current state of
the fast fashion industry where Bangladeshi is the second-largest producer (Swazan and Das
2022). I will return to these key moments throughout the thesis to indicate continuities,
connections, and repetitions between the past and the present, and the way Bangladeshi wage
workers are depicted and treated, nationally and globally.
There is a vast literature on the complex history of the independence and partition periods
of Bangladesh. My goal here is to provide a brief context for the focus of my analysis, which will
9

consider how Bangladesh’s past has shaped not only the contemporary garments sector but also
the national government, economy, and the formation of “citizenship” (cf. Brown 2010; Sassen
2002). In the grand scheme, the sentiments that resulted in the partitioning of the Indian
subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) in 1947, and the ethnoreligious conflicts inflicted by
the British empire’s divide and conquer ruling, played an enormous role in the ailments facing
the region and its inhabitants today (Lewis 2019, p1958; Rajan 1969). In the case of Bangladesh,
following the India-Pakistan partition, the state fell under the rigid dictatorship of the West
Pakistani military regime. Meanwhile, there remained a 2,204 km (about half the width of the
United States) distance between the two geographic bodies. It remained this way for twenty-four
years, while Bangladeshis (East Pakistanis) continued to struggle for their rights, language,
culture, and independence. In 1971, Bangladesh gained its independence after years of suffering
under the Pakistani dictatorship. There were hopes of assembling a socialist governing system
that centralized the needs and well-being of all citizens post-independence (Muhammad 2020).
The era of partition and state formation in the mid-twentieth century was around the same
time when developmental projects were being capitalized and governmental entities were being
subsumed by privatization (corporate interests), alongside the tactful introduction of
International NGOs (INGOs) by the West (Lewis 2019, p1958). Post-WW2 was a period of
expanding the notion of ‘nation-states’ with an interest in “decolonizing” formerly conquered
regions to ensure independence from European hegemony (cf. Sassen 2002). Meanwhile,
American neoliberalism began to expand, and corporations reimagined ‘the global’ as
increasingly one place, therefore easier to expand and commodify already inhabited regions
(Ong 2007). To retain corporate sovereignty over post-colonial states, transnational corporations
entered the market with increased neoliberal logic to intercede in smaller economies like
Bangladesh (cf. Standing 2014, 5; Ong 2007). Since Bangladesh’s independence, the country has
been exposed to several Western neoliberal structural adjustment plans and economic projects
(Lewis 2019; cf. Ong 2007). Bangladeshi state players such as factory owners and ministers of
parliament are found looting the profits of these rigid systems that were set in place by
colonialism, military dictatorship, and patriarchal oppression against Global South women
(Chowdhury 2018). I aim to address these matters and their build-up more thoughtfully
throughout the chapters in this thesis. The representation of Bangladesh as a place where
‘disaster,’ ‘corruption,’ ‘patriarchy,’ and ‘crisis,’ takes place is systematically enabled by the
10

post-colonial state of Bangladesh that overlooks the conditions of its citizens and sides with the
western corporations to retain national profits, and is inconsiderate towards garments workers,
and wage workers more generally (Tanjeem 2017; Siddiqi 2015; cf. Beckett and Wagner 2022).
The dream of an independent Bangladesh “Shadhin Bangla” involved ideas of liberty,
growth, and development for all Bangladeshis; however, that dream did not last long
(Muhammad 2020). Political restructuring and inter-governmental warfare between competing
political parties in the past four decades provoked hopelessness amongst Bangladeshis who for
the most part consider the national government untrustworthy. In 2022, two of Bangladesh’s
largest economic sectors are 1) the Temporary Foreign Worker program—currently booming
with migrant workers going to the Middle East and sending back remittances while living very
precarious lives abroad, and 2) the Readymade Garments Industry that expanded significantly in
the 80s–90s and is feminized in global contexts (Karim 2014). According to my informants,
these sectors are employing enormous numbers of precarious workers who produce the bulk of
Bangladesh’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (cf. Standing 2014). Consequently, little
provisioning is done on part of the Bangladeshi government in maintaining the rights of these
workers. Both sectors are export-led, privatized, and outward-facing—much like the people,
labour, and production of ‘value’ in Bangladesh.

1.3. War-torn Bangladesh and Women’s Memoir
The notion of Shadhin Bangla (independent Bengal) altered over the years in both meaning and
value for average Bangladeshis. As I mentioned earlier, the Pakistani military government was
considered too rigid and conservative for Bangladeshis, cogitating the rising middle class and
expansion of liberal ideologies that had already saturated the Bengal region (Rahman and
Langford 2014, 174). Additionally, these discrete identities, class, gender, religious, and ethnic
divisions, were further instilled through British colonialism and the divide and conquer ruling
system which distracted the masses from seeking their rights (Hossain 2010). In the midtwentieth century, Bengalis were known for being highly educated—although, the Western
interpretation of the Indian subcontinent remained rather simplistic, as illiterate, or uncivilized
(Muhammad 2020). Many Bengali women, mainly from upper classes, were educated while
women in neighbouring regions were battling for the same rights, nevertheless, there remained
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several gender, class, and ethnoreligious gaps that contributed to the formation of the womendominant garments labour market in Bangladesh in the 1980s (Chowdhury 2018; Karim 2014;
Abu-Lughod 2013; Siddiqi 2009). Before I return to the readymade garments sector, I will be
referring to a case study conducted by Yasmin Saikia (2004) to identify the historical role and
contributions of Bangladeshi women towards Bangladesh, compared to how their positionality is
represented nationally and globally. This is significant in informing the evaluation of racialized
women and their social and/or economic contributions to key historical moments.
In 1999, almost twenty-eight years after Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan,
Saikia (2004) received a summer research grant permitting her to travel to collect the narratives
of Bangladeshi women and their accounts of the civil war in 1971. Before this, there were no
archives of women’s experiences from the liberation war (Saikia 2004, 277). Saikia (2004)
highlighted that in post-war Bangladesh, the building of the national identity represented the
oppositional political powers in dichotomous and patriarchal ways. The first group was made of
Bangladeshi soldiers who formed a guerilla militia called the liberation army “Mukti Bahini”
endorsed by the Awami League and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina), who was declared the founding father of Bangladesh. The Mukti Bahini were
(and are) widely celebrated as war heroes, in comparison to the second group—the Pakistani
military who were given the culprits’ status (Saikia 2004, 275). This is significant, as these
divisions would, over time, come to characterize the interparty rivalry that defines Bangladeshi
politics and people’s mistrust of the government. Additionally, the key concern that Saikia’s
(2004) research emphasized was the absence of women’s narratives, as it is essential to archive
the narratives of different voices in building an authentic memory of nation-building and
women’s contributions. Controversially, the 200,000 cases of rape that were suffered by
Bangladeshi women during the war received selective recognition by national players including
the Awami League to evoke anger against Pakistanis and generate national unity (Saikia 2004,
277). This aspect of selective recognition is crucial and can be similarly detected when the
current Bangladeshi national players are celebrating the garments industry in affiliation with the
country’s growing GDP, however, the state is rather hands-off when it comes to attending to
workers’ rights or demands.
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Overall, Saikia (2004) encountered several barriers in accessing women’s accounts of the
war. She traveled from village to village and wherever she entered, a large crowd of men
gathered, commanding her to listen to their heroic stories rather than the women she intended to
learn from (2004, 279). She was told that women would not speak up, nevertheless, this was
falsified by the informants who shared their narratives of rape, pain, and torture, with Saikia,
although in fragmented bits from the memories that still lingered (2004, 280). These women had
been silenced for several decades—some of them were raped by both Bangladeshi and Pakistani
men (Saikia 2004), nevertheless, very few people are aware of this matter. By listening to
survivors, it is possible to build a ‘language’ of communication for atrocious events such as the
war crimes from 1971 (Saikia 2004, 280), similarly to industrial disasters that are seen repeating
across the apparel industry, such as the Rana Plaza collapse tragedy, which I return to throughout
this thesis.
The strategic silencing, “othering,” and selective recognition of women’s contributions as
deemed beneficial by the government, is what Elora Chowdhury (2018, 48) calls the ‘paradox of
celebration and suffering’ (Saikia 2004; Sassen 2002, 49). The paradox or ‘politics of seeing and
not seeing’ enables patriarchy, capitalist development, and human suffering to propel—as
observed in the ways that the post-colonial Bangladeshi nation-state was formulated and is
maintained today with its reliance upon export-led industries for economic development at the
cost of safety and security for Bangladeshi wage workers (Siddiqi 2015 in Chowdhury 2018, 51;
Brown 2010). Social and environmental conditioning can veil a group or society’s memory and
awareness of ‘truths,’ about themselves and others, and thus, personal suffering consists of social
elements (Brison 2002; Das 2001; and Kleinman 1996, in Saikia 2004). For example, the history
of brutality that faced Hindu-Bengalis during the civil war was articulated by Saikia’s
informants. Mathumita, shared the pain she bared from being abused because her brothers were
found supporting the Mukti Bahini—after she was raped, Mathumita dragged herself across the
floor to save her 11-year-old-brother (Saikia 2004, 282). The systemic silencing of women’s
narratives and the erasures of women’s abortion and pregnancy reports, all to ensure the ‘honor’
of the Bangladeshi peoples, demonstrates the primary targeting and subjugation of Bengali
women—specifically from lower classes, Hindu families, and other superfluous groups (Saikia
2004, 284). Meanwhile, the rape counts of Bangladeshi women are only emphasized when
negotiating the state’s patriotism and need for external aid. Nevertheless, textbooks, media tales,
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and testimonies from soldiers all avoided the brutalities faced and sacrifices made by
Bangladeshi women who contributed to the nation’s liberty in quieter ways (Saikia, 2004). I will
display how this similar patriarchal character is visible in the Bangladeshi garments industry.
During moments of crisis or disaster, the media channels and INGOs monetize from the imagery
of helping or saving poor and vulnerable women in developing states (Lewis 2019), meanwhile,
the demands and voices of local garments workers and activists, are strategically silenced and
overshadowed.
In post-colonial Bengal, by the devising of the bhadramahila (gentlewoman) ‘new
woman’ identity that borrowed tremendously from the Victorian “new woman,” the state
dichotomized the representation of Bangladeshi women (Chowdhury 2018, 48). The Bengali
bhadramahila who is ‘smart, sophisticated, and virtuous’ was pitted against two other types of
women—the ‘poor, uneducated, and uncivilized,’ woman in Bengal, who would be targeted for
recruitment in the growing national garments industry, and the sexually liberated and
promiscuous Western woman (Chowdhury 2018). The effect further increased the importance of
class divisions and of the rural-urban social and spatial divide within Bangladesh (Chowdhury
2018, 47). The bhadramahila may appear disassociated from western saviours and completely
‘anticolonial,’ however, the ‘victim-saviour complex’ of colonial feminism produces a South
Asian woman trope that celebrates the neoliberal ‘new woman’ identity while simultaneously
overlooking the violence it triggers (Chowdhury 2018, 49). The ‘logic of capitalism’ both
liberates and victimizes Bangladeshi women in the same sentence (Chowdhury 2018, 49).
Furthermore, Bangladeshi women are not only pitted against other women, but western feminism
also universalizes the violent male counterpart rhetoric, therefore, South Asian men are blatantly
criminalized and presented as oppressive and patriarchal (Chowdhury 2018). The 2013 Rana
Plaza collapse exposed these dichotomies alongside the multiple axes of violence facing
Bangladeshi women who are burdened by corporate and global patriarchy, alongside social and
kinship responsibilities (Chowdhury 2018, 48).
One of my informants, Miah Bhai (bhai means brother in Bangla) shared with me his
memories of the Rana Plaza collapse aftermath and how national players including employers’
organizations like the BGMEA reacted to the globally recognized disaster. These institutions
(BGMEA) verbally represent garments workers on the international front and in meetings with
14

international brands and buyers. However, the BGMEA attempted to hide the magnitude of the
Rana Plaza catastrophe to protect the reputation and liability of western brands by shutting down
the factory collapse site and prohibiting the counting of dead bodies immediately after the
collapse. Nevertheless, local labour activists like Miah Bhai continued counting the bodies until
they reached more than double the number of what the authorities had formally declared.
Saikia’s (2004) case study showed us how women’s voices, roles, and experiences have been
systemically suppressed since the formation of the Bangladeshi nation-state, exposing a
continuity of state-led patriarchal violence that can be traced further back to the era of British
colonialism (Chowdhury 2018). Likewise, the narratives I collected from my informants on their
memories and affiliations with the Bangladeshi garments industry, will emphasize the demands
and voices of gendered workers and the labour activists who are representing them.
Shifting from Past to Modernity: A Brief Statement on the Entry of NGOs and Top-Down
Development in Bangladesh
Following Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in the 1970s, Bangladesh was referred to as
a “bottomless basket” for charity by Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State. The news
depicted Bangladesh as a sob story of hungry and impoverished women and children who
required saving from their unfortunate conditions. Neoliberal market practices induced by
western corporations which sought after the cheap and abundant labour found available in South
Asia, normalized the saviour complex and the ability of quasi-governmental actors including
INGOs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank to enter Bangladesh (Lewis
2019; Karim 2014). These players deployed neoliberal tactics to take over the market and other
governmental responsibilities, such as the provisioning of basic human rights including access to
food, nutrition, education, employment, and health care, for citizens and workers (Lewis 2019;
Karim 2014; Abu-Lughod 2013). Through these neoliberal modes of individualizing sufferings,
struggles, and demands—across race, class, and gender—western corporations came to dominate
the global supply chain and Bangladesh’s economy, employment, and labour movements. In the
2020s, the Bangladeshi government struggles to maintain its relationship with its citizens whilst
quasi-governmental actors deploying Westernized modes of development pervade the region. An
uncertain, anti-democratic, and clouded socioeconomic and political climate faces Bangladeshis
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where workers like the garments factory employees who are producing immense wealth and
value for the industry, have little to no room to claim their rights as full citizens.
By the turn of the century, Bangladesh witnessed a steady GDP growth and substituted its
“underdeveloped” status for a “model” developing nation with two of the largest women-centric
development projects: i) micro-finance and ii) readymade garments (Karim 2014, 54). In the
1980s, the Bangladeshi garments sector began to flourish, offering the world’s cheapest labour
with essentially zero regulation over labour standards (Karim 2014, 54). In addition to the
advertisements for saving third-world women and children, western corporations used this
opportunity to promote the hiring of women garments workers in regions where labour
organizing appeared to be limited, as a lucrative opportunity to accumulate profits (cf. Ong 2007;
Freeman 2000). Meanwhile, millions of Bangladeshis, mainly women, and girls with limited
economic opportunities, started to arrive on the outskirts of Dhaka city in search of factory work.
In the 1990s, the Bangladeshi textile industry reached a critical moment and was condemned for
practicing child labour. Western brands immediately turned all blame onto the country and
displayed a hands-off approach on the matter (Tanjeem 2021; Absar et. Al 1999). In 1992, in
response to the heated criticism facing American brands regarding their tolerance for child
labour, the US government enacted the Child Labor Deterrence Act, also known as the Harkin
Bill (named after Iowa State Senator, Tom Harkin) (Tanjeem 2017; Absar et al. 1999). This bill
prohibited the US government from allowing the import of garments from Bangladeshi factories
that were suspected of practicing child labour (Tanjeem 2017).
As a result, tens of thousands of shishu sromik (child labourers) lost their jobs (Tanjeem
2017; White 1996). Later, a handful of the shishu sromik who had lost their jobs due to the
Harkin Bill were selected by INGOs to address the pejorative conditions of women and children
in developing countries and represent Bangladeshi garments workers globally. Among those
selected to represent Bangladeshi women garments workers were, Kalpona Akter who later
founded the Bangladesh Centre for Workers Solidarity, and Najma Akter, who is the chair of the
Awaj Foundation. Both Najma and Kalpona are globally renowned for their contributions to
women’s liberation in the garments industry. Additionally, they are two of the few women trade
unionists in the country. The question of child labour and the international response to it in the
1990s was thus a moment of rupture that has continued to have a significant impact on labour
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organizing in Bangladesh. As my informants repeatedly noted, certain NGO-associated activists,
many coming from the 1990s era, retain a virtual monopoly over media representation, largescale funding, and more. However, local activists argue that NGOs often publicize policies that
are deemed beneficial by western corporations and governments, rather than listening to
Bangladeshi garments workers themselves. Many of these NGOs were beneficiaries of western
donor groups in the 90s, where the focus was on gender issues; consequently, their agendas are
mainly based on the interests of the donors and their distanced understanding of Bangladeshi
women’s and workers’ obstacles (Karim 2014, 58). Moreover, most NGO activists in
Bangladesh are English-speaking, unlike majority of the garments factory workers, who only
speak in Bengali. This language gap, in addition to other barriers, produces a distance between
those representing and those being represented in the garments industry (Karim 2014). This can
be described as a direct threat to labour organizing, disabling people from different classes from
collaborating on their efforts, resulting in a chain of violence for young women workers in the
supply chain (Karim 2014). By contrast, majority of the local activists organize and mobilize in
Bengali/Bangla. In addition, local labour organizers are keen on engaging in inter-class
solidarity, such that the conditions and demands of Bangladeshi garments workers can be
addressed and prioritized by the players in the supply chain.
In my conversations with local labour organizers, I learned about the fragmented labour
movement in Bangladesh. As activists described it, there are two main types of labour organizing
that can be observed. The initial method of advocacy is based on NGO-affiliated and donorfunded organizations. I collaborated with a few activists who are situated in this way—Saira,
who worked at BRAC’s research division, and Fariha who was an advocate and organizer for
Naripokkho. These NGOs were founded in Bangladesh (rather than outside of it). These activists
are fluent in English and are involved in projects aimed to specifically aid women garments
workers. As Bangladeshi women, Saira and Fariha were familiar with the intricacies of lived
experiences of garments workers and the acute sense of crises that workers endure. Both
community leaders have extensive comprehensive knowledge and critical takeaways on
Bangladesh’s export-led industry, furthermore, many activists shift between working with NGOs
and organizing independently—hence why there exists an overlap in the types of activism that
can be observed. However, the main criticism of NGOs (as an institutional model) made by the
second group of activists, who are mainly independent labour organizers, is that NGOs are
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generally donor-driven and privatized. For example, they provide medical care or education to
communities, including to garments workers, when it should be the responsibility of the
Bangladeshi government to fulfill the rights of its citizens. Additionally, local activists stress that
NGOs are known to lend aid and action following a disaster rather than working on preventative
measures to produce and provide sustainable tools to communities, empowering them to live
independently without donor dependence. Local activists make it their goal to disassociate from
these players, for the most part, and to condemn the (in)actions of state-led actors such as the
Bangladeshi government. Local activists focus instead on demanding increased wages for
workers, so that, workers can live self-sufficiently. While there is some overlap between actors
who are NGO-involved and the local organizers, for the most part, NGOs like BRAC and Awaj
are criticized by other activists for receiving a larger platform than the local activists and for their
ties to the national and foreign governments, corporations, and international donors. Local
advocates are seeking systemic and political changes to centralize the voices of Bangladeshi
garments workers. Multiple local activists claimed that since they mainly speak in Bangla (their
efforts do not translate to other global actors) and refuse to accept funding from western NGOs
such as USAS, the localized labour movement gets subsided and overshadowed by western
modes of development.
Local activists argue that during disaster aftermaths, such as following the Rana Plaza
collapse, workers were intentionally distracted by news and media outlets that chose to fixate on
their tragedies, making workers repeat their tales of loss and grief, keeping them occupied from
organizing their efforts and mobilizing their demands. In 1994, the minimum wage in
Bangladesh was set at $11 per month, which was raised to $67 per month following the Rana
Plaza collapse in 2013, despite the workers’ demand for $100 (all amounts are in USD) (Karim
2014, 54; cf. Perrow 2004). In April 2022, I attended a handful of conferences commemorating
the 9th anniversary of the Rana Plaza collapse, where several Bangladeshi scholars, activists, and
independent labour organizers were present and engaged in discussion. The topic of NGOs doing
the job of the government arose, as people discussed who should be responsible for providing for
workers. At the conference, participants stressed that activists like Najma Akter, and her NGO
Awaj Foundation, were promoting promising and positive efforts in the community. Awaj
Foundation provides free health services to aid garments workers and their families (Awaj
Foundation 2022). However, during the conference economist Anu Muhammad highlighted that
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the government of Bangladesh appears immensely proud of the garments industry in terms of the
revenue it brings in for the nation, yet when it comes time for providing access basic services for
garments workers, the government appears inactive and inattentive. Meanwhile, NGOs are
deemed necessary to fulfill those gaps. NGOs play this buffering character which ultimately
weakens the role of the government in neoliberal economies like the garments sector, attributing
to the slow demise of nation-states (cf. Schuller 2012; Brown 2010; Sassen 2002). This hampers
and disables workers from acquiring their rights as citizens while being curtailed or chained to a
pejorative system or industry that commodifies their labour. Local activists challenge this
abstraction and distancing between Bangladeshi citizens and the government by holding the
state-led players accountable and by reiterating their responsibility over workers.
The different organizing methods I encountered during my fieldwork made it clear that
those who are described as national players by local activists—such as the Bangladeshi
government, the MPs (Ministers of Parliament), the national factory owners and managers, and
third-party players like NGOs and Trade Unions—are devoted to maintaining the Bangladeshi
garments sector largely as it already is. My informant, Fariha, who works with Naripokkho, a
community-based women’s organization dedicated to advancing women’s rights, has done
incredible community-level advocacy for garments workers in Bangladesh. Fariha emphasized
that the crucial matter here is to sustain the Bangladeshi garments industry so that workers can
have jobs. While this is true, this same sentiment is criticized by local activists, who argue that
the fast fashion industry is likely to shift away. Local activists do not simply want to retain the
garments industry as it is; rather, they find it vital to command fair wages and treatment for all
wage workers. Localized activism seeks to provide immediate relief and aid during disasters,
demand justice, raise the minimum wage, and mobilize action to achieve long-term
improvements to Bangladeshi workers’ rights. The goal of local activism is thus quite different.
For local activists, mobilizing means that even if the industry were to shift away to other places
(which is already the case), workers and Bangladeshi citizens can continue to receive their
deserving rights, wages, severance, etc.
In this section, I outlined a few significant characteristics of the Bangladeshi garments
industry that became apparent as I delved into my fieldwork, such as the two different modes of
labour activism that is prevalent in Bangladesh. I will elaborate on this in the next section where
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I will describe my engagement with informants, the local labour organizers on the ground whose
experiences informed my analysis. However, before that, I will name the theorists whose works
shaped my thinking, and the main texts I will be borrowing from to analyze the case of the
neoliberal garments industry that subjugates wage workers; describe the remnants from the
colonial era that still shape the treatment towards racialized and gendered bodies today; and
lastly, present the importance of revitalizing listening local actors and pursuing a grounded
approach to activism. Next, I will describe the methodologies I applied to collect my data which
not only informed my findings but also influenced the way I decided to divide this thesis into
scales that replicate the global supply chain. The informants I spoke with theorized the condition
of the Bangladeshi garments industry from their nuanced perspective and lived experiences as
local labour activists who are fighting for the rights of garments workers. My informants
described the three scales: the global, the national, and the local, and how the various players
from these scales navigate the Bangladeshi garments industry and who ultimately represents the
workers.

1.4. Theoretical Fields – Colonialism, Capitalism, Crisis, and Haunting
In my thesis, I refer to several streams of thought including theories on colonialism, racialization,
and ‘Othering’ (Gayatri Spivak; Chandra Mohanty; Edward Said; Dipesh Chakrabarty) that are
the root of violations facing Bangladeshi garments workers; global capitalism, neoliberalism, and
uneven geographic development by David Harvey (2006) and Mark Anner’s (2019) theory of
western corporation’s spatializing techniques that promote ‘price and source squeezing’ to
accumulate the highest profits while maintaining a distance between the consumer and producer.
The theory of state formation, citizenship, and post-coloniality by Wendy Brown (2010), Saskia
Sassen (2002), and Gupta and Ferguson (2004), will be applied to analyze the role of the
Bangladeshi national players and the Government to scrutinize the positionality of post-colonial
states in maintaining their ends of the global supply chain. The condition of gendered and uneven
distribution of labour by Carla Freeman (2000) and Aihwa Ong’s (2007) theory on the neoliberal
supply chain that is used to manipulate labour in smaller economies will be applied to address
the discriminatory treatments facing workers in this gendered economy. As I get closer to the
ground, I will refer to the works of scholars who are familiar with the condition of Bangladeshi
peoples, wage workers, and women labourers in the apparel industry such as Dina Siddiqi (2009;
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2015), Nafisa Tanjeem (2017; 2021), Youbin Kang (2021), and Elora Chowdhury (2018); and
the materiality of INGO domination and western saviour complex as observable in Bangladesh
by David Lewis (2019). Additionally, as mentioned earlier, I will refer to the theories of Chloe
Ahmann (2018) where she highlights that moments of crisis can cause rupture to the routinely
forms of struggles facing subjugated communities, and both local activists and other (capitalist)
institutions can use those moments to their advantage to further their agendas. These moments of
crisis can include events such as the Rana Plaza collapse or the COVID-19 pandemic and its
effects on workers in the garments supply chain. Continuing with this idea of crisis, I will refer
to Greg Beckett’s (2020) theory on disasters and ordinary violence, and the concept of “normal
accidents” by Charles Perrow (2004) to disclose that these struggles facing subjugated gendered
workers in the garments industry continue beyond ruptured moments. Lastly, to analyze this
complex system, I will refer to some historical moments of crises that have faced the global
garments industry within and outside of Bangladesh. In doing so, I will interrogate the
similarities in the forms of violence facing Bangladeshi garments workers in the twenty-first
century, which resemble what Katie Kilroy-Marac calls “colonial haunting,” where the struggles
that faced native inhabitants during the colonial era resonate with the forms of ongoing violence
facing the regions and its peoples today (Kilroy-Marac 2018). Bangladeshi apparel workers
regularly confront layers of gendered, racialized, and classist violence, despite so, millions of
workers continue to be employed in garments factories. To answer why this is the case, Chapter
Two—The Global, will address the limitations of a top-down, western-centric approach, that
refuses to ‘listen’ to garments workers and their demands to maintain hierarchies between
corporations and global wage workers (cf. McGranahan 2018). In this thesis, I argue that we
cannot fully theorize the condition of labour in the garments industry from the global
perspective. The Bangladeshi labour moment has been suppressed for several decades while
garments workers are prohibited by their employers from speaking up or demanding their rights.
The state-led players proceed with violence attempting to silence workers and activists from
mobilizing their agendas. Local Bangladeshi labour organizers assemble their efforts to uphold
the rights of the wage workers who are being subjugated, often by risking their lives. Yet the
contributions of local actors receive limited national or international attention. By contrast,
throughout this thesis I will emphasize the voices, memories, experiences, and demands of local
labour activists who are representing Bangladeshi sromik. Localized activism advocates for the
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fulfillment of rights for all citizens, including garments workers, who deserve a rightful wage,
safe working conditions, the ability to afford living costs, and to receive equitable compensation
for any loss or trauma endured from working in factories. Therefore, by centering the localized
sromik andolon (labour movement) I argue that we get a better understanding of the experience
of garments workers and of the necessary changes to this capitalist industry that repeatedly
places workers in vulnerable circumstances. Now I turn to the next section in this chapter, where
I describe the methodologies that I applied to collect primary data for the thesis.

1.5. Methodologies
Initially, when I began this research, I aimed to travel to Bangladesh and interview Bangladeshi
garments workers and NGO groups to collect their accounts of the fast-fashion and garments
supply chain. I intended to connect with a handful of activists whose names are popularly
known, globally celebrated, and formally associated with garments activism in Bangladesh, such
as the Bangladesh Centre for Workers Solidarity (BCWS) led by Kalpona Akter, and the AWAJ
Foundation led by Najma Akter. While it would have been a great privilege for me to connect
with these NGOs, due to the unexpected challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I was
unable to conduct my research in such a way. Unfortunately, I was unable to travel to
Bangladesh to conduct fieldwork or conduct my research as I had initially imagined.
Nevertheless, soon, a colleague from my department placed me in touch with a
Bangladeshi scholar and labour activist who is differently situated than the former groups of
organizers I just mentioned. In a phone call, anthropologist, and advocate Saydia Gulrukh,
provided me with a synopsis of the Bangladeshi garments industry and the labour movement
from her unique standpoint. Gulrukh highlighted the ongoing issues workers were facing at the
time of our conversation in April 2021. She mentioned that the garments workers in Bangladesh
were the only active participants producing for the economy at the time—amidst strict pandemic
lockdowns. Furthermore, workers were demanding a proper break for the upcoming Eid-Ul-Fitr
festival, to avoid taking unsafe hazardous travel routes when they head back to their villages to
see their families. However, these demands were not fulfilled. According to Gulrukh, union
representatives soon announced that early dispersals would not be provided, thereby, forcing
workers to pursue riskier modes of travel. Later, Gulrukh provided me with a contact list of
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people who are well versed and knowledgeable about the Bangladeshi garments industry and
labour activism from a local point of view. This encounter snowballed into eleven interviews,
fifteen Zoom calls, dozens of hours of virtual participant observation, hundreds of hours of data
compilation and transcription, and overall, a critical awareness of localized activism in the face
of global capitalism. I will be using pseudonyms to replace the names of my informants and any
institution or organization that they may be affiliated with, to ensure their privacy.
I conducted a dozen semi-structured interviews between August-October 2021. The
criteria for participants included anyone who self-identified as an activist, advocate, or labour
organizer, and had any familiarity with the fast fashion industry, specifically in Bangladesh. I
had the opportunity to speak with scholars, academicians, labour activists, local organizers, NGO
workers, entrepreneurs, and more. The interviews were conducted online using Western
University’s Zoom platform and lasted between thirty minutes to an hour. During this time the
participants and I engaged in critical discussions regarding the condition of work for Bangladeshi
garments workers.
In this thesis, I will present the narratives and stories shared by my informants, most of
whom were locally situated and present during and following the multiple cases of disasters that
effected the Bangladeshi garments industry, such as the 2012 Tazreen Factory fire, the 2013
Rana Plaza collapse, and others. Miah Bhai, Onik, Salma Apa (apa translates to sister in
Bengali), to name a few, were involved in the formation of a key activism group in Bangladesh,
whom I call the Sromik Sheba (Labour Care) team. The Sromik Sheba group was made up of
Bangladeshis who were passionate about achieving labour rights in the country, they came from
varying professions in academia, anthropology, advocacy, politics, and more, and most had
careers beyond labour organizing. The team was formed following the Rana Plaza collapse
where the members conjoined their efforts and worked tirelessly and continuously for six months
to provide aid and relief to the victims of the disaster. Some of these same individuals worked on
relief projects following the Tazreen Factory fire, the Tuba crisis, and other industrial disasters.
Taslima Akhter, Rehnuma Ahmed, Moshrefa Mishu, Saydia Gulrukh, and Shabujul Islam, to
name a few, are the activists behind the revolutionary efforts formulated by Sromik Sheba. These
names may be recognizable to those familiar with Bangladesh’s sromik on the ground. The
efforts forwarded by the Sromik Sheba team following the Rana Plaza collapse was a key event
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that many of my informants referred to during their interviews, alongside a few other key
moments and disasters that lingered in their memories. Furthermore, I learned that local activists
are highly vigilant and aware of the forms of violence and mistreatments that face average wage
workers, and what their demands are. Locals are cautious of national players and transnational
corporations looking to accumulate wealth at the expense of the worker. Local activists continue
with their agendas mindfully, to increase the national minimum wage and provide better rights to
workers while they are at their jobs, thereby, challenging the state and promoting workers’ rights
and well-being. In this thesis, the local activists in Bangladesh who are attentive to the needs of
Bangladeshi garments sromik and seek to find opportunities that will promote independence for
labourers, are the main theorists of global capitalism and its influence upon the lives of average
wage labourers in developing regions.
Chapters and Scales: The Global, The National, and the Local
Throughout my research, local activists repeatedly pointed out the visible scales and gaps that
are apparent in the garments industry. While there are dozens of players in the garments supply
chain, only a few of them have the privilege to jump scales. These scales were described like this
to me: at the top of the chain, in the global, there are transnational corporations who are the main
beneficiaries of the wealth produced by the sector and are known to promote distractions in the
supply chain (such as producing western policies, introducing NGO-led development, circulating
imageries that promote the saviour complex on the news and media, and more) in their search for
the cheapest labour. While there are several locally led NGOs that are doing incredible work to
produce knowledge and provide resources to garments workers, local organizers are skeptical
that NGOs can bring any long-term improvement in the lives of workers, considering how their
agendas are generally scripted by western actors. Secondly, there are national players, which in
this case includes the Bangladeshi government, the factory owners, and subcontractors. These
actors are profiting from the industry, although their profits pale in comparison to the enormous
amounts of wealth that western corporations are accumulating. Nevertheless, the national players
in Bangladesh want to maintain the garments industry and see it thrive, because for them it
contributes to the country’s GDP, which ultimately fills the pockets of only a handful of people.
Many NGO-led activists share this sentiment of needing to retain the garments industry in
Bangladesh at any cost, in order to provide jobs to workers. However, local labour activists argue
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that providing jobs to people is not the same as fulfilling their rights. Thus, local activists
criticize state-led players’ devotion to maintaining the garments industry as it is, rather than
paying rightful wages to workers, giving them breaks during work, and paying them severance
when they get fired. Additionally, certain players in the industry, such as NGO activists, can
jump scales and thus they play a significant role in maintaining neoliberal, export-led economies
(Lewis 2019). NGOs are heavily criticized by local activists for promoting westernized modes of
development that have limited translation in the lives of Bangladeshi garments sromik. Similarly,
trade unions are criticized by Bangladeshi activists for being male dominated while representing
the garments industry, which has historically employed mainly women and girls. The few
women trade unionists in the country, such as Kalpona Akter, are platformed for their affiliation
with western institutions such as INGOs. Western-funded, English-speaking activists are also
highly criticized by local labour organizers, who argue that NGO-based actors tend to
misrepresent the needs and demands of Bangladeshi garments workers on the national and global
front. Lastly, and the most important scale that I will emphasize in this thesis, is the local. The
local is where the Bangladeshi garments workers and labour activists are situated. These
individuals are highly vigilant and critically aware of the ins and outs of the garments industry,
what it feels like to be a wage worker in the 2020s, and what would help improve the lives of
garments sromik. This thesis is an attempt to listen to and learn from them.
Following large-scale disasters such as the Rana Plaza collapse, western brands and
governments produced policies like the ACCORD and the Alliance, which were meant to
promote safer work environments for garments employees. However, locals described these
policies to be weak and inept. My informant, Maisha, highlighted that most of the local political
labour organizers in Bangladesh ‘refuse’ (cf. Simpson 2007) to accept funding from or
affiliations with the NGO model. This is because accepting funding generally leads their agendas
to get overwritten., as NGOs steer advocates to promote those same westernized policies that
display zero improvements in the lives of Bangladeshi garments workers. Consequently, local
activists accept their status of receiving less limelight than the activists who are NGO-affiliated
and receive large-scale funding and global attention. Nevertheless, when it comes to disaster
aftermaths or in ordinary moments of violence facing Bangladeshi wage workers, it is the local
labour activists who are seen organizing and standing alongside workers and demanding fair
wages and treatment.
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These scales—the global, the national, and the local—represent the distance between the
consumers and the producers in the global garments sector. At the bottom of the chain, at the
local level, we find the garments workers and labour activists, the true producers of value and
wealth in this economy. The closer we get to the ground, the more nuanced the narratives
become in theorizing the conditions of exploitative wage work and the gendering in the global
supply chain. The chapters in this thesis exposes this distancing and ‘othering’ of workers and
uses moments of rupture and crisis to make visible the layers of social, economic, racial, and
gendered, discrimination facing Bangladeshi garments workers in the 2020s. Chapter Two: The
Global, will address the international relocating of the garments industry over several decades,
outlining the forms of precarity and vulnerability that became apparent as this capitalist industry
shifted time and time again, to acquire the cheapest labour. Additionally, when any disaster
transpired in the industry, the responses from international players in the supply chain, including
brands, and western governments, followed a top-down hands-off approach, producing abstract
policies that had limited significance to the lives of the workers on the ground. The reason the
responsibility of international brands and North American buyers got overshadowed could be
due to their abstract approaches—they tend to feel out of reach from national and local players.
The data I have collected (both contemporary and archival) suggests that international brands
and buyers are annually cutting costs of production and seeking cheaper sources of labour—a
phenomenon called ‘price squeezing’ (Anner 2019). The site of producing the bulk of global
readymade garments and fast fashion has changed several times, as American corporations
shifted their extraction of labour from local factories in the US, to Mexico, then to Bangladesh,
Vietnam, China, and others. The industry will likely shift away once again attaining even
cheaper sources of labour for western corporations to accumulate wealth. However, it is essential
to consider the compelling case of the Bangladeshi industry, to recognize the efforts of
Bangladeshi players in maintaining this industry despite major threats of losing the economy.
Furthermore, by shifting away from the globalized perspective where the consideration toward
garments workers’ lives is rather abstract and commodified, I will emphasize the desperate need
to fulfill the rights of labourers within the national realm by listening to local demands.
In Chapter Three: The National, I will address the roles and responsibilities of the
Bangladeshi national players who are involved in maintaining the garments industry. These
players include the Government of Bangladesh, employers’ organizations like the BGMEA and
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Bangladesh Exporters Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA), subcontractors, national factory
owners, and factory supervisors. Most of these players are beneficiaries of the Bangladeshi
garments industry, therefore, deem it essential to maintain the industry by any means. National
players like the Government of Bangladesh are embodying the limited capability of neoliberal
states as they are mainly controlled by the movement of capital that is dominated entirely by
corporations (Tanjeem 2017; cf. Ong 2007; Harvey 2006; Sassen 2008; Graeber 2001).
Transnational economies like the garments industry surpass any national authority, placing wage
workers in ‘precarious’ conditions where their human, labour, and gender rights are challenged
(cf. Standing 2014). Meanwhile, NGOs and other external players are introduced and relied upon
to fulfill those gaps between the citizens and the state. Hence why it is mandatory to turn to
Chapter Four: The Local, which will disclose my ethnographic findings as I connected with local
labour activists in Bangladesh to learn their narratives.
In Chapter Four: The Local, I will elaborate on what I learned by engaging with local
garments activists, scholars, and labour organizers. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic
exposed various layers of injustices that garments workers endure and combat, such as; garments
workers’ inadequate access to healthcare or vaccines; the premature reopening of the garments
factories with improper social distancing regulations while the rest of the country was in
lockdown; the expectation for workers to pursue overcrowded transport routes to and from work;
the ongoing burdens of the double shift facing women employees; demands of overpacking
orders while working overtime, and much more (Leach 2022; Hoskins 2022; Sarker 2020).
Garments workers in Bangladesh are facing double subjugation through the gendering and
racialization of populations in post-colonial states and their employment in capitalist industries
that enable corporations to profit through exploitation and domination of the working classes (cf.
Ong 2007; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Freeman 2000). Women garments workers in the
Bangladeshi industry are placed in vulnerable situations (Chowdhury 2018; Siddiqi 2015), and as
observed, these matters become excruciating during ‘moments of crisis’ like the coronavirus
pandemic as described above (cf. Beckett 2019; Ahmann 2018). Women and girls employed in
Bangladeshi garments factories are struggling to make ends meet—most of them are suffering
from hunger, starvation, and poverty, while also struggling to feed their families and children
(Kabir et al 2020; Chowdhury 2018; Karim 2014). The key takeaway from my fieldwork and
findings highlights that for activists and organizers in Bangladesh, such as the Sromik Sheba
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team, the local labour movement is pivotal as it provides a basis for collective action, bargaining,
organizing, and support in moments of crisis for Bangladeshi workers. Meanwhile, garments
workers are forbidden by their factory supervisors and managers from speaking up about their
rights and participating in unions. Because of these constraints, local activists are a key voice for
workers who receive little to no room for political organizing. Local committees and independent
political labour organizers like Sromik Sheba, mobilize during and following moments of crisis
to defend against structural violence, thereby producing room for political organizing that is not
only about higher wages and improved working conditions for workers. Rather, local labour
organizing summons the possibility for people to negotiate, confer, work towards, and claim
their rights as citizens and raise awareness on these matters before the nation-state and
transnational corporations through inter-class solidarity and advancement of workers’ rights.
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Chapter Two:
Supply Chain Capitalism and Corporate Social Responsibility –
Continuing my Conversation with Saira about Crisis
The global garments industry has witnessed several shifts and changes over the years. For the
Bangladeshi garments sector, more particularly for the workers, the major conflicts challenging
their condition are the fragmented labour movement and the prolonged limitations to
transnational labour organizing (Kang 2021). Saira worked for BRAC (a renowned microfinance
concentrated NGO and international development agency) as a leading research expert on the
sustainability of Bangladeshi women’s economic rights, including within the garments sector.
Saira and I engaged in a critical discussion during fall 2021, few months before the world
entered another global recession in 2022, where she mentioned that the international economic
condition drastically influenced all aspects of the industry—and to simply demand “systemic
change” is wishful thinking. Throughout the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic, and in
response to the piling challenges facing the national garments sector and Bangladeshi factory
workers, locally, people placed one-sided pressure on the national garments factory owners to
take accountability. However, according to Saira and other scholars in the field, the entire
responsibility cannot be placed solely upon Bangladeshi national players. European and North
American brands and their buyers have an enormous responsibility for this supply chain. Saira
suggested that we must think collectively in configuring the responsibility of brands and the
buyers that represent them. To gain greater insight into how the garments supply chain functions,
it became crucial to analyze the roles of the actors who are differently situated in maintaining the
global supply. Therefore, in this chapter, I will begin by identifying and scrutinizing the roles
and responsibilities of a handful of key international players such as transnational corporations,
brands, and buyers, western governments, International Governmental Organizations (IGOs)
such as the IMF and World Bank, and lastly, INGOs. Certain players such as NGO groups and
trade unionists can be observed jumping between scales more freely, unlike others, depicting a
that certain actors have more rights and say over the conditions in the industry than others.
Additionally, I will emphasize that certain moments of crises and disasters can be identified as
definitive events in the garments industry that shaped the upcoming shifts, movements, and
negotiations that came to impact and define the lives of ordinary workers in the Bangladeshi
garments factories. I will identify how these responses during and after moments of disaster
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ultimately had limited positive influence on the lives of Bangladeshi garments workers and were
not considerate of their conditions, placing them in further vulnerable positions within the
garments supply chain and labour industry. Global players’ responses to crises are defined as
intangible and lacking translation, according to local activists. These negotiations made by
international players do not cogitate the conditions of workers. Thus, it is mandatory to pursue a
more niche approach to identifying labour demands and how to effectively attend to their rights.
My conversation with Saira further informed me about the ongoing gaps in planning and
implementation between various players in the readymade garments sector—the international
brands, western governments, IGOs, NGOs, garments factory owners, trade unionists, the
Government of Bangladesh, and finally, garments workers and the local activists who represent
their demands. The forms of ‘ordinary violence’ such as joblessness, unstable work conditions,
poverty, gender discrimination, unpaid wages, and more—are not novel phenomena; workers in
the global supply chain are familiar with these conditions. The ‘normalization’ of ‘ordinary
violence’ facing wage workers in the Global South is a result of neoliberal economic structuring
that involves ‘spatializing techniques,’ where the transnational business model is deployed by
global western corporations and international buyers (Tanjeem 2021; Kang 2021; cf. Beckett
2020; Ahmann 2018; Ong 2007; Perrow 2004; Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
The year 2022 marked the 111th anniversary of the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire in
Manhattan, NY, which resulted in 146 garments worker fatalities (Cornell University Industrial
and Labor Relations School 2018). This case has become a touchstone for thinking about how
unethical labour practices are often key factors in industrial disasters because they can lead to
“normal accidents” (Perrow 2004). It is also an interesting case for revealing the long history of
how factory owners (and capitalism more broadly) use disasters as opportunities to expand
capital accumulation—in this case, by relocating their factories to regions that have less
oversight or regulations and cheaper labour costs (in this case, to the West Coast, but in later
instances, the garments sector has repeatedly relocated to other countries). In the early 20th
century, at the time of the Triangle Shirtwaist fire, majority of the garments purchased by North
Americans were produced locally. Yet, by the mid-20th century, those market practices had
significantly shifted, as the garments sector moved to new and cheaper sites of production in the
Global South. In this sense, the contemporary garments sector has emerged through the same
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processes that have given rise to the most recent era of globalization under neoliberalism (see
Harvey 2006). The global garments sector, like global capitalism in general, has thus been
defined by a rapid increase in demand for cheap and replaceable labour and the neoliberal
transformation of the state. As Saskia Sassen (2007) has noted, the latter has led to the
denationalization of territories and the rights of citizens.
Throughout this period of the globalization of the garments sector, the key productive
sites for the industry have repeatedly shifted, moving from country to country, to permit
transnational corporations to acquire cost cutting measures by exploiting labour in
geographically distant regions where the opportunity to unionize is prohibited, enabling brands
to avoid taking responsibility over workers (Tanjeem 2017). Furthermore, through these spatial
techniques, brands sought to avoid any backlash coming from consumers and citizens regarding
unethical labour practices, as well as for the capitalist disasters that transpire, such as factory
collapses and fires that immediately affect and haunt factory workers (Anner 2019; cf. Klein
2007). In the last two decades since the industry settled in the outskirts of Dhaka, Bangladesh,
garments factories have witnessed countless disasters and workplace crisis. Bangladeshi
garments workers are placed in vulnerable working conditions where the profitability of
capitalist brands is distinguished as more valuable than the lives of wage workers who produce
for the economy (Ahmed, Tanjeem, et al. 2020). The 2013 Rana Plaza collapse garnered media
attention across the globe as well, and it came to be known as one of the largest industrial
disasters in the twenty-first century. The event appeared in the media as a capitalist scandal that
exposed the corrupt practices led by western corporations which violate human rights, and this
heightened the harsh criticisms facing Euromerican brands and international governments
regarding their transnational labour regulations (Tanjeem 2017, 45).
Chloe Ahmann (2018, 144) argues that a crisis is a privileged “moment of rupture” that
calls for attention and brings contradictions to light. As scholars continue investigating the
normalization of these axes of violence that racialized, gendered, and economically subjugated
groups face, the COVID-19 pandemic functioned as a punctuated ‘moment of crisis’ that gave
insight into the normalcy of the forms of inequality, precarity, and structural violence that global
wage workers routinely encounter (cf. Ahmann 2018; Perrow 2004). Additionally, the frequency
of these forms of violence such as joblessness, wage issues, inflation, discrimination, inadequate
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health care, etc. depicts the ‘ordinariness’ of exploitation against women of color (Chowdhury
2018; Karim 2014; Siddiqi 2009; cf. Beckett 2020; Ahmann 2018, 144). In the next section, I
will present a historical analysis of the shifts and movements as observable across the global
transnational garments industry—these moments of rupture both enabled and challenged the
normalcy of violence facing those garments workers who are producing clothes for western
closets (cf. Ahmann 2018; Perrow 2004).

2.1. The Historical Relocation of the Transnational Garments Industry:
Not in My Backyard—It is Cheaper Over There!
The ready-made garments industry is a multi-trillion-dollar business sector. Over the last few
decades, the industry has witnessed rapid changes at distinct levels, including in production
strategies, consumerism, and business models. The industry is dominated by European and
American Transnational Corporations (Tanjeem, 2017). These corporations and their associated
brands seek ‘network capitalism’ where various transnational players are involved in maintaining
the economy (Wills and Hale 2005 in Tanjeem, 2017, 37). Euro-American corporations promote
neoliberalism and practice lucrative tactics such as relocating to cheaper sites of labour to lure in
smaller economies (Anner 2019; Tanjeem 2017; cf. Ong 2007). Corporations tend to own
multiple brands and businesses, meanwhile, buyers represent the brands on the global front.
These corporations intervene in the Least Developed Countries with the ideas of building new
economies and providing jobs to those who were formally excluded from wage work such as
women and girls from lower classes (Lewis 2019; cf. Freeman 2000). The recruiting of garments
workers is generally targeted at racialized and gendered groups who are identified as ‘illiterate’
and ‘unskilled,’ (Karim 2014), which allows corporations to ‘sell’ employment in garments
factories as a promising and progressive move for governments of Least Developed Countries
(cf. Ong 2007; Harvey 2006). Additionally, bringing garments sector jobs to developing
countries is often marketed as a benevolent act on part of international corporations and their
brands. Nevertheless, fundamentally brands are seeking competitive, cheap, and replaceable
labour supplies from distant geographic locations (Tanjeem 2017, 37; cf. Ong 2007; Freeman
2000). In the 2020s, China and Bangladesh hold the titles of being the largest global exporters of
clothing, whilst Vietnam, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Cambodia, and others, remain competitive
producers of readymade garments. The geographic location of garments factories in lesser
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developed countries and post-colonial states permits the extraction of cheap and replaceable
labour from workers who are considered ‘unskilled’ and lacking literacy or unionizing capacity
(Prentice 2021; Kang 2021; Lewis 2019; Ong 2007; Harvey 2006).
The key feature of the garments industry is its transnational business model that grants
brands the ability to shift their site of production to even cheaper sources of labour with little to
no oversight or accountability (Kang 2021; Tanjeem 2017). In a neoliberal economy, those with
bigger pockets control the political and economic negotiations; similarly, in the apparel
industry—transnational companies like GAP, H&M, and SHEIN, can control where and how
capital flows, and when it stops. Since the 1970s, the Government of Bangladesh has pursued
various neoliberal economic tactics to attract foreign economic relations. In Marxist
anthropology, to understand any society it is suggested that we must investigate how that society
reproduces to sustain itself (Graeber 2001, 24). In a capitalist economy, one can analyze a
society’s inequalities and forms of exploitation by tracing the state and ‘capital,’ as there is a
ruling class that maintains coercion to extract surplus from those who do most of the productive
work (Graeber 2001, 24). Whereas the Bangladeshi garments industry follows a neoliberal
market approach that promotes a mode of governing where the state is responsible for preserving
capitalism within the region (cf. Harvey 2006)—thereby, the Government of Bangladesh is
compelled to compete for and remain in coerced economic relations with Euro-American brands.
Furthermore, by doing so, the Bangladeshi government performs a mediating role between local
labour markets and global capital. The ruling class in the neoliberal Bangladeshi state is
protected by western capital, meanwhile, the national sphere accommodates free-market
practices, evasion of taxes, reduction of tariffs, and other such barriers for international brands.
Thereby, safeguarding the flow of economic relations and accumulation of wealth for a select
few players in the supply chain. I will analyze the role of the key national players more closely in
Chapter Three, however, in this chapter, it is significant to continue examining the roles of the
international players in the chain.
While the brands are receiving tax exemptions and competitive labour costs from
various post-colonial countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Vietnam, new modes of
control and subjectivity are introduced by the neoliberal national states to repress workers’ rights
and accommodate the western corporations’ demand for cheapest and replaceable labour (Anner
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2019). Bangladeshi garments workers are often depicted in masses (like other generic
representations of Global South women), especially following a disaster when thousands of
people might be framed only through their collective suffering. Local activists argue that this
form of misrepresentation erases the individuality of the worker, their struggles, and their
demands. Additionally, these distorted images inform the sorts of oversimplifications that are
produced in media and on the news about garments workers who are described as “unskilled”
(Karim 2014), yet, fulfilling most of the productive work in the supply chain. Furthermore, the
transnational business model enables this dominance over workers’ rights and representations
while brands continue shifting toward further deregulated locations to secure the extraction of
the cheapest sources of labour (Prentice 2021; Tanjeem 2017; Ong 2007; Harvey 2006; Tsing
1994).
The current situation of the garments industry has a history and I want to address a few
significant moments in the historical development of the global readymade apparel sector over
the last century, to highlight certain patterns that became apparent and to connect them to the
case of Bangladesh to situate it within the larger, global history. In the next section, I will
address the movements and relocations of the readymade industry from place to place, and the
worsening occupational risks that can be observed by analyzing the forms of ‘crisis’ facing
garments workers (cf. Ahmann 2018).
Factories in the Global: Sweatshops, Relocations, and the Top-Down Mediation
As noted above, one place to begin the history of the current readymade garments sector is with
the case of one of the most infamous disasters in the industry, that made global news headlines
and received backlash for labour mistreatment. In 1911, the Triangle Shirtwaist factory caught
on fire in New York City (Prentice and De Neve 2017; Cords 2022; Liebhold 2018; Akter 2014;
McEvoy 1995). The exit routes in the factory were locked and jammed, leaving limited
emergency escapes for workers, posing them with inescapable and life-threatening challenges
(Liebhold 2018). The fire resulted in nearly 150 casualties for garments factory workers, most of
whom were young migrant women (Liebhold 2018). This key characteristic of hiring young
migrant women was definitive of the unethical practices and commodification of low class,
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racialized women’s labour, and it continues to be a defining characteristic of the garments
industry today.
The Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire caused a social awakening amongst Americans and
brought about changes to the state’s labour rights and regulations. However, these new
regulations were deemed ‘too costly’ by factory owners who responded instead by moving
production to the West Coast (Akter 2014). The Triangle Shirtwaist ‘incident’ became a classic
example of industrial disasters and an early encounter of what is possible through global
capitalism—the tendency for an industry to relocate its factories to lesser audited manufacturing
locations to evade environmental and labour regulations (Anner 2019; Prentice and De Neve
2017). Additionally, the 1911 disaster became a touchstone case for disaster capitalism, and it
resonates with the forms of normalcy of factory collapses, fires, and other avoidable “accidents”
(cf. Klein 2007; Perrow 2004). By the mid-20th century, the rising costs of factory regulations
imposed by the US government threatened corporate profits, consequently, the garments
factories relocated once again and this time to neighbouring Mexico (Akter 2014).
The relocating of garments factories to Mexico increased steadily from the 1960s
onward, resulting in the appearance of the ‘maquiladora system’ across the United States-Mexico
border (Domínguez et al. 2010). In 1994, Canada, Mexico, and the United States signed the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—a multilateral trading policy that made it
easier for North American corporations to relocate operations to Mexico to take advantage of
lower labour costs and to avoid millions of dollars in taxes and tariffs (cf. Ong 2007; Freeman
2000). Furthermore, while this negotiation allowed Mexico to attract foreign investment, it came
at a much larger, unspoken cost. Hundreds of export processing zones (EPZs) appeared near the
border over the next few decades—fostering an economic boom due to the neoliberal export-led
business strategy practiced by the Mexican government (Domínguez et al. 2010). EPZs are
typically located on the outskirts of towns where the extraction of cheap labour is easier to
enforce due to the lack of auditing or oversight, in addition to the absence of unions (Neveling
2015; Domínguez et al. 2010). In Chapter Three, I will return to discuss the relevance of EPZs in
the case of Bangladesh, where I will present a third factor that gets utilized by the Bangladeshi
state to ensure the maintenance of its lucrative economic functions, that is the role of
subcontractors. As for the case of the Mexican readymade garments industry—as experts had
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predicted, the early 2000s financial crisis facing Mexico and the enforcement of labour laws
were deemed too costly, thereby provoking corporations to move again, this time to Asia, where
a number of countries were seeking global capital investment by offering low labour costs and
cheap production sites. And so, the garments industry moved once again, securing even cheaper
labour sources. This time, one of those enticing sites was discovered outside of Dhaka,
Bangladesh (Akter 2014).
There are similarities between the two countries—Mexico and Bangladesh—including
their literacy rates, gross domestic product, human development index, and the hiring of
gendered and racialized workers (Domínguez et al. 2010). However, maquiladoras in cities like
Tijuana in the 1990s operated under quite a different sociopolitical climate than present-day
Dhaka (Domínguez et al. 2010). The garments/textile industry in Bangladesh is more dispersed
and volatile for workers, meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government and other state players are
determined to maintain the economy to accumulate national profit. In her book, Neoliberalism as
Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, based on an ethnographic analysis of a
handful of East-Asian countries, Aihwa Ong (2007), critiqued the market practices pursued by
neoliberal economies and argued that western corporations enter smaller economies to dominate
their labour markets and acquire cheap and replaceable labour. Corporations arrive to promote
opportunities for growth and employment for populations who were formally disengaged from
the economy, specifically targeting women and girls (Ong 2007; Freeman 2000). Meanwhile,
those workers become the ‘exception to neoliberalism’ as their rights as citizens in their current
state get revoked while they are working in volatile conditions in the global sweatshops,
producing for western corporations that deem them ‘unskilled’ and replaceable (Ong 2007;
Karim 2014). As I will soon reveal, this is particularly relevant to the case of the Bangladeshi
garments industry where transnational corporations entered by initially promoting ideas of
modernity and offering factory jobs to unskilled informal workers. However, rather than building
a stable local economy, the neoliberal model of export-led development restricted sustainable
development from materializing in Bangladesh, alike other post-colonial regions (Tanjeem
2017).
The global supply chain is heavily influenced by international relations and global
economic structures, as my informant Saira had disclosed. The enlistment of China and Vietnam
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to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and 2007 increased competition among
garments suppliers (Anner 2019, 4). Consequently, this increased power asymmetries between
brands, factory owners, and workers and symbolized the three scattered and displaced scales
within the industry: the global, national, and local (Anner 2019, 4). Since certain countries could
not cut enough costs, the economy relocated several times, such as in the case of Mexico, and
other states like the Dominican Republic, where thousands of maquilas were left stranded and
workers turned jobless overnight (Anner 2019, 5). This continued relocating of the factories,
leaving behind trails of unrecognized voices of workers who were violated by other global
supply chain players, exposes the sense of “haunting” that is prevalent across the apparel supply
chain (cf. Kilroy-Marac 2018).
The global corporations, Western governments, NGOs, development practitioners, and
other globally situated players promote the neoliberal model of export-led production as an
opportunity to develop national economies, and they claim that the industry will modernize the
access to employment for informal workers (cf. Ong 2007; Freeman 2000). The garments
industry is an assemblage with various powerholders and in this capitalist sector, major
corporations such as Walmart have the capacity to constitute economic, political, and social
changes transnationally, exposing power imbalances between developing economies and western
corporations (Anner 2019, 3). Through the maintenance of these global economies as mandated
by corporations, western brands and governments can accumulate exceptional rates of profit
(Ong 2007), meanwhile, the normalcy of violence and forms of accidents facing garments
workers in the global supply chain continue to increase (cf. Perrow 2004).
Continuing Factory Relocations: Fewer Labour Regulations and Higher Corporate Profits
In this section, I will examine how the garments industry came to settle in Bangladesh more than
three decades ago, following several relocations, and has since received recognition for being the
second largest exporter of fast fashion. Furthermore, I will address the general social, cultural,
and political conditions and climates in Bangladesh that have made factory disasters possible and
‘normalized’ (cf. Perrow 2004), subsequently, I will analyze how these events led garments
workers into further vulnerable conditions. This will be followed by a critical case study of the
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Rana Plaza collapse that transpired in 2013 in Savar, Bangladesh which is a touchstone event
that is heavily critiqued and remembered by the local labour activists and scholars.
Mark Anner (2019), Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University,
argued that IGOs such as the ILO and the World Bank only recently began acknowledging the
hierarchies between international brands and post-colonial economies such as Bangladesh.
Transnational corporations are assured exponential growth in profit margins while average
retailers without at least a few billion dollars in the bank simply cannot compete against Google,
Amazon, or Walmart (Anner 2019, 3). Subsequently, there is a visible rise in larger mergers and
fewer corporate competitors (Anner 2019). Nevertheless, competition exists elsewhere, between
manufacturers in post-colonial nation-states who are interested in attracting those global brands
and their buyers (Anner 2019; cf. Sassen 2008; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Therefore, the
success of western corporations is synonymous with the decreasing wages being offered and the
increased levels of exploitation facing garments workers in post-colonial states (Anner 2019, 3).
With advancements in ‘trade rules’ power imbalance is increased between global supply chain
players in the global, national, and local arena, meanwhile these scattered scales result in ‘price
squeezing’ and ‘source squeezing’ by brands (Anner 2019, 5). Source squeezing allows
corporations to give shorter notices for changing orders (Anner 2019) as observed during the
COVID-19 pandemic with the quick cutbacks on orders by brands like H&M which resulted in
joblessness and unpaid wages for marginalized workers (Antara and Sultan 2021; Tanjeem 2021;
Sarker 2020). In the global garments industry today, the pace of fast-fashion markets and the
quick turnover in the number of clothing designs means that the pressure falls on factory workers
to work faster and to over-produce with shorter deadlines and interrupted wages (Tanjeem 2021;
Anner 2019, 6).
These systemic issues in the global readymade garments industry have specific effects in
Bangladesh, where many factories are unable to keep up with global demand, even with a 70hour work week. As a result, many textile factories have turned to using subcontractors to fill
orders (Tanjeem 2021; Anner 2019; Tanjeem 2017). Conditions in subcontracted factories are
subpar and worse than in factories that are regulated by Bangladeshi national employers’
organizations such as the BEPZA or BGMEA. The subcontractors are made up of third-party
players that are neither approved nor audited by brands, although brands are aware of this grave
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issue (Anner 2019, 7; Tanjeem 2017). I will return to the issue of subcontractors and the role of
key national players in the Bangladeshi garments industry such as employer’s groups, in Chapter
Three: The National. As violations of the law can be detected across scales, factory owners and
supervisors work their level best to prohibit workers from unionizing (Kang 2021). Unions are
viewed as disruptions to wages and production in terms of organizing strikes and protests—
therefore, the continued hiring of ‘unskilled’ young workers who are taken out of school is a
lucrative scheme used by transitional corporations to further exploit gendered and racialized
labour (Kang 2021; Chowdhury 2018; Siddiqi 2009).
These new modes of exploitation apparent in the garments sector harken back to a key
feature from the Triangle Shirtwaist factory incident—that is the prevalence and ‘normalization’
of accidents and disasters in garments factories and the possibility for quick relocating (Prentice
2021; Harvey 2007; Perrow 2004). Since the fire that struck the New York City factory in 1911,
the garments industry witnessed countless disasters that have killed or injured thousands of wage
workers across the transnational garments supply chain. In the next section, I will be taking a
closer look at a few specific cases of disasters and crises that have transpired in the garments
industry in Bangladesh. As the case of COVID-19 illustrated, the workload for garments workers
in Bangladesh has risen significantly compared to before the pandemic (Antara and Sultan 2021;
Tanjeem 2021). These punctuated moments of crises are an important analytic lens for
understanding how global players and international institutions react to disasters and how their
responses impact garments workers on the ground.
So far, I have provided a more general briefing about the global apparel industry and the
shifts and multiple relocations it has witnessed, alongside the cases of industrial disasters that
have become far too common, placing workers in the utmost vulnerable conditions. As
mentioned above, in Bangladesh, the economy is working against the workers and for the
corporations who are demanding the cheapest labour. This highlights the limitations to regulating
labour laws and rights across the supply chain. Furthermore, since the industry has shifted
between so many different countries, national players are continually afraid of losing the
economy to another competitor. The ever-present threat of relocating and poor working
conditions for labourers induces vulnerability, additionally, it becomes clear that the repetition of
factory disasters is not at all accidental, rather they are an intrinsic feature of the system, and
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what Charles Perrow (2004) calls “normal accidents.” In 2017, over 70% of the clothing
purchased in the United States were imported from top labour rights-violating states in the
Global South (Anner 2019, 21). The global supply chain exposes a continuity of violence facing
racialized, gendered, and economically disenfranchised bodies—additionally, garments workers
are expected to interpellate their identity as wage workers and suppress their demands, revealing
the forms of colonial subjugation and ‘Othering’ to enact this oppressive system (Millar 2018;
Karim 2014; Bauman 2013; Nixon 2011; Said 1978). As Anner (2019) argues, the neoliberal fast
fashion industry is duly unjustifiable in terms of the destruction it poses upon the rights of
workers by commodifying their labour (cf. Ong 2007; Graeber 2001). Consequently, while
workers continue to battle ordinary violence in the form of hunger and wage-lessness (due to
wage-theft, unpaid wages, insecure working conditions, and firings), atop of disastrous events
and factory collapses—the larger concerns regarding sustainable vs. fast fashion are entirely
under corporate control.
Disasters are a step away from ordinary forms of violence such as hunger, poverty, or
harassment, which wage workers encounter regularly. However, when a factory collapse kills
hundreds or even thousands of workers while those factories are found supplying popular
western brands, it can create a different form of awakening on an international scale. Collective
organizing post-disaster done by concerned global citizens can put pressure on international
brands and institutions to develop policies attending to the demands of wage labourers. In this
way, disasters are an important moment for revealing wider structural issues and for potentially
addressing not only vulnerability to disasters but also everyday forms of labour exploitation and
precarity in the garments industry. The Rana Plaza collapse (on which more below) was
followed by the formation of a new policy—the ACCORD on Fire and Building Safety in
Bangladesh. The ACCORD was heavily celebrated in the West, yet it was defined as impractical
and inoperable by workers, activists, and even factory owners in Bangladesh. Furthermore, it
could not implement any ground-level changes to improve the lives of workers (Tanjeem 2021;
Anner 2019). In the next section, I will present the case of the Rana Plaza collapse and analyze
the complex overlapping of voices and narratives that could be unraveled when approaching the
Bangladeshi readymade garments industry from an ethnographic lens.

40

2.2. The Case of the Rana Plaza Collapse
On April 24th, 2013, an eight-story garments factory building located in a Savar, Bangladesh,
collapsed, resulting in more than 1,134 fatalities, and wounding more than 2,500 individuals,
with injuries ranging from minor to life altering (Comyns and Franklin-Johnson 2016). The
building housed several garments factories across different floors, all owned by various
Bangladeshi bebshashis (businessowners). A few days before the collapse transpired, workers
had observed cracks on the walls and ceilings of the building and informed management about
the matter (Thapa, Human Rights Watch, 2018). On the day of the collapse, many workers had
refused to enter the building under such hazardous conditions, yet they were threatened and
forced to enter by their supervisors (Thapa, Human Rights Watch, 2018). To this day, the Rana
Plaza event is globally recognized as one of the largest industrial disasters and a devastating
tragedy in the history of the garments industry. According to the Clean Clothes Campaign,
twenty-eight international retail brands were contracted with the factory at the time of the
collapse. Additionally, the disaster was labeled as an ‘unintentional’ ‘incident’ by all parties
(Comyns and Franklin-Johnson 2016). The Rana Plaza collapse was a large-scale disaster in
terms of its magnitude as well as the number of lives affected directly by the event. The collapse,
therefore, created a shift within the industry and initiated a global awakening regarding the
tolerance of mistreatment toward garments workers and the exploitation imposed upon racialized
and gendered bodies by Western corporations. International pressures enforced political changes
to be pursued by international players.
In response to these pressures, dozens of international brands such as Children’s Place,
Gap, Canadian Tire, Sears, Target, including others, conjoined to produce and implement the
Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety and the ACCORD on Fire and Building Safety in all
factories that are regulated by Bangladeshi Employers’ Organizations. In Chapter Three, I will
return to critically examining the positionality and responsibilities of employers’ organizations in
the Bangladeshi garments industry—alongside other national players that aid in maintaining this
economy. Nevertheless, the ACCORD and the Alliance were produced as legally binding policy
agreements negotiated only between certain transnational players—such as brands, trade unions,
and NGOs, whereas Bangladeshi garments workers were represented by state-led players such as
BGMEA and BKMEA (Tanjeem 2021; Kang 2021; Anner 2019). The intention of these policies
41

is to ensure safety and adequate working conditions in Bangladeshi factories for garments
sromik. However, before I can turn to elaborate on the usefulness of these western-centric
policies in affecting positive change in the lives of fast fashion workers, it is important to
recognize that the Rana Plaza collapse was not the first nor last disaster of its kind. In fact, a
handful of parent company names that appeared from the Rana Plaza collapse were found linked
to other factory disasters in Bangladesh, including the Tazreen Fashions factory fire in the
Ashulia district that killed 117 workers and injured many in November 2012, the fire at Tung
Hai sweater factory in Mirpur District, where eight workers lost their lives, and other similar
disasters (Comyns and Franklin-Johnson 2016). These events disclose the continuities of
mistreatment facing wage workers that can be traced back to the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire
in 1911. Furthermore, these disasters expose and normalize the forms of violence facing
gendered and racialized workers in the Global South and resemble the remnants of colonial
haunting while trembling the garments industry. What do these repetitions in industrial disasters
reveal about the normalcy of violence facing wage workers in the global supply chain?
Companies like Walmart, the Children’s Place, Primark, Loblaw & Mango, and JC Penny
were amongst the brands whose names were listed at the site of these disasters. Some of these
companies are notorious for their ongoing scandals involving negligent management practices of
global factories and the exploitation of workers (Comyns and Franklin-Johnson 2016).
Additionally, while the ACCORD and the Alliance, and other international policies are expected
to improve factory conditions, ‘price’ and ‘source squeezing’ by brands remains stagnant (Anner
2019, 14). With the cost of inflation and additional budgetary expenses introduced by the
ACCORD, national factory owners were burdened with the increasing cost of maintenance.
Meanwhile, brands continued seeking sites with reduced production costs and fewer auditing
opportunities (Anner 2019 15). The volume of orders in the apparel industry remained unstable
while ‘source squeezing’ permitted brands to easily shift locations or cut back orders as deemed
necessary. At the same time, policies like the ACCORD and the Alliance, which added to the
cost of regulating factories increases, placed increased costs and financial burdens on national
factory owners, manufacturers, and suppliers. As a result, when suppliers experienced price
squeezing from buyers, they turned to subcontractors who relocated production to buildings with
suboptimal or haphazard working conditions to convene low production costs (Tanjeem 2021;
Anner 2019, 16). In the case of Bangladeshi garments workers, a clear pattern can be observed
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where workers find themselves in unsafe working conditions, meanwhile, they are forced by
supervisors to risk their lives to produce fast fashion for the supply chain.
Many owners and suppliers in Bangladesh state that they are running their factories at a
great personal cost, to maintain export-led business relations with foreign investors and in hopes
of receiving favourable contracts in the future (Anner 2019, 17). With the amount of
international coverage, the Rana Plaza collapse received, many scholars and activists across the
globe imagined that it would help strengthen and secure the opportunity for workers to unionize,
collectivize, and demand adequate rights and compensation. Before the collapse, only 100
garments factories in Bangladesh were unionized, a seemingly sparse number compared to the
whooping 440 unions that formed in 2018 (Anner 2019, 19). Although there was a momentary
shift in treatment toward unions following the collapse, that sentiment did not last, as my
informants attested. As international attention faded away from the Rana Plaza collapse, antiunion repression increased, and union applications were being turned down once again (Anner
2019, 19). Additionally, labour reforms were not implemented within the factories during this
time as various controversies transpired amongst transnational players—notably, these policies
completely overlooked the role of subcontractors (Tanjeem 2021).
There were several international institutions that attempted to regulate this capitalist
global supply chain. The most important ones, such as the United Nations’ guiding principles on
Business and Human Rights, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) guidelines for brands and buyers, and the International Labour Organization’s (ILO)
labour codes for countries, which were all designed to foster increased integration into the global
economic order and to mitigate issues pertaining to matters affecting international players in the
global supply chain. Even when they did set out limits or regulations (or “best practices”), these
institutions are criticized for their inadequate implementation strategies and for permitting
transnational corporations to avoid taking accountability for supply chain workers (Hira and
Benson-Rea 2017). Issues surrounding free-riding by certain self-interested companies who
expect others to follow the rules so that they do not have to hamper collective action (Comyns
and Franklin-Johnson 2016). The international community’s response to the Rana Plaza collapse
focused on making modifications to Bangladesh’s incompetent labour laws. However, as
research shows, the policies formulated in response to these moments of disaster can be very
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costly, and the burdens are placed upon national players, who resort to cost-cutting measures to
maintain their export-led business relations. Furthermore, if Bangladesh attempted to implement
certain reforms to provide better conditions to workers, the costs of the reforms would lead
brands and buyers to relocate through ‘source squeezing’ which would not resolve the violations
of workers’ rights that are currently taking place (Anner 2019). In reality, brands have already
shifted to other countries for cheaper sites of labour—where working conditions are more
volatile, and workers are paid even less than they are in Bangladesh. On an international scale,
the forms of oppression facing racialized and gendered subjects in post-colonial regions are
reproduced through relocation.
In an industry as large as the readymade garments sector, there should exist a regulatory
system that holds all members of the supply chain accountable, to allow a more socially
conscious and ethical transnational economy to function. The status-quo which permits the
dismissals of jurisdictions and exempts western brands from paying taxes and duties must be
amended to avoid ‘price squeezing’ and to decrease preventable deaths and injuries for garments
workers (Anner 2019; Martin and Bravo 2016). Holding global actors accountable can be
difficult and it is the duty of international and national players in the global supply chain to
collaborate and ensure that the voices, rights, and demands of factory workers are being
prioritized and fulfilled while maintaining this industry. Now, let us take a closer look at how
those global concerns about labour and industrial disaster have taken shape in Bangladesh before
and after the Rana Plaza collapse.

2.3. A Continuum of Colonialism: History Repeats at the Level of
Transnational Policy Making
When a crisis occurs, the reaction from international institutions often takes shape in the form of
policies produced by transnational actors. When the Rana Plaza factory collapsed, average
people such as American consumers and Bangladeshi citizens put tremendous pressure on brands
and international and national governments to improve working conditions for garments factory
workers in the global supply chain. This resulted in brands, NGOs, and trade unions coming
together to formulate the ACCORD and the Alliance (Tanjeem 2021; Kang 2021). Throughout
this thesis, I will continue to critically analyze the relevance and efficacy of the ACCORD and
the Alliance policies and their effectiveness in instilling systemic change within garments
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factories, by referring to scholars who have conducted extensive research on these policies.
However, in this section, I will take a step back to probe other forms of ‘crisis’ that have molded
Bangladesh’s present stance as one of the largest producers of global garments in the 2020s (cf.
Ahmann 2018).
I will begin by presenting a case of a crisis that faced the Bangladeshi garments industry
in the 1990s. This historical event in the 90s caused an awakening alike the Rana Plaza collapse
and the 1911 Shirtwaist Factory fire—to which western institutions responded by producing
more policies intended to amend the imminent issue. What sort of issues did garments workers
confront when the industry had initially shifted from Mexican maquiladoras to Bangladeshi
factories? In this section, I will analyze the 1990s Child Labour Deterrence Bill which was
formulated in response to the accusations of child labour practices in Bangladeshi garments
factories (Tanjeem 2021; Absar et al. 1999). A significant aspect of this movement was its
influence upon the changing dynamics of Bangladeshi garments workers’ representation across
the globe. As novel neoliberal modes of activism penetrated the post-colonial state, individuals
who were closely affiliated and represented by western NGOs came to represent Bangladeshi
garments workers’ rights (cf. Lewis 2019). Meanwhile, these NGO-led actors were reiterating
the westernized policies that were imposed by international corporations in the supply chain.
Furthermore, historical evidence is significant and telling of what may befall the Bangladeshi
garments industry in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the pattern of neoliberal
policy formations that have been introduced over the years in attempting to mitigate the
exploitation of workers, however, how much direct impact do these policies have upon the lives
of workers? The formation of western neoliberal policies intended to maintain global factories
and workers shall be closely assessed in this chapter, beginning with the Harkin Bill.
In the early 1990s, Bangladesh was employing over 750,000 factory workers, at least
10% of whom were child labourers (White 1996, 833). Most of the workers in apparel factories
at the time were women and girls, and many were as young as eleven years old (White 1996,
833). As the issue gained attention in the media in the North, average citizens began to blame
brands for their unethical practices. This event functioned as a ‘moment of rupture’ that brought
about changes to the functioning of the garments industry (Ahmann 2018). In 1992, in response
to the heated criticism facing American brands regarding their tolerance for child labour, the US
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government found it mandatory to produce the Child Labour Deterrence Act, also known as the
Harkin Bill, which was named after the Iowa State Senator in the US, Tom Harkin (Tanjeem
2017; Absar et al. 1999). This bill would prohibit the US government from allowing the import
of garments from Bangladeshi factories that were suspected of using child labour. Furthermore,
this Harkin Bill outlawed workers under the age of fifteen from working in garments factories
(White 1996, 833). Absar et al. (1999), argued that the Harkin Bill was limited as it was
determined to prohibit child labour rather than proposing regulatory changes intended to benefit
those vulnerable workers employed in the factories. The bill aimed to prevent importing goods
from places that were associated with child labour practices and threatened to boycott
Bangladesh as a production site (Absar et al. 1999, 986). Eventually, this act attributed child
labour as “Bangladesh’s problem,” painting a narrative of Bangladesh as a failed state with
unethical employment practices while safeguarding the western brands and easing them from
taking responsibility for workers (Tanjeem 2017).
The Harkin Bill, A.K.A. The Child Labour Deterrence Act
In 1995, one of the main employers’ organizations, BGMEA, was obliged to sign a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the International Labour Organization and
UNICEF (Absar et al. 1999, 986; White 1996, 833). According to the MOU, BGMEA was
obliged to remove all underage workers from their factories, offer a stipend to those families
losing their sources of income, and to ensure that the children are placed in schools (Absar et al.
1999, 986). Nearly 55,000 children lost their jobs as a result; however, these children were not
placed in schools, as had been promised, nor did they or their families receive any compensation
(White 1996). The Harkin Bill failed to acknowledge the socioeconomic conditions that propel
children in post-colonial states to participate in wage labour (Absar et al. 1999). Moreover, many
of these children consequently turned to other sources of employment that were more precarious,
hazardous, and exploitative than the garments industry, such as brickwork, sex work, or working
as a domestic servant for middle- or upper-class families (Tanjeem 2017). While these US
domestic policies like the Harkin Bill and the ACCORD were mandated by global players and
expected to be institutionally implemented in factories, Bangladeshi garments factory owners
were the ones compelled to upkeep the costs of applying such changes (Mahmud and Kabeer
2003 in Tanjeem 2017, 50). Additionally, these policies had a limited impact on the factories
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located in export processing zones and little to no impact on subcontracted factories (Tanjeem
2017, 50). There are thousands of workers employed in these subcontracted factories, but due to
the informal or unofficial nature of the work, they remain largely invisible to or ignored by
global policy negotiations. Overall, corporate codes enable consumers to feel guilt-free while
placing the entire liability of worker safety and responsibility upon suppliers (Tanjeem 2017, 5051). Meanwhile control over capital rests with western corporations.
In keeping with neoliberal and colonial ideologies, by placing blame on Bangladesh
western brands were able to avoid taking responsibility—facilitating the shift in attention away
from matters of corporate greed and the demands of fast fashion workers (Tanjeem 2017, 263).
Additionally, the media’s reiteration of Bangladesh’s incompetency in failing to fulfill the rights
of its citizens, which compelled children to turn to factory work, it normalized the need for
outside intervention by international players—creating room for NGOs and other developmental
agencies to insert themselves as key actors (Lewis 2019; Tanjeem 2017, 263; Siddiqi 2009; cf.
Perrow 2004). In my conversations with Bangladeshi garments activists in 2021, I learned that
child labour in Bangladeshi garments factories remains abundant and not much has changed
since the passing of the Harkin Bill. However, the Harkin Bill did result in some changes within
the garments industry—except not in the ways it intended to. The Child Labour Deterrence Act
garnered tremendous media attention and spurred INGOs to get involved to help “aid” the
matter. A handful of child labourers who were affected by the Harkin Bill were promoted by
NGOs and turned into labour activists. These activists would soon come to figure as the global
representatives of Bangladeshi garments workers. This might indeed by one of the most
significant consequences of the act in Bangladesh—it resulted in the endorsement of certain
NGO-based activists who came to define the political climate for apparel factory workers in
Bangladesh (and beyond).
Kalpona Akter—a former child labourer turned activist, and founder of the Bangladesh
Centre for Workers’ Solidarity (BCWS) is a familiar public figure within the Bangladeshi
garments industry and beyond. Akter experienced years of threats and difficulties and was
arrested several times for demonstrating for workers’ rights, as she dedicated her life to bringing
justice for Bangladeshi garments sromik (Akter 2014). Following the Rana Plaza collapse, Akter
was invited to tour a number of countries and several US states to talk about the experiences of
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workers and highlight their needs. Akter’s advocacy aimed to get brands to sign the ACCORD to
ensure safety for workers in Bangladesh (see UN (United Nations) Women, 2016). Kalpona
Akter authored a book called Invisible Hands: Voices from the Global Economy which I read in
2017 in a second-year Political Science classroom. As a second-year undergraduate student at the
University of Toronto, reading this book expanded my interest towards and awareness of the
transnational supply chain and the experiences of garments workers. When I embarked upon my
graduate school journey in 2020, my hope for this thesis was to receive the opportunity to
interview Kalpona Akter and collaborate with her NGO, BCWS, during my fieldwork. It would
have been a great opportunity for me to learn from Akter, however, as mentioned earlier, due to
unexpected challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, I was unable to conduct my research
in such a way. Unfortunately, I was unable to reach Kalpona Akter or BCWS even through
email. Nor was I able to travel to Bangladesh to conduct fieldwork.
Nevertheless, following my conversation with activist Saydia Gulrukh, I received a
contact list of people who were differently situated than the former group of activists, who are
well versed in the Bangladeshi garments industry and familiar with the local labour movement.
From there, the conversations snowballed which led me to collaborate with and learn from my
informants during fieldwork. My conversations with informants widened my knowledge about
the gaps that appeared when observing the forms of activism taking place in the Bangladeshi
garments industry, and how it has evolved over the years from the era of the Harkin Bill to the
celebration of the ACCORD, to its complete abolition (see Tanjeem 2021; Tanjeem 2017).
Several informants shared with me that certain televised and marketed names of activists are not
necessarily the only ones who are representing garments workers on the ground. There are other,
not so internationally celebrated, activists who stand alongside garments workers and aid them in
navigating their rights as they continue to face ordinary forms of violence in the fast fashion
supply chain. Miah Bhai who was of my key informants, stated that the activists in Bangladesh
who are doing the lion’s share of work—by protesting for workers’ rights and aiding workers in
accessing those rights—are not represented by the media, nor do they receive much funding.
NGO-funded groups and individuals generally focus on mandates that are emphasized and
deemed valuable by the international community, including policies such as the Harkin Bill, the
ACCORD, and the Alliance. However, local activists are aware of the physical and mental needs
of the factory workers and attend to provide worker relief in basic regards—such as access to
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food, shelter, physical safety, increased wages, job security, and more. I will elaborate on the
different forms of activism evident across the Bangladeshi garments industry in Chapter Three,
where I look closer at the conditions and efforts of those who are more locally situated in the
supply chain. Here, I want to explore further how certain NGO-led activists promote western,
neoliberal projects in Bangladesh by advocating for the implementation of policies like the
Harkin Bill, and later the ACCORD. As noted above, these policies intend to assuage the guilt of
western consumers and safeguard jobs in the west by maintaining positive Corporate Social
Responsibility profiles for the brands they represent, rather than considering the well-being of
garments workers in post-colonial states (Rahman and Langford 2014, 182).
So far, I have presented the case of the Harkin Bill, which was a signed agreement
between global brands and international institutions to prohibit trade relations with countries
practicing child labour. This bill was created in response to accusations of child labour in
Bangladeshi textile factories in the 1990s. However, as highlighted, these westernized policies
fail to address the conditions of labourers on the ground. In attempting to dismantle inequalities
facing children by prohibiting them from working in factories, the Harkin bill displayed an
intention to safeguard children in third-world countries. Nevertheless, by placing the blame upon
national players and firing tens of thousands of children the Bill and other similar policies
managed to avoid any responsibility toward garments workers. Ultimately, the proposition to
protect children was overwritten by corporations saving face. As time went on, many of the child
workers who were supposed to be “saved” by the Act ended up working in more volatile
conditions in informal sectors, while the remaining garments workers continued to face
precarious and exploitative conditions in the apparel factories (Tanjeem 2021, 263).
Trade Union Imperialism and NGO Representation of Garments Workers in South Asia
The garments sector is often characterized as being women dominant. In 2001, it was still the
case that majority of the workers employed in these factories were women (Khan 2001 in
Rahman and Langford, 2014). However, all my informants who are intimately familiar with the
garments industry from a local angle said that the 80-20 gender gap (80% women to 20% men) is
no longer the case. In fact, in the 2020s the number of men and women working in the sector and
the gender division of labour in garments factories is closer to 60-40. Nevertheless, the
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feminization of labour in representing the industry contributes to the commencement of other
Structural Adjustment Programs and the interference of western actors including NGOs.
Bangladesh displays a historically weak labour movement enabling the saturation of American
imperialism through institutions, for example, the American Federation of Labour and Congress
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) which is the largest federation of unions in the United
States (Rahman and Langford, 2014). The AFL-CIO enforces the United States’ foreign policy
goals upon Bangladesh’s labour movement, and this is called ‘trade union imperialism’ (Rahman
and Langford 2014). I will not spend long elaborating on trade union imperialism, (Jack Scott
1978; Don Thompson and Rodney Larson 1978; Kim Scipes 1989; Roger Southall 1995, in
Rahman and Langford 2014), however, this had a significant impact on Bangladesh’s labour
movement. Trade union imperialism, which has existed since the Cold War era, plus the
presence of colonialism, militarism, and dictatorship in Bangladesh throughout the 80s–90s, has
prohibited the sromik andolon from flourishing (Rahman and Langford 2014, 170). In this
domineering system, imperialist influence is advanced by not only the post-colonial state of
Bangladesh (that is in a perpetual state of coloniality—cf. Brown 2010) but also by quasigovernmental actors (e.g., USAID (US Agency of International Aid), the AFL-CIO, and others)
and INGOs (Scipes 1989 in Rahman and Langford 2014, 172). These events eventually shaped
the trade union movement and workers’ representation in Bangladesh.
Local labour activists define the Bangladeshi trade union movement as repressive, topdown, and male-dominated, meanwhile, a handful of women unionists in Bangladesh were
founded by Western players. In 1997 there were 3,000 factories producing garments and only 24
unions to represent them (Rahman and Langford, 176). Following the Rana Plaza collapse, joint
efforts by ACCORD and Alliance audited roughly 2500 factories, however, this only covered
half the workers as the remaining 2 million workers were employed in subcontracted factories
(Kang 2021; Tanjeem 2021, 264). Nafisa Tanjeem (2021, 263-264) argued that Bangladesh’s
transnational labour movement deploys a ‘spotlight approach,’ starting with the 1990s anti-child
labour campaign, corporate codes of conduct that do not consider subcontractors such as
ACCORD and Alliance, and supply chain capitalism—individualizing the narratives of workers
to minimize their demands. Additionally, the AFL-CIO produced a project called Solidarity
Centre that is funded extensively by the government and a key member of the Solidarity Centre
(important for AFL-CIO’s functioning) is the Bangladesh Centre for Workers’ Solidarity led by
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Kalpona Akter, who is one of the few women trade unionists in the country (Rahman and
Langford, 181). A handful of these names have come to represent workers on a global scale
before transnational allies, most of whom are English-speaking (Karim 2014, 60; Kang 2021, 10;
Tanjeem 2021, 265).
In 2010, while Kalpona Akter and her colleagues, Babul Akhter, and Aminul Islam were
protesting outside the Nassa Global Wear factory in Ashulia district, they were arrested and
detained (Clean Clothes Campaign, Geertjan, 2010). These events would soon reveal the
insecurities within the Bangladeshi labour movement, and the gaps between players such as trade
unionists, workers, and brands. Kalpona and her colleagues were arrested, charged, and
eventually released. In 2012, BCWS organizer Aminul Islam was brutally murdered (Manik and
Bajaj 2012; Rahman and Langford 2014). At the time, activists such as the BCWS members
perceived this event as a threat to their agendas (Manik and Bajaj 2012). AFL-CIO protested this
case in 2012, alongside other cases, such as the murder of trade unionists in Guatemala’s banana
industry (Manik and Bajaj 2012). Following the tragic demise of Aminul Islam—whose death
captured the Bangladeshi national’s attention in 2013—the Obama administration threatened to
add tariffs to 5000 items exported from Bangladesh if they continued abusing these trade
unionists (Rahman and Langford 2014, 182). This case received tremendous attention and
spotlight, following which, Kalpona Akter and Babul Akhter were able to use the momentum to
reregister BCWS and begin their efforts once again (Rahman and Langford 2014). It was more
critical for AFL-CIO and the US administration to protect its neoliberal functions by maintaining
these state-led actors such as BCWS than to protect the Bangladeshi union leaders. Similarly, the
ILO and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), conserve the pockets and jobs in the
US by continually exploiting Global South actors in the supply chain such as these NGOaffiliated trade unionists (Drake 2013 in Rahman and Langford 2014, 182). Trade union leader
and my informant, Miah Bhai, shared with me that he regularly faced threats and violence in his
experience while working in the textile industry. However, according to Miah, only certain cases
receive special attention because of their connection with Western players and NGOs, such as
the case of Kalpona Akter and her colleagues at BCWS. This is how exploitable the state
functions are under a neoliberal regime, disabling the agency of workers and controlling the
agendas of labour activists and trade unionists who are meant to represent the garments workers.
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These issues raise moral concerns regarding the mistreatments and misrepresentations of workers
in Bangladesh and across the supply chain.
Eventually, the Harkin bill and additional international policy formations affected the
overall structure of workers’ representation and labour activism in the Bangladeshi garments
industry, with the entrance of neoliberal modes of intervention (cf. Lewis 2019). NGOs and
western philanthropes entered Bangladesh to “save” third-world women and children (Siddiqi
2009; cf. Abu Lughod 2013). This led to the formation of novel modes of advocacy that were
entirely influenced by Western actors (see Lewis 2019). The labour rights agenda within the
Bangladeshi garments industry was completely overshadowed by westernized modes of
development—creating a gap between workers’ demands and the issues receiving ‘spotlight’ and
media coverage locally and abroad (Tanjeem 2021). Before I wrap up this chapter, I want to
briefly return to the Rana Plaza collapse ‘incident’ once more, as this case has become a
touchstone issue for how people perceive the Bangladeshi apparel industry and how they speak
about the situation facing garments factory workers.

2.4. Concluding Thoughts – The Rana Plaza Collapse and the ACCORD
versus the Alliance Debate
One morning in February 2022, I had just woken up and found myself passively scrolling
through my Facebook newsfeed. When I came across this news article titled “রানা প্লাজায় প্রাণ গিয়য়গিল
মেয়র, এবার আগুয়ন েয়রলন ো,” “Their daughter had died during the Rana Plaza collapse, this time, the
mother dies in a fire.” This article written by Shamsujaman Savar was published online by
Prothom Alo, Bangladesh’s leading liberal newspaper. In the article, Savar (2022) shares the
narrative of Mohammad Abdul Hamid, a street vendor who sells chanachur (Bombay mix) on
the roadside. In April 2013, the eight-story building called Rana Plaza collapsed in Savar,
Bangladesh, killing “1,134” garments workers (although it is assumed that more lives were lost
to this event) and injuring thousands of others (Akhter 2022, p8). One of the persons to have lost
their lives during this tragic industrial disaster was Hamid’s 13-year-old daughter, Shathi Akter,
who was employed in one of the factories. Hamid and his wife, Shahanara Begum, a shoe factory
employee, were living in grief over the loss of their beloved daughter. Before Hamid could
recover from this trauma, he was faced with another brutal reality check. On February 23rd,
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2022, Uniworld Footwear, an unauthorized shoe factory in Ashulia, Bangladesh, on caught fire
and resulted in three fatalities and over twelve workers being injured (BD News 24, 2022). In an
unfortunate turn of events, one of the workers who passed away was Hamid’s wife, Shahanara
(Savar 2022). Conversations with workers following the fire outbreak found that many of the
employees in Uniworld Footwear were child labourers like Shathi (Savar 2022). Hamid
expressed his deep sorrow from bearing the loss of his child and now his wife and he said that he
was losing his mind trying to cope with these multiple traumas (Savar 2022). There are millions
of people across Bangladesh and across the apparel supply chain who, like Hamid, sent their
loved ones to work in factories, only for them to never return or to undergo tremendous lifealtering injurious in the process. Furthermore, ongoing scandals of factory disasters display the
continuity of unethical labour practices—including child labour, hazardous work conditions,
stolen wages and relief funds, and more, facing workers, specifically women and girls in global
factories.
The Rana Plaza collapse was a devastating tragedy, but it is not a singular event. Still,
throughout this thesis, I will return to the case of the collapse as a critical lens through which to
analyze the reactions from transnational players including brands and international institutions,
and their attempts to mitigate future disasters. Furthermore, the usefulness of the ACCORD and
its predecessor, the Alliance will be closely examined. They are both global framework
agreements that were signed between international brands and trade unions to ensure the safety
of workers following the multiple factory disasters that took place in Bangladesh throughout the
2000s–2010s (Kang 2021; Tanjeem 2021). Moreover, I will distinguish the forms of continuity
of colonial and patriarchal violence toward wage workers in the Global South that appear during
these moments of rupture or ‘crises,’ followed by the procession of westernized modes of aid,
intervention, and policies (Ahmann 2018). A historical case highlighting the inadequacy of
western policies in implementing ground-level changes to improve the lives and conditions of
garments workers was produced through the pursuance of the Harkin Bill. It revealed that these
policies do not aid workers, they permit western brands to avoid taking accountability for the
safety and well-being of apparel factory workers. Consequently, workers in the global supply
chain find themselves in more precarious and vulnerable conditions with the widening power gap
between international players such as Euro-American brands and national and local stakeholders
(Prentice 2021).
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In the next chapter, I will present my conversations with local scholars to build my
argument on the inadequacy of western policies such as the ACCORD and the Alliance. The data
presented will emphasize the inefficiency of these policies in producing sustainable
improvements in the lives of garments workers. Ultimately, although highly celebrated in the
west for its novel and transformative approaches to transnational labour regulation, the
ACCORD failed to address the gaps within the fast fashion industry that dislocates workers in
the global supply chain and places them in vulnerable conditions (Tanjeem 2021; Kang 2021;
Lewis 2019; Anner, 2019). Additionally, issues concerning most national and local players, such
as the role of subcontractors, are completely ignored by policies like the ACCORD (Tanjeem
2017). I will highlight the limitations and challenges of westernized policies, and in response,
offer a contrapuntal perspective that engages with ideas and remarks made by local and national
scholars, thinkers, and activists. I will emphasize the significance of taking a bottom-up
perspective that an ethnographic approach enables. Overall, I will distinguish the need for a
localized point of view in producing preventative measures intended to protect workers in global
factories, meet their demands for day-to-day survival, and present a distinctive theory of global
capitalism from the ground.
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Chapter Three:
“Bangladesh is being sold for parts”: Neoliberalism, the Nationstate and the (Un)Making of the Readymade Garments industry
My investigation of the garments industry aims to highlight how Bangladesh became the secondlargest exporter of fast fashion over the last few decades (Rahman and Langford, 2014; Karim,
2014). To understand the full picture, I begin with a short synopsis of the history of post-colonial
state formation and economic development projects in Bangladesh, as the country’s political
conditioning pre-and post-independence has influenced its entry into the era of neoliberal
economization (Chowdhury 2018; Karim 2014; Ong 2007). The Global South is generalized and
presented as underdeveloped, developing, or lesser developed—a discourse that refuses to
acknowledge the four hundred years or more of European colonialism that subdued and plagued
the region (see Chakrabarty 2018). Any ‘post’-colonial state, such as Bangladesh, is a state that
has bled through the nefarious tactics exerted by European colonialism—including the extraction
of lands, resources, and labour (cf. Lowe 2015). The exploitation of bodies, specifically of
women of color, has been essential to this long history, and the current trope of the ‘new woman’
who produces for the economy and gets manipulated to extract profits (Chowdhury 2018; Siddiqi
2009; cf. Brown 2010; Abu-Lughod 2013). In this sense, American-led neoliberal globalization
is heir to European colonialism and imperialism. The neoliberal market ideals targeting certain
populations in Lesser Developed Countries for employment is a tactful and lucrative tool
weaponized by transnational corporations to commodify racialized bodies and their labour for
profit (Ong 2007; Freeman 2000). Garments factories currently in Bangladesh are productive
sites that exude ‘colonial haunting’ and make visible the forms of violence that sustain these
neoliberal economic systems (cf. Kilroy-Marac 2018; Gordon 2008; Williams 1991).
In this chapter, I will examine the Bangladeshi garments industry by analyzing the national scale
and will inquire about how the historical complexities mentioned above characterize the roles of
key national actors and players. These players include the Government of Bangladesh, ministers
of parliament, employers’ organizations like BGMEA and BKMEA, factory owners and
supervisors, and the subcontractors who are appointed to complete projects that are deemed too
costly by others. In my account of the garments sector at the national level, I will draw on my
interviews with Bangladeshi activists, such as Rizwana, who described the apparel industry as an
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“archetypical sector that exposes the unwavering dominance of international corporations and
buyers over transnational economic markets and profit margins.” National players including the
government of Bangladesh and the factory owners are considered matha noto (head-bowed or
restricted) by the demands set by buyers who represent corporations and brands like Walmart,
Gap, and Zara. The relationship between national players, buyers, and transnational corporations
needs addressing when considering the exceptional neoliberal projects Bangladesh has witnessed
since the 1970s—such as microfinance, advancement of export-led businesses, NGO-led
‘developments’, and more (Lewis 2019; Karim 2014). The garments industry is a neoliberal
economic system that has developed in a political climate where Bangladeshi sromik are
prohibited from organizing or speaking their truths (Kang 2021; Tanjeem 2017). To elaborate on
this, I will outline key moments in Bangladesh’s political and economic history, as it went from
being under British occupancy as ‘Greater India,’ to Pakistani military ruling as ‘East Pakistan,’
to an independent nation-state after partition. This history highlights the continuities of colonial
and patriarchal ‘haunting’ that pervade the Bengal region today and directly affects the lives of
sromik (cf. Beckett 2020; Kilroy-Marac 2018; Ahmann 2018; Chakrabarty 2018). As we will
see, aspects of that colonial and postcolonial history are reproduced in the contemporary forms
of violence and subjugation facing racialized and gendered workers in Bangladeshi textile
factories. Throughout this chapter, I will draw on my conversations with activists like Miah
Bhai, a trade unionist in Bangladesh who feels like “Bangladesh is being sold for parts.”
Additionally, I will refer to those key moments of disasters that wounded the garments industry
since its relocation to Bangladesh, specifically the Rana Plaza collapse which many of my
informants described as the most harrowing experience to have witnessed. In this capitalist
economy, these moments of crisis are part of the system, they are repetitive and commonplace.
Furthermore, these events ultimately influence the shape of the transnational garments industry,
leading it to shift to lesser audited areas, while leaving behind trails of ‘haunting,’ that local
apparel factory workers and activists must deal with.
Over the past decade, the cost of producing garments has increased but the prices offered
by brands to national manufacturers remain exceptionally low and are annually decreasing
(Anner 2019, 15). In this chapter, I will apply the term ‘disaster capitalism’ to emphasize the
constrained relation between the national level and the global level, and how the nation-state’s
limited role and the domineering neoliberal economic structures have shaped the garments sector
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(cf. Imperiale and Vanclay 2020; Schuller and Maldonado 2016; Klein 2007). I will analyze a
select few cases that I have mentioned in the previous chapters, where a disaster has shaken the
Bangladeshi garments industry, and highlight that transnational corporations are quick to pull
away during these “moments of rupture” (cf. Ahmann 2018). This results in cutbacks on a
national scale leading to employers’ organizations firing thousands of workers, or national
factory owners having to fulfill economic gaps. One main case that I will inspect is the Rana
Plaza collapse that led to the formation of the ACCORD and the Alliance, where policy-related
costs fell directly upon Bangladeshi factory owners who could not bear these burdens (Kang
2021). Furthermore, when the issues of building safety arose, brands ‘squeezed’ their prices once
more, leading Bangladeshi factory owners to relocate to cheaper building sites and to turn to
subcontractors to minimize costs (Tanjeem 2021, 264; Anner 2019, 6). Some factory owners are
known to take orders at a deficit to merely safeguard factory operations—and they ‘hope’ for
better contracts in the future (Anner 2019, 17). To unwarp what resulted in these national
insecurities to rise, it is crucial to address some of the historical reasons that led to this.

3.1. A National Crisis: Miah Bhai describes his memories from the Rana
Plaza Collapse
It was an early morning in September 2021 when I received an unexpected phone call. I did not
realize I would be conducting an interview until it had already begun. Miah Bhai and I had been
texting back and forth for a few days by then through WhatsApp—we were having difficulty
finding a suitable time for us to connect. Before I knew it, technological disruptions began to get
in the way as it was the only interview that I could not record or transcribe. It was a disrupted
morning, one of those moments when virtual research felt tedious or unfeasible. However, these
mundane moments of fieldwork are often the ones I missed the most. Looking back at it, these
moments of interruptions are comparable to the disruptions that many anthropologists face while
conducting fieldwork on the ground. Entering the field with expectations that would not be
fulfilled, sitting through extremely long, dull meetings one after the other, wishing to speak with
someone only to be turned away, or sitting under the scorching sun for hours doing participant
observation, etc.—are all familiar arenas for anthropologists. Still, speaking with Miah Bhai truly
opened my heart. There were several parts of that call that I could not capture in their full
essence, nonetheless, there were other parts that will remain with me vividly for the rest of my
57

life. The timing that day was off—it was 9:00 am EST (Eastern Standard Time) for me and
closer to midnight for Miah; the methods were interrupted—I could only hear his voice but even
that came broken at times, nevertheless, the spirit of the conversation was clear and heartfelt.
These moments of profound engagement and dialogue with my informants left the rough edges
of virtual fieldwork at bay.
Fast-forwarding to the phone call now. Miah Bhai rang me as I was sitting on my balcony
drinking cha tea. When I received the call, I quickly grabbed whatever writing utensils I could
find around me and began to take notes. This would be my fifth interview and I knew that I
would not be able to record our conversation and could only hold onto what I had written down
during that long-distance call. Nevertheless, as the interview transpired and Miah and I
exchanged words, strangely I felt taken back. It felt as though I was in Bangladesh, near my
house in Malibagh, Chowdhury Para, taking a rickshaw ride down Shiddeshwari Road as I
passed by the crowded bazaars and food carts near Mouchak Market. It was the first time in ten
years that I felt as though I was present in the flesh, standing amidst the heat, dust, and hustling
streets of the city where I was born, Dhaka. At times I sat in awe, other moments had me shaken
to my core. In that one-hour phone call with Miah Bhai, I learned more than I could have
imagined. Although initially, I had felt sorry for myself for being unable to record that call, soon
I felt fortunate simply to have had it at all.
Miah Bhai, a trade unionist, has been heavily involved in providing food, water, shelter,
and more to Bangladeshi textile workers, and protesting alongside them since the early 2010s,
alongside other grassroots activists in Dhaka. He opened a few pockets of organizing called
shakhas (branches). Miah and his colleagues have established an ongoing page called “Freedom
for Garments Workers” on Facebook. Additionally, they continually work towards finding
remittance opportunities for workers who were fired or injured, and their families. Furthermore,
Miah Bhai worked with groups and individuals who are invested in areas such as worker wellbeing, health and wellness, and maternal, newborn, and child health. They have organized
several protests over the past few years in attempts to raise the minimum wage, which at the time
in 2021 was around 8,000 Takas or $96. Miah argued that the monthly salary for workers should
be 16,000 Takas or $186, minimum. However, the employers’ group, Bangladesh Garments
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) fought against them during the protests,
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which led to the loss of lives of several activists. The BGMEA is known for crashing protests
and putting an end to them, as these employers’ organizations are heavily influenced by
international players and brands who are opposed to the idea of paying workers, according to
Miah Bhai.
Miah Bhai was part of a group of eleven activists whom I call Sromik Sheba, or labour care—
although, the group did not have an official name. Sromik Sheba was involved in organizing a
massive portion of the relief funds and aid for workers following the Rana Plaza collapse. I was
fortunate enough to speak with a few different members of this group, including Salma Apa,
Onik, and Miah Bhai. Some of the other members of this group, I have cited throughout this
thesis, and others I have heard of, connected with, or learned from through additional means.
Miah, a trade unionist shared upfront that few people are a fan of him or his field of work, but he
is used to it and believes his work is valuable. Miah Bhai was present at the site of the Rana
Plaza collapse, as well as other factory disasters and calamities. But, Miah says, “there was
nothing like the sight of the Rana Plaza aftermath.” Miah witnessed skulls of dead sromik falling
from the ceiling. No one had the time to consider or process their feelings of shock, trauma, or
disgust at that moment—as too many lives had already been sacrificed.
The Sromik Sheba team was formed of various independent actors who were simply
passing by or happened to arrive at the scene of the collapse. Many of them described the
collapse site as one of the most traumatic experiences that changed the shape of their lives. Miah
Bhai explained to me how the authority and police wanted to shut down the site and stop
counting the dead bodies once they had reached five hundred. However, the Sromik Sheba
team—formed of average citizens and advocates, people who gathered from different classes,
religions, backgrounds, and professions—congregated their skills to direct the scene of the
aftermath. Sromik Sheba continued to count the dead bodies of workers until they reached
“1,134”. Nevertheless, it is believed that way more lives have been lost during and following the
Rana Plaza collapse. In Chapter Four, I will present a story that my informant Onik shared with
me, about his friend Himu, and how the collapse altered his life. This devastating eight-storybuilding collapse wounded people in distinct ways. Miah Bhai and the Sromik Sheba team
witnessed first-hand what many of us learned about on the news and in textbooks in the days and
years to follow.
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The Rana Plaza disaster killed half the number of people that 9/11 did, yet according to
my informants, the collapse fails to be acknowledged for its magnitude and its ramifications
upon the lives of average Bangladeshi sromik. Perhaps it is simply due to the ‘value’ or lack
thereof that is associated with human lives due to colonial and patriarchal hierarchization of
bodies based on race, class, gender, etc. (cf. Rajan 1969; Ahmann 2018; Agard-Jones 2017;
Graeber 2001). The ‘othering’ and exoticization of racialized bodies perpetuated by colonial
actors reduce people of colour to stereotypical representations—depicting non-white peoples and
cultures as ‘uncivilized,’ ‘patriarchal,’ ‘backward,’ (Said 1991; Spivak 2003; Mohanty 1984),
and therefore ‘exploitable' (Lewis 2019, Chakrabarty 2018). As western news and media
highlighted, 9/11 was initiated by brown people, resulting in the loss of lives for many white
people (and others), however, the disasters in the apparel industry are kind of a reverse situation.
In the garments sector, white people profit from the exploitation of people of colour, specifically
women of colour, and thus, this colonial subjugation continues to get hidden under the rug as
much as possible to maintain white supremacy and elitism globally.
This collapse was not the first nor last of its kind, as there have been many disasters of its
sort, before and after, within Bangladesh and in other parts of the world, and within the fast
fashion industry as well as in other global factories. For example, in July 2021, a Shezan Juice
Factory in Narayanganj, Bangladeshi caught fire, resulting in the death of three workers and
injuring more than fifty people (Rita 2021). The domineering practices exhibited by factory
owners and supervisors who lock fire exits to prohibit workers from taking breaks, and limit
adherence to safety protocols—stimulate the normalization of these disasters (Rita 2021).
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a handful of parent company names that appeared from the Rana
Plaza collapse were also found involved in multiple other factory disasters throughout the early
2010s (Comyns and Franklin-Johnson 2016). These brand names include Primark, Loblaw &
Mango, Benetton, JC Penny, etc., and some of these companies had ongoing scandals regarding
their negligent management of global factories, (Comyns and Franklin-Johnson 2016).
Nevertheless, western brands refuse to take responsibility for their (in)actions, and thus the entire
expectation of maintaining garments factories and directing the aftermath of disasters falls
immediately upon national actors. As recalled from the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire in 1911
that resulted in the relocating of factories from New York City to the West Coast, these events
display the same forms of underlying conditions and vulnerabilities, normalizing violence facing
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wage workers. Subsequently, the annual global recognition given towards large-scale disasters
tells the tale of colonial hierarchization of bodies. An event that threatens western actors
occupies (and deserves) greater action and coverage than any factory disaster facing poor,
gendered, and racialized sromik working in factories in developing countries (cf. Agard-Jones
2017).
The international response following these disasters does not vary drastically from one
calamity to the next. While the Rana Plaza collapse garnered tremendous media attention due to
its magnitude, in 2022, few of the promises made by national and international players to the
victims of the disasters and their families, have been fulfilled. Moreover, there are only a handful
of local actors actively seeking remittance opportunities or organizing protests alongside the
sromik. Nevertheless, one key difference between the Rana Plaza collapse and other factory
disasters was the international response it garnered—as the disaster threatened western
corporations’ legitimacy and revealed its exploitative strategies. This ‘moment of rupture’
resulted in the formation of a few international policies including the ACCORD in April 2013,
followed by the Alliance, only a few weeks later. As previously stated, these neoliberal
transnational policies had limited effect on preventing disasters or providing relief to victims of
these events. In the next section, I want to explore how the Bangladeshi government and other
national players responded to the Rana Plaza collapse. What measures were taken following the
disaster on a national scale? What remittances were given to the victims and their families? What
has changed or remained the same in the Bangladeshi garments industry since 2013?

3.2. Disaster Capitalism: Nine Years Post-Rana Plaza Collapse
The term ‘disaster capitalism’ was coined by activist Naomi Klein (2007) to distinguish the
features of a neoliberal economy where following a ‘shocking’ or catastrophic event, the
responses from the state evoke further oppression against the average peoples and works in
favour of the corporate players (Schuller and Maldonado 2016; Klein 2007). This is relevant in
the case of the Bangladeshi garments sector and the disasters it has witnessed. April 23, 2022,
marked nine years since the devastating Rana Plaza collapse. The Bangladeshi Garments
Workers Solidary (BGWS) hosted several events including panels, protests, and more to observe
the occasion. I attended a handful of the panels led by Taslima Akhter (Lima Apa) who was one
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of the key organizers behind Sromik Sheba, and others. There were other recognizable names of
scholars and thinkers on the panel including Dina Siddiqi, Nafisa Tanjeem, Rehnuma Ahmed,
and Anu Muhammad. During the panel, Muhammad, who is an economist, stated that the main
causes behind the Bangladeshi apparel industry’s untethering conditions (that bring in profit only
for a select few players) are the fragmented labour movement and the limitations of trade union
work. Furthermore, he mentioned that the Rana Plaza collapse was the largest industrial disaster
in the garments industry, enough to shake western brands and result in the production of the
ACCORD and Alliance. However, the Bangladeshi government has yet to raise a hand in favour
of the victims, despite the episodic disasters that have transpired since. Muhammad referred to
the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire in NYC and the drastic changes it brought and
compared it to the limited concerns of the Bangladeshi state for its citizens. During COVID-19,
Hashem Foods, a six-story-building that was built illegally outside of Dhaka, caught on fire, and
killed fifty-two factory workers—including Laizu Begum’s 11-year-old nephew, and Bilal
Hossain’s 13-year-old daughter (BBC News Asia 2021). The fire blazed for 24 hours before it
was extinguished (BBC Asia 2021). These disasters are ‘normal accidents’ (Perrow, 2004). The
panel discerned that the oppositional political parties (Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jamati
Islam, and the Awami League) weaponize sromik (workers/labourers) and their demands to gain
votes. Therefore, until workers can unite independently, the labour movement cannot succeed
and will remain pongu (disabled).
How can workers take control of the movement? Taslima Akhter (Lima Apa) added that
a young garments factory worker named Rehana was recently fired from the factory following
posting a Facebook status about their unlivable wages amidst the rising living costs in
Bangladesh. The news and media are found repeating the same narrative of ‘fear,’ ‘loss,’ and
‘grievances,’ distorting the image of Bangladesh as a hapless place where terrible things happen
(cf. Beckett 2020). What the media should be highlighting, Lima Apa asserted, are the deplorable
wages offered to workers by western brands and Bangladeshi factory owners. Hashem Foods
employees, many of whom were children as young as 11, were paid less than $0.24 per hour
(BBC Asia 2021). In Bangladesh today, workers and activists are prohibited from speaking up;
anyone who is seen questioning the neoliberal state is quickly dismissed by state-led players.
Lima Apa voiced the amount of stress she embodies daily, regardless, she says the fight must go
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on. Thus, in 2022 BGWS’s slogan is “Mritoder Shoron Koro, Jibitoder Jonno Lorai Koro,”
which translates, “Remember Those that have Died, and Fight for Those Who are Alive.”
After the Rana Plaza collapse, workers were kept distracted by Western media channels
and outlets that made them repeat their tragic stories and struggles, rather than gathering workers
to collectivize and claim their rights, exclaimed someone during the commemoration event.
Western corporations hinder labour activism to their benefit by keeping supply chain workers
disconnected. This is pursued tactically so that local demands get overwritten by transnational
solidarity efforts post moments of crisis. International media fixates on policies like the
ACCORD and blames national players for the corruption and misery facing factory workers
(Rahman and Langford 2014, 170; Tanjeem 2021). Bangladeshi state players are seen as puppets
of these western transnational corporations by local activists and labour organizers—whatever
the corporations demand the privatized institutions and post-colonial state players like
employers’ groups and factory owners are compelled to fulfill. What resulted in this national
crisis where Bangladeshi garments workers are prohibited from organizing and collectivizing
their demands, and the overarching “helplessness” narrative that is deployed to speak about the
region more generally? In the next section, I will provide a brief chronological synopsis of
Bangladesh’s historical state formation and political partitioning that became definite features of
the country’s economic relations in the global arena, which influenced the representation of
Bangladeshi people and garments workers globally.
How the World Remembers Bangladesh: From an “Underdeveloped” State to a Competitive
Global Producer of Fast-Fashion
Bangladesh has long been an object of international concern that is framed in terms of
humanitarianism, suffering, and of victims who are portrayed as in need of saving by westerners.
In this section, I will elaborate on the entrance of western NGO-based development in
Bangladesh following independence. Moreover, the promotion of western donor dependence
(Lewis 2019), and the increased convoluted relations between opposing political parties within
the country (which was prompted by British partitioning), produced several barriers between the
Government of Bangladesh and its citizens. Eventually, neoliberal, and outward-facing industries
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came to saturate the country’s economy, which as I argue, only benefits a select few players,
while enabling a chain of workers’ rights violations.
After a nine-month-long, cold, and brutal war, on December 16, 1971, Bangladesh—formerly
known as East Pakistan—received its independence from West Pakistan’s military dictatorship
(Huda 2019). The war resulted in mass casualties for millions of average civilians and soldiers in
Bangladesh. Today, many Bangladeshis recall the war as a form of genocide against their people.
On August 1, 1971, singer-songwriter and lead guitarist of the Beatles, George Harrison, in
collaboration with Indian sitarist Ravi Shankar, hosted the Concert for Bangladesh in Madison
Square Garden before 40,000 people (about twice the seating capacity of the arena). The concert
was one of the first of its kind, and it raised $250,000 for Bangladesh relief. These funds were
overseen by UNICEF and were even followed by the publication of an album, in addition to
several other events such as the formation of the George Harrison Fund for UNICEF (UNICEF
USA 2021). This fund continues to provide aid to various countries and communities in need,
including the recent Rohingya Refugee Crisis occurring across the Myanmar-Bangladesh
borderlands (UNICEF USA 2021).
Following the philanthropic endeavors forwarded by Harrison and UNICEF in 1971, American
folk singer Joan Baez (1977) published “Song of Bangladesh,” in light of the outbreak of war
and famine facing the region. The lyrics included the following:
The story of Bangladesh
is an ancient one, again made fresh
By blind men who carry out commands
Which flow out of the laws upon which nation stands
Which is to sacrifice a people for a land
Bangladesh, Bangladesh
Bangladesh, Bangladesh
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When the sun sinks in the west
Die a million people of the Bangladesh.
The song addressed matters of famine, flooding, and civil war, along with the dangers of
violence, exploitation, and corruption facing the Bangladeshi region and its people. These events
and the Western humanitarian concern with Bangladesh correspond with the era of expansion of
North American neoliberalism (cf. Ong 2007) and the international development rhetoric
involving NGOs that sought to ‘save the third world’, meanwhile, maintaining western
hegemony over these regions' cultures and economies (Lewis 2019). This moral concern for the
people of Bangladesh in the 1970s went hand in hand with the presence of colonial haunting
resonant in the structural relations of exploitation and extraction that led to the long
“underdevelopment” in the region (Lewis 2019; cf. Kilroy-Marac 2018; Gordon 2008;
Chakrabarty 2018). Quickly, Bangladesh was recognized as a global basket case as my Ammu
(mother) recalls it. White developers representing western NGOs entered the region with
intentions of modernizing the state and helping improve the lives and conditions of Bangladeshi
people, specifically women, and children.
Bangladesh is a developing country and globally scrutinized for its ‘under-development,’
poverty, unstable political climates, corruption, lack of democracy, and a widening gap between
the governing state and its citizens (Muhammad 2020; Prentice 2021; cf. Sassen 2008; Sassen
2002). These conditions make room for international actors—private corporations, NGOs, and
global organizations such as UNICEF—to easily enter Bangladesh with socio-economic
development plans involving neoliberal modes of dominance cloaked under terms resembling
‘equality’ and ‘modernization’ (Lewis, 2019; cf. Brown 2010; Ong 2007). As I have mentioned,
American-led neoliberalism uses international organizations like the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to intervene in post-colonial economies to expose developing
nations to exceptional trade policies, enabling international corporations to maintain a top-down
economic grip (Ong 2007, 1). Arguably, the International Labour Organization (ILO), Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and other international organizations and frameworks favour
protecting the jobs of American corporate players rather than safeguarding the lives of ordinary
Bangladeshi workers (Drake 2013 in Rahman and Langford, 182).
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As of 2022, two of Bangladesh’s largest economies i) the Temporary Foreign Worker
program and ii) the Readymade Garments are employing enormous numbers of precarious
workers who produce the bulk of Bangladesh’s national revenue. Furthermore, both sectors are
export-led, privatized, and outward-facing, therefore, little provisioning is done on part of the
Bangladeshi government in maintaining the rights of these workers. The representation of
Bangladesh as a place where ‘disaster,’ ‘corruption,’ ‘patriarchy,’ and ‘crisis,’ takes place is
systematically enabled by the post-colonial state of Bangladesh that overlooks the conditions of
its citizens and sides with the western corporations (Tanjeem 2018; Siddiqi 2015; cf. Beckett and
Wagner 2022). In the next section, I will analyze the roles of a handful of national players and
how these state-led actors respond following moments of crisis.
As witnessed by activists during the Rana Plaza collapse, the BGMEA and government
authorities attempted to shut down the body count of victims to protect the identities of
corporations such as H&M and Zara. Nevertheless, this disaster was televised globally for
months to follow, additionally, several restoratives and remittance opportunities were promised
to the victims. Rather than fulfilling these empty promises—the western colonial state reiterated
the imageries of Bangladesh as suffering and victimized and described the fast fashion industry
as women-dominated and feminized. All these characteristics functioned as what Siddiqi (2015)
calls the “politics of seeing and not seeing,” to permit the enactment of colonial tactics and
exploit racialized, gendered, and classist labour (cf. Beckett and Wagner 2022; Ong 2007;
Freeman 2002). The post-colonial state of Bangladesh has limited say in its own economic
affairs; capital is controlled strictly by western corporations (cf. Standing 2014). Therefore, to
ensure its position as a leading global producer of textile, state players must concede to the
demands of international brands (cf. Brown 2010, 8; Sassen 2008; Sassen 2002, 45). Today in
Bangladesh, the responsibilities of the national government—such as providing health care or aid
to sromik—are overseen by NGOs such as Awaj Foundation led by Najma Akter (Karim 2014,
56). Akter’s celebratory work is worth acknowledging. However, as Muhammad (2022) noted, it
is important to acknowledge that the national government has failed to provide basic human
rights to all citizens, including garments workers, meanwhile, the same state players are known
for frequently boasting about the capacity of the apparel industry in terms of the revenue it
produces. This reveals the submission of the nation-state to corporate demands, in addition to the
commodification and subjugation of Bangladesh garments labourers.
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There are several limitations and challenges as expressed by scholars and activists that
limit the labour movement in Bangladesh. Many of these conditions are maintained by postcolonial state players, including the Bangladeshi government and employers’ groups, to profit
from these lucrative systems. Meanwhile, a handful of NGO-led and western-funded actors
represent garments workers internationally, and since non-Bangladeshis are not fluent on the
dynamics of labour activism in the region, they remain uninformed that certain activists are
distinguished for stealing spotlight from local activists and sromik on the ground (Kang 2021,
10). This leads to the oversimplification of workers’ rights and demands by western players who
are unfamiliar with the ongoing conditions in Bangladeshi garments factories, which results in
the repeated subjugation and impediment to the working classes and to the local sromik andolon.
These issues could be a compilation of many issues that faced Bangladesh, such as the
accumulation of inter-party rivalry, assassinations of party leaders, or the concern that some of
these actors were against Bangladesh’s independence and preferred Pakistani and British rule.
Most Bangladeshis today believe that most parliamentary players have become corrupt and
inseparable from the capitalist state. At one-point Miah Bhai said to me “buddhijibira shob
bikrito hoye geche”— all the war heroes of Bangladesh have become sellouts—as he let out a
sigh. The Bangladeshi government proclaims it follows the same values from the independence
era of restoring a “shonar/shadhin Bangla” golden liberated Bengal—while functioning as a
neoliberal economic state (Muhammad 2022). However, by 1975, most economists and
politicians who had promoted socialism had either called it quits or were fired, and with them
gone the ‘socialist dream’ experienced a short and swift demise (Muhammad 2022). One key
matter that Professor Dina Siddiqi warned me about during a phone call, was to be mindful when
criticizing these nation-state players and to avoid single-handedly blaming only factory owners.
Siddiqi was my first informant, and her contributions heavily influenced my research. State
actors are seen looting the profits of the rigid systems set in place by colonialism, military
dictatorship, and gendered discrimination against Global South women (Karim 2014). However,
the one-sided blame that Bangladeshi national players face in maintaining the fast fashion
industry further promotes western brands to play a hands-off role in attending to the garments
factory workers. I aim to address these matters and their build-up more thoughtfully in this
section.
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Moments of crises such as the Rana Plaza collapse are treated as unstoppable rather than
preventable and the result of an accumulation of corporate decisions (cf. Ahmann 2018;
Chakrabarty 2018). The representation of Bangladesh as a place where ‘disaster,’ ‘corruption,’
‘patriarchy,’ and ‘crisis’ happens not only overlooks the perpetuated violence promoted by
western brands and national players, (Tanjeem 2017; Siddiqi 2015), but also fails to display the
solidarity efforts and coming together of average Bangladeshis (from across age, class, gender
divides) to provide aid and relief during the coronavirus pandemic for families in need, argued
Lima Apa during the conference. During the Rana Plaza collapse and its aftermath, Miah Bhai,
Onik, and other activists saw how the BGMEA and governmental players like the Ministers of
Parliament (MPs) sent the police and army to the streets and the collapse site to shut down the
body count of victims. Nevertheless, the local activists continued their search until they reached
“1,134.” People do not turn powerless during disasters; rather, they often act out of feelings of
mutual solidarity, helping each other survive and recover (Solnit 2009 in Beckett and Wagner
2022). The collapse and its aftermath were the subject of much media attention around the world
for months afterward. Additionally, several restorative and remittance opportunities that were
promised to the victims by global and national players, did not reach the workers for the most
part. If these proposals and promises went unfulfilled, what, then, did happen following the Rana
Plaza collapse at a national and state level?
Making of the Neoliberal State and Global Industrial Disasters
Newly after Bangladesh’s independence, the country opened its markets to foreign investment,
and the garments industry was a major focus for transnational corporations seeking cheap labour
costs. In 1977, the BGMEA was founded, followed by the BEPZA in the 1980s, along with a
handful of other employers’ groups that came to represent Bangladeshi workers in the global
supply chain. As national players such as Bangladeshi manufacturers and factory owners sought
to attract foreign investment by submitting to the demands of western brands, the normalization
of hazardous and unsafe working environments facing workers increased. Soon, the Bangladeshi
readymade garments sector witnessed a drastically widening power imbalance between Western
brands and national players. This resulted in an accumulation of industrial disasters including
factory collapses, fires, and other calamities. The 2012 Tazreen factory fire in Ashulia,
Bangladesh, for example, killed 112 garments factory workers, and inspired demonstrations and
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protests across the country that were led by garments workers and labour activists seeking relief
for the victims of the disaster. The issue of relief for the Tazreen victims was still unresolved in
2013 when the Rana Plaza building collapsed. The latter became notoriously known as the worst
industrial disaster to ever affect the fast fashion industry and its workers. Beyond the 1,134
confirmed casualties, the collapse affected the lives of millions of people in Bangladesh and its
enormity even disrupted those players sitting at the top of the global supply chain although they
were physically distant from where the disaster transpired (Tanjeem 2017). As discussed
previously, the sheer scale of the disaster provoked a global humanitarian response that repeated
the tropes from the earlier humanitarian responses that faced Bangladesh in the 1970s. This in
turn led American brands, NGOs, and trade unions to produce two policies in response: the
ACCORD on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker
Safety (Anner 2019, 13), which were touted as protecting workers.
The promoters of these policies say they were intended to ensure safety for garments
workers and maintain adequate working conditions in Bangladeshi factories. However, Kang
(2021, 4) argues that the ACCORD was not created with locals in mind and that there were
significant power imbalances at play between capital, labour, and the state when negotiating
these transnational policies. The ACCORD set out to cover 1600 apparel factories in Bangladesh
by 2017. In total, 71 suppliers were terminated, although only seven out of 1360 factories
addressed all issues and were approved by the engineering team, others witnessed closures or
relocations (The ACCORD in Tanjeem 2017, 54). The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker safety,
which was formed a few months after the ACCORD, also sought to address safety concerns. But
it was a commitment rather than a signatory deal, intended to improve working conditions for
Bangladeshi garments workers (Tanjeem 2017, 55). The Board of Advisors for the Alliance
includes representatives from major NGOs like Care Bangladesh and BRAC (Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee), as well as from employers’ organizations such as Bangladesh
Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA) and BGMEA (Tanjeem 2017, 5556). The Alliance did not include independent workers’ representatives and, much like the
ACCORD, was focused primarily on applying westernized codes of conduct and ensuring the
continuation of neoliberal modes of development that ‘essentialize’ the struggles of apparel
workers and third world women (Chowdhury 2018; Tanjeem, 2017; Abu-Lughod 2013; Siddiqi,
2009). International groups as well as grassroots NGOs such as BCWS (led by Kalpona Akter),
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emphasized the improvements of the ACCORD over the Alliance (Tanjeem 2017, 46). However,
many local Bangladeshi scholars and activists bunched the ACCORD and Alliance together in
critiquing their limitations (Tanjeem 2017, 46). Additionally, while certain NGOs and
international organizers preferred policies that sought to blame brands, local players were highly
cognizant and critical of the discrepancies within the industry and acknowledged that focusing
on brands has limited ground-level impact on workers’ lives, due to the role of subcontractors
(Tanjeem 2017, 37). Thereby, local labour activists centralized their efforts by holding national
players accountable for the mistreatment facing factory workers and citizens and demanded
improved salaries and working conditions for wage labourers.
In this global supply chain, a “bottom-up” approach is necessary to investigate the
subcontracting practices that influence management structures and sustain the fast fashion
industry (Wills and Hale 2005 in Tanjeem 2017, 37). Tanjeem (2017) borrows the term “network
capitalism” from Wills and Hale (2005) which describes the novel capitalist modes of
accumulation that emerged in the 1970s, in which various transnational players are involved in
maintaining any economy. In the garments sector, transnational corporations and western brands
increasingly rely on subcontractors to run their factories. Those subcontractors handle
employment, factories, and other key aspects of production, which allows brands to avoid
knowledge or responsibility of what is happening on the ground, all while in turn ensuring their
access to cheap sources of labour from distant geographic locations (Wills and Hale 2005, 5, in
Tanjeem 2017, 37). Subcontractors create another layer or gap between apparel factory workers
and western brands. Physical factories are no longer directly maintained by corporations, so
focusing on getting them to sign the ACCORD or the Alliance has limited meaning for local
activists or workers (Tanjeem 2017). Subcontracting is thus a stark example of the challenges
posed by neoliberal structures of governance and the gaps produced by uneven development and
geographic displacement (Prentice 2021; Harvey 2006). Consequently, this hampered traditional
methods of labour organizing that would permit workers to unionize and ensure representation
(Kang 2021). The United States-based transnational labour organizing practices and neoliberal
policies such as the ACCORD and the Alliance strategically overlook local realities of
subcontracting—thus, they are unable to fully understand how production through
subcontracting impacts the safety and security of garments workers in Bangladesh (Tanjeem
2017, 47).
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While the international community celebrated the ACCORD for what some saw as its
revolutionary labour regulating motto, it did not lead to any substantive institutional changes on
the ground. Moreover, it was perceived as an abstract policy by local activists, who could barely
tell it apart from the Alliance (Kang 2021). In 2018, Smart Jeans Factory Ltd. filed a lawsuit
stating that the ACCORD illegally suspended its relations with their factory despite the owner
Mostafizur Rahman’s full compliance with all the policy regulations (Mirdha 2017; Kang 2021,
2). Additional complaints from other national players, factory owners, and labour activists arose,
with many arguing that the corporate codes enforced by the ACCORD were inefficient and
illegitimate (Kang 2021, 2). Following these litigations, in fear of losing the ACCORD, the
members of the Readymade Garments Sustainability Council (RSC) brought in local players,
including the employers’ groups BGMEA and BKMEA, to administer regulations (Kang 2021,
2). The lack of presence from independent activists in the RSC depicts the hierarchical relations
between players from distinct levels and class brackets. Additionally, it emphasizes the role of
capital, labour, and the post-colonial state in maintaining those hierarchies (Kang, 2021, 4).
By 2020, the ACCORD had audited 2159 factories, 91% of which witnessed the implementation
of new regulations, while 156 factories were ordered to close, and another 159 relocated (Kang
2021, 7). Factory owners could not (or would not) afford the structural costs imposed by the
ACCORD, such as having multiple fire-exists. Consequently, many Bangladeshi factory owners
had to take out loans to sustain their businesses (Kang 2021, 7). In addition, factory owners and
supervisors deemed the requirements placed by the ACCORD wasteful and unnecessary. They
argued that they were better informed on what the factories and the workers needed, compared to
national or international players in the supply chain, and they complained that they had not been
consulted when these policies were initiated (Kang 2021, 8). In some cases, factory owners
managed to fight against the ACCORD, such as in the case of Smart Jeans Factory Ltd. Overall,
owners have sought to use the employers’ organizations, notably the BGMEA, as an institutional
means to gut the ACCORD (see Kang 2021). The case of the ACCORD is telling because it
shows the inadequacies of such policies in directing ground-level changes—they overlook local
intricacies such as the subsequent role of subcontractors, the concerns of factory owners who are
more familiar with the demands of workers, and overall, these policies misrepresent and
overshadow the demands of garments factory workers in the global supply chain. The ACCORD
was overturned before the end of the decade (Lewis 2019).
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Going back to the Rana Plaza collapse that provoked majority of these initiatives and civil
lawsuits that were made against players who were found affiliated with the disaster, including
factory owners and managers, many of which are still moving through the courts (Ahamad and
Islam 2019 in Prentice 2021). Several families of victims have filed claims against corporations
located in Canada and the United States—where Bangladesh is the second largest producer
(Rahman and Langford 2014, 169)—seeking damages for the loss of their loved ones, although
most of the claims have been unsuccessful due to limited witnesses to attest on behalf of workers
(Prentice 2021, 15). Through “geographies of unevenness” brands’ responsibility over global
factory workers becomes highly avoidable, meanwhile, enforcing transnational or even national
jurisdiction within the global supply chain to enforce safety for workers is becoming nearly
impossible (Prentice 2021). In practice, by 2017 the ACCORD had run its course, amid concerns
that the policy was too expensive and arduous for state players to comply with the regulations.
As well, the policies had a limited impact on the improvement of working conditions for workers
(Tanjeem 2021; Kang 2021; Lewis 2019). But the ACCORD did help reveal a key part of the
story, which is the significant role played by the state itself as well as by employers’
organizations and other national-level groups in the maintenance of the garments sector. It is to a
discussion of the role of employers’ organizations such as Bangladesh Garments Manufacturing
and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and other state players that I turn to next in this chapter.

3.3. Post-Colonial State and Export-led Garments Sector: The Rise of the
Bangladeshi Neoliberal Government
In this section, I will elaborate on the roles and responsibilities of all the key national players
who are responsible of the upkeep and maintenance of the Bangladeshi apparel industry and
provide a brief history on the formation of the Government of Bangladesh. After Bangladesh’s
independence in 1971, national politics quickly came to center around a two-party system, with
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as the leading center-right party and the Awami League
on the left (Rahman and Langford 2014). The BNP was initially led by West Pakistani
conservative politics and supported by the United States. Meanwhile, the Awami League was
chaired by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and initially formed of communist and liberal nationalist
thinkers who promoted the formation of the guerrilla militia group called the Mukti Bahini. The
Awami League won by majority post-Independence (Rahman and Langford 2014, 174). Since
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independence, the country has observed six five-year development plans, the first of which
differed tremendously from the rest (Muhammad 2020). The first plan was focused on a socialist
framework (Muhammad 2020). That first program also included support for expanding the
region’s agricultural sector, my Baba father tells me. The first plan was drafted by economists
focusing on areas for social development; these people joined out of passion and patriotism
rather than bureaucratic professionalism (Muhammad 2020). However, these ‘socialist dreams’
were short-lived. Some critics have suggested that the socialist national plan was characterized
by its “unrealistic idealism” and that already by 1971 too many people were profiting from trade
and increased privatization (Muhammad 2020). By 1974, Bangladesh signed the Multi-Fiber
Agreement that, like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in the 1990s, was
designed to protect North American brands from paying taxes and tariffs. In short, the
postcolonial state, despite its official ideology, has always played a key role in the liberalization
of trade for the garments sector (Lewis 2019, 1964).
Despite being recognized for its socialist ideals, the Awami League is criticized for
historically suppressing workers’ rights, controlling labour unions, and forcing Awami League
demands to be centralized (Rahman and Langford 2014, 174–5). Sheik Mujib, popularly known
as Bangabandhu—who is titled the “jatir pita” founding father of Bangladesh—was
assassinated in August 1975, before completing his first term as Prime Minister. The Awami
League was defeated and replaced by a military government—this group was renamed a few
times, until 1977 when they formed the BNP led by Major General Ziaur Rahman, (Rahman and
Langford 2014). My nanu (maternal grandmother) told me that during Zia’s rule, she could not
leave the house to even buy milk for her daughters. Throughout the occupancy of this military
regime, the Bangladeshi labour movement was downright suspended. Around this time, interunion rivalry became normalized while corruption and nepotism became definitive features of
Bangladeshi state politics (Rahman and Langford 2014, 175).
In 1981, Zia was assassinated, and President Sattar from the BNP took over, until the
government was overthrown by another military coup d’état a few months later, led by Army
Chief Hussain Muhammad Ershad (Rahman and Lanford 2014, 175). Ershad formed the Jatiya
Party, and his regime was heavily influenced by Bangladesh’s history of military occupancy
under the Pakistani administration, as well as British colonial partitioning (Rahman and
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Langford 2014). It was during this tumultuous period in the 1970s and 1980s, while coups and
military governments shaped national politics, that the World Bank entered Bangladesh with
several neoliberal development projects, including structural adjustment programs, microfinancing, and more mercantilist type export-led businesses (Muhammad 2020; Lewis 2019;
Chakrabarty 2018). Intermediary tactics were deployed by American corporations, enabling IMF
and the World Bank to capture authority over Bangladesh’s ‘development,’ and things only
worsened from here (Muhammad 2020). According to Muhammad (2020), corruption expanded
during this time along with the formation of the super-rich class and ‘neoliberalism for the
poor’—through increased urbanization and a shift away from agriculture to other neoliberal
privatized sectors such as garments production and the Temporary Worker Program—all of
which were claimed to promote GDP growth (Lewis 2019; Karim 2014, 57). From this period
onward, development in Bangladesh has been exclusively associated with the growth of the
national GDP, with little regard given to other measures of national life, such as the quality of
living for citizens and wage workers (Lewis 2019, 1971). It was under these political and
economic conditions that the global garments industry gained traction and began planting its
roots in Bangladesh (Rahman and Langford 2014, 1975).
The current Bangladeshi government, which is led by the Awami League and Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina, has a big place in my house and with my parents. As I was writing this
chapter, I had to stop a few times to question ‘the truth’ as my family members and I entered
several “passionate” discussions regarding blind nationalism vs. what the textbooks cannot tell
you. I probed my parents on the legitimacy of their faith in the Awami League government given
the criticisms they are facing. Baba tells me that I was not there when Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic
movement from the British India era founded in 1941) formed in Bangladesh around 1975, and
how tyrannical and domineering their philosophies were. Between 2001-6, Jamaat-e-Islami
experienced its largest succession in partnership with the BNP, however, since 2010, the
members of Jamaat were found affiliated with war crimes from the era of independence (Islam
2021). These groups weaponize religion to oppose Bangladesh’s liberation and continue to
restrict women’s rights and access, Baba told me.
The advancements proposed by PM Hasina’s advocacy for the Bangladeshi people and
the legacy of her father, known as the jatir pita (nation’s father) Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur
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Rahman, continues to inspire and enlighten many older generations of Bangladeshis, including
my Generation X parents. This is in keeping with the struggles and sacrifices of their parents (my
grandparents) who witnessed and endured the liberation war between Pakistan and Bangladesh,
51 years ago. Comparably, the garments industry is a source of national pride for Bangladesh,
and it is regularly celebrated, advertised, and associated with conversations about Bangladesh’s
growth and prosperity. However, as the old socialist values faded with the advent of neoliberal
development plans, permanent industrial jobs were slowly replaced by temporary, outsourced,
and insecure employment sectors (Muhammad 2020; Lewis 2019). While Bangladesh’s
agricultural practices suffered cutbacks and impoverished conditions for farmers, two main
streams of GDP growth emerged as central to the Bangladeshi economy—migrant workers going
to the UAE, and the export-led apparel industry.
The garments industry exuded new and modern characteristics, such as the opportunity
for formal employment for ‘unskilled’ and ‘illiterate’ women (Karim 2014). Alongside
microfinance, the apparel industry remained a leading focus of women-centric development
projects in Bangladesh (Karim 2014, 54). In 2005, the value of Bangladesh’s garments industry
grew from $3.5 billion to $10 billion within one year (Karim 2014, 54). Since then, over the last
two decades, the industry has grown exponentially, as western clothing brands have found
Bangladesh as a site for cheap and exploitable labour with little to no governmental oversight
(Karim 2014, 54). These neoliberal industries occupy spaces and evaluate them as “states of
exception” where anything abides, (cf. Agamben 2008). Therefore, when disasters such as the
Rana Plaza collapse takes place, brands can easily place blame upon national actors. The state of
exception is a space outside of the law and the sovereign reach of the nation-state, but at the
same time, it is also like a space of immunity or indemnity—that protects the corporations and
allows them to shift the responsibility to the government, even when the government cannot
easily enforce regulations or protections (Agamben 2008). Meanwhile, inter-governmental
politics suffers from rivalry and mistrust of the common people upon the neoliberal state and
state-led players. Transnational corporations condemn turbulent political conditions in countries
like Bangladesh and use the opportunity to make regions compete for their investment, while
factory workers are placed in cruel and discriminatory conditions.
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In Bangladesh, the first wage board for garments workers was created in 1994 and the
monthly salary was set at $11; it increased to $22 in 2006, then $37 in 2010, and then $67
following protests after the Rana Plaza collapse—still, ranking it a world-wide low (Karim 2014,
54, 3). This makes me think back to my conversation with Miah Bhai, who had told me that in
2021 the wages for workers were around $3.2/day or $96/month. Miah Bhai and Sromik Sheba
members, including Taslima Akhter, wish to see the wages raised. During the pandemic, while
Miah Bhai was protesting alongside other activists to raise the minimum wage, BGMEA
authorities stopped the protests and launched attacks that resulted in the death of several
protestors. Miah Bhai suffered several beatings at the hands of these organizational players who
are affiliated with the Bangladeshi government and therefore have operational authority over
state entities such as the police, armies, and more. Moreover, the BGMEA launched an industrial
police program hiring over 3,000 deputy personnel to “maintain order in industrial zones”
(BGMEA 2020). However, the BGMEA refutes any accusations regarding shutting down labour
organizing and protests (Chua 2020). Any efforts that could prevent workers from producing
‘value’ for the national economy or that could be seen as a threat to Bangladesh’s export-led
business model, are viewed as highly contentious and disfavoured by institutions like the
BGMEA. These institutions answer to international corporations and reproduce colonial
mentalities in viewing Indigenous lands, resources, and peoples, as commodifiable (cf. Lowe
2014; Wolfe 2006; Rajan 2001). Employers’ organizations thus play a key role in maintaining
and policing the fast fashion sector. To fully understand their relationship with the state and
foreign capital, it is important to address that local labour activists in Bangladesh estimate that at
least one-third of the garments factory owners in the country are currently also Ministers of
Parliament (MPs). In effect, the state is the garments businesses and vis-à-vis. What is more, the
BGMEA, BKMEA, and other employers’ organizations operate as alternative governments in
Bangladesh (Antara and Sultan 2021, 3). To understand better the relationship between the state
and the garments sector, it is necessary to assess the role of the employers’ organizations in
Bangladesh in greater detail.
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3.4. Pre-to-Post-Colonial Bengal: Ruling of the British Empire and
Partitioning of the Indian Subcontinent
One classic example of the commodification of labour in Bengal is presented by Dipesh
Chakrabarty (2018) in his investigation of the Jute Mills in Kolkata that survived between the
1890s and 1940s. The hiring target for these mills constituted a very niche socioeconomic and
political group of the poorest workers with a lack of class consciousness (Chakrabarty 2018, 11).
These workers were mostly illiterate and recognized as ‘unskilled,’ similarly to the Bangladeshi
workers who are employed in garments factories today (Chakrabarty 2018; Karim, 2014). The
philosophy of this market was to exploit cheap labour. Additionally, the jute mills were
maintained by the Indian Jute Manufacturers/Mills Association (IJMA) (Chakrabarty 2018, 15),
whose role in the supply chain can be compared to the Bangladeshi employers’ group BGMEA.
Chakrabarty (2018, 15), argued that national institutions like IJMA (and BGMEA in the case of
the Bangladeshi apparel industry) embody a ‘mercantilist’ economic approach that derives from
the 16th to the 18th-century trade systems, associating increasing exports with national wealth and
prosperity. The Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was unfamiliar with
the bourgeois ideas of ‘individualism’ or ‘equality,’ therefore the hierarchization of bodies or the
presence of inequality was considered the norm, and not shocking to its regional inhabitants
(Chakrabarty 2018, xxi). Consequently, in the 1920s–30s, western notions of equality and
creating job opportunities for populations who were formerly disenfranchised from producing for
the formal economy (such as lower-class women) were presented through a colourful lens and it
was easily marketable to many South Asian and Indian state players. This longer history of
commodifying South Asian men and women’s labour by individualizing their voices and
demands (Karim 2014; cf. Chakrabarty 2018; Spivak 2003), would later reappear in my research.
The cultural connotations of pre-capitalist practices proscribed the populations in Bengal from
organizing to their utmost capacity and benefit—once western capitalism had already permeated
the region (Chakrabarty 2018, xxi). Even in the 2020s, the social stratification amongst and
within South Asian communities (e.g., Indians, Pakistani, and Bangladeshis) remains rigid,
especially amongst the middle-to-upper-class groups who are incredibly careful not to associate
themselves with the lower classes. Without the formation of alliances amongst different classes,
wage workers found it difficult to organize and mobilize around their needs and priorities,
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preventing them getting their demands heard on a national scale. In this section, I will investigate
the overlap of historical, structural, and cultural issues present in Bangladesh that prevent
workers from accessing their rights in this transnational corporation-driven global supply chain,
and how national actors play a key role in maintaining this system. As it will become clear,
export-led production in general and the readymade garments industry have been central to the
story of the development of a national economic model since Bangladesh’s independence.
International brands intentionally select areas of production where auditing and factory
regulations are limited, off-loading the corporations of any responsibility for workers. Therefore,
employers’ organizations including the BGMEA, BKMEA, BTMA, and BEPZA, are assigned to
provide local-level administration (Kang 2021, 2). I have referred to these institutions several
times already in this thesis. Now, I want to elaborate on my findings by asking the following
questions: who are these institutions; what roles do they play in the Bangladeshi garments
industry; and how are they perceived and described by local activists? To answer these
questions, I will refer to my conversation with two differently situated activists, both of whom
are experts on the Bangladeshi garments industry and labour movement: they are Rizwana and
Saira.
In the 1990s, BGMEA was responsible for maintaining twenty-eight percent of all
garments factories (Tanjeem 2021, 263). By 2010, there were 5600 factories enlisted under
BGMEA (Rahman and Langford 2014). This accounts for only half of all factories since
majority of the workers in Bangladesh today are employed by subcontractors (on which more
below). The factories listed under BGMEA, or under the Bangladesh Export Processing Zone
Authority (BEPZA), are generally considered to be better maintained than subcontracted
factories, for which there is little to no regulatory oversight (Tanjeem 2021, 264). Nevertheless,
these institutions embody the post-colonial state and can be oppressive in nature (Rahman and
Langford 2014; cf. Brown 2010). Recall, for example, the discussion in chapter one regarding
the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 26, 2020, the Bangladeshi government
declared strict lockdowns, leading BGMEA to shut down all the garments factories, as ten
million Bangladeshis returned home from Dhaka (Kabir, Maple, and Usher 2020, 48). Suddenly,
while the spread of the virus was at its peak during the summer, BGMEA ordered the reopening
of the factories. Supervisors called and demanded workers return to work, threatening they
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would lose their jobs if they did not return (Kabir et al. 2020, 48). During this period, all public
transportation was still closed, so apparel factory workers were compelled to walk back to the
factory towns surrounding Dhaka on foot.
This is how Saira, a leading researcher on the garments labour movement, described the
situation:
The thing we noticed during the corona pandemic is that the treatment that workers had
to face. Suddenly, while the entire country is under lockdown, the factories were
reopened. The garments workers were outside of the city and had to come back. Here the
gap we noticed is that communication was an issue, between trade union leaders and the
workers (those who are average labourers and cannot participate with any unions because
the factories they work for do not allow it). How wide is this communication gap?
Well, at the national level while these negotiations were taking place regarding whether
the factories will be opening. There were posts appearing in newspapers and on social
media. We were observing—once they said that the factories will be opening, then the
decision came that the opening will be deferred by a week. The news of that one week of
delay, was flooding social media as people were criticizing the situation. This had a
substantial impact which obliged factory owners and groups to change our decisions, since
the public was getting so upset that how could this be? As these negotiations were taking
place, at that point I had this question within myself that I tried to mention in my research
as well that, was there no way for the trade union leaders to inform the garments workers
who had gone back to their villages, of the news that, okay we are trying to keep the
factories closed, so please hold back, and do not return to work just yet. We saw that no,
thousands of workers, they walked on foot—basically at that time there was no
transportation, during the national corona lockdown, even if they could somehow afford it.
Meaning, rickshaws, cars, vans, trucks, bus, absolutely nothing was running. So, they
walked mile after mile, some of them had to walk 200-300 miles to reach the factory
districts. They just walked. And when they reached Dhaka in the middle of the night after
their miles-long walk, they came to find that the factories were not opening. They will
remain closed for one more week. At that point, they had to turn back. Those who did not
want to return, they attempted to stay in Dhaka at the houses they maybe rent in the city
during work. We were watching on the news that at that point the bariwalas (tenants) were
not allowing workers to enter since everyone was afraid of contracting the virus at that
point. The bariwalas said “they walked through crowds to get here, if we allow them to
enter this could expose those who are here to the virus.” So, what did the workers have to
end up doing? Many of them spent the entire night sitting along the sidewalk. They could
not enter their rental units, and so eventually, they headed back to their villages.
The fact that garments workers were forced to walk for hundreds of miles only to be turned back,
is a glaring example of the power of the state and the employers’ organizations, as well as their
failures to attend to workers’ needs or be responsible for worker safety. It reminded me of the
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IJMA at the Jute Mills in Kolkata (Calcutta), as discussed by Dipesh Chakrabarty (2018). If the
IJMA played a key role in maintaining the colonial economy, today the BGMEA plays a similar
institutional role in upholding the neoliberal economy, and anything that could threaten its
functionality, or the profitability of the export-led apparel sector becomes a threat to the nation
and the state. The key difference, though, is that there is no longer a single colonial power but an
array of corporate interests and powerful international and national actors and institutions who
require cheap labour to be readily available to them.
In my quest to learn more about how the garments sector operates, I had the opportunity
to speak with a leading Bangladeshi American scholar named Rizwana. Rizwana and I got along
from the beginning. They had so many insightful contributions to make, it was only my second
interview and I had learned a lot. I turned to Rizwana and said, there seem to be so many global
and national players, who would you define as the state that is responsible for the workers?
Rizwana replied that she thinks, in the case of the Bangladeshi fast fashion industry, it is a very
confusing and convoluted state because there are many overlaps in roles and players. For
example, the former mayor of Dhaka North was also the CEO of BGMEA until 2017. She noted:
I mean if you look at the makeup of our parliament members, more than one-third of our
parliament members own garments factories. So, to some extent, garments factory
owners, they are the government, they are the state. And when we talk about another
state and its role in protecting government workers, you are basically going back to the
garments factory owners, again and again because they run the state.
Rizwana explained that the political climate can be quite intimidating as a scholar. People are
allowed to criticize the state, such as the Bangladeshi government or a particular institution,
however, it is unacceptable to criticize the people or players in it. Many scholars have received
tremendous backlash for attempting to raise awareness about these matters. Rizwana concluded:
“Garments factory owners in Bangladesh are the state. They exploit workers and act as the voice
of garments workers through organizations such as BGMEA, BKMEA, etc.” Rizwana and her
colleagues have experienced more direct repercussions, including having publications they wrote
removed from online newspapers because they criticized particular figures from the employers’
organizations and ‘named names.’
Rizwana described it this way:
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So, if you criticize the state, say you mention the Bangladeshi state should be doing this,
or that, then to some extent it is permissible. However, if you directly quote those folks,
or even in other cases, if it is not related to the work you are doing, and you become
critical of the army for example—I mean you cannot say those things. So, going back to
your question about who you see plays the role of the state, I mean, I will say it is
garments factory owners and managers who basically have total control over what the
state does. And, oftentimes within Bangladesh, those same names who are exploiting the
workers, when it comes to the question of appealing to the international community, they
tend to be the voice of workers.
During the COVID-19 crisis, the BGMEA published a heartfelt video requesting
international buyers to not cancel the orders of workers so that they can pay their bills
and afford to survive. The deeply charismatic appeal of the video as though these
employers’ groups deeply care for the workers is problematic. Considering, BGMEA is
known for preventing workers from protesting, resulting in people like Miah Bhai, Saydia
Gulrukh, Shabujul Islam, and other labour activists risking their lives when protesting for
workers’ rights and demands.
Just look at what BGMEA did in the last couple of years. Like when workers were
organizing for the wage movement, BGMEA kept repeating that 20,000 Taka is
impractical, 16,000 Taka, is impractical, and 8,000 Taka, perhaps can be managed.
Therefore, ultimately, it’s BGMEA that is doing everything to ensure the minimum wage
is not raised or is minimally raised. And all the things that were happening during our
call-in summer of 2021, such as forcing workers to come back to the factory while the
Delta variant was killing so many people and with vaccination, discrepancy, we have not
yet achieved that rate of immunity. So, whilst all these things are happening—what are
the garments factory owners and employers’ groups doing to remedy the situation?
Nothing. Yet, when it comes to the question of whether orders should be canceled, which
would lead garments factory owners to lose money, in that case, they tend to suddenly
care for the voices of factory workers and try to appeal to the international community
that, okay, do not cancel our orders as it will hurt the workers—when really it is to save
their pockets.
Rizwana clarified what majority of texts and publications on the apparel industry do not cover,
regarding the convoluted labour movement where workers and activists are outright beaten or
fired for criticizing the national players and factory owners who are maintaining the capitalist
industry in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the nationalistic progress in terms of GDP growth that the
garments industry and workers produce is tactically marketed by the national government; and
the imagery of helpless workers who need the industry for sustenance is reproduced by both
national and global players.
Before I wrap up my analysis of the employers’ organizations, I will shortly turn back to my
interview with Miah Bhai whose trade unionist experience exposed him to learning about the
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insides of two of Bangladesh’s largest export-led businesses. According to Miah Bhai, in the two
main economic sectors in Bangladesh, the garments industry and the temporary workers’
program, both industries treat workers like “twenty-first-century slaves.” The Bangladesh
Association of International Recruiting Agency (BAIRA) recruits Bangladeshi sromik through
recruitment agencies where Bangladesh’s strength is described in terms of “manpower” or the
number of available recruits (BAIRA 2022). While manpower describes the strength of
Bangladesh’s population density, it is worth recognizing that the trade union sector receives
national and global scrutiny for being thoroughly male dominated, therefore, the usage of these
terms should be further problematized. Nevertheless, continuing with Miah Bhai’s analysis of the
Bangladeshi migrant workers program, in 2021, Pakistani workers were paid $1200, Indians
received $1400, but Bangladeshi workers only received $400–500. Until the 1980s, migrant
workers in Bangladesh were treated and paid well; comparatively, in the 2020s, their wages are
disproportionately low. Miah Bhai further exclaimed that people from other countries get paid
more than Bangladeshis, even though several BAIRA members are also the ministers of
Bangladesh. “They are so powerful . . . we average people cannot compete,” he exclaimed.
According to Miah, any time apparel workers, labour activists, or trade unionists enter the streets
to protest for higher wages or remittances following injuries, losses, or layoffs, facing workers,
the BGMEA is known for stopping these demonstrations by force.
Both industries—the garments sector and the temporary worker program—are equally
volatile and exploitative in their own ways, especially considering the factory owners are the
state and fulfill the roles of MPs and MPPs. Miah Bhai expressed his frustration that these people
have so much power in their hands, yet they continue suppressing worker’s rights. As he viewed
it, these powerful players bend laws and regulations to increase profit much of which comes at a
cost for workers who are uninformed of these changes for the most part. The close alignment
between the government, factory owners, and employers’ organizations meant that workers’
rights were getting repeatedly violated and or overlooked. Indeed, he said that the government
was working for the interests of factory owners and others profiting from the apparel sector,
rather than advocating for the rights and interests of workers themselves. When factory owners
hold seats in the government, they can alter parliamentary laws, labour laws, and all such
processes concerning the rights and security of average wage workers to their own advantage and
to promote other capitalist players. “Buddhijibira shobai bikrito hoye geche” translates: all the
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war heroes of Bangladesh are now sellouts, Miah exclaimed; “the heritage of Bangladesh is
getting sold.” The government is “matha noto” (obedient) to the garments bebshahis,
additionally, certain governmental players are direct beneficiaries of these key industries. Two of
my informants shared that to them, it feels as though Bangladesh (and Bangladeshis) is being
commodified and sold for parts. One key aspect of that vulnerability and exploitation arises from
the intricate relations and (mis)alignments between the Bangladeshi government, factory owners,
and subcontractors. It is to a discussion of the role of subcontractors in the garments sector that I
now turn to.
Neoliberal Exceptions: Subcontractors in the Bangladeshi Garments industry
At the time in 2021, when I initially began my fieldwork, I was curious to learn more about the
exceptional conditions facing apparel factory workers that overwrite the forms of ordinary
violence they encounter (cf. Beckett 2020; Ahmann 2019; Agamben 2008). International
criticisms of the garments industry often garner attention toward export processing zones
(Neveling 2015), however, as I unraveled through my research, an exceptional zone or space
where the vulnerability of workers increases can be formed anywhere. Nevertheless, while
speaking with Rizwana, I learned the different ways that EPZs are described and conceptualized
in the context of Bangladeshi garments production. Subcontractors and export processing zones
(EPZs) are different institutional arrangements and are responsible for distinct types of
factories—EPZs are maintained by employers’ groups such as BEPZA and BGMEA, while
subcontracted factories are completely unregulated (Anner 2019). Subcontractors will locate the
cheapest vacant lot as a location for a factory and hire workers for temporary periods until their
orders are completed. After that, workers are let go and left to seek alternative means of income.
In chapter one, I discussed how EPZs are heavily scrutinized by Western scholars. Much of that
criticism has focused on how EPZs operate as a kind of space of exception. Yet, in Bangladesh,
factories located in EPZs are better maintained and frequently deemed safer for workers than the
factories in the expanding sector of subcontractors (Anner 2019). My research looks to shift
away from a narrower focus on the exceptionality of EPZs (which do allow factories to be
exempt from certain kinds of laws or regulations) and to expand the theory of exception
(Agamben 2008). Undeniably, in the case of the Bangladeshi garments sector, the subcontracted
factories are perhaps more exceptional spaces. Rizwana shared with me that many activists and
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workers are not too concerned about EPZs, instead, they view the 50% of apparel factories that
are under subcontractors, as the more pressing issue. Rizwana visited one such factory and
described it as exceptionally dangerous, but Global North players and institutions tend to avoid
the topic of subcontractors altogether.
When Rizwana went on her field visits to factories, the owner happened to be one of her
neighbours; he had limited knowledge about the sort of work that Rizwana was doing but was
kind enough to show her around. Rizwana described her visit to the subcontracted factory
outside Dhaka this way:
At the factory, I saw that it was on a high-rise building that was under construction. It
was not even finished yet. And they put some heavy machinery in the building where
they were producing those clothes. They were probably coloring the clothes or whatever
at that time but there were these extremely heavyweight machineries set-up in that
building. So that is just one of the examples of how subcontractors actually work.
Therefore, I would say it is complicated because from a global perspective, EPZs by
default are an exploitative mechanism of suppressing workers’ rights and so on. But at
the same time when you do your field work, I mean, it is suppressing workers’ rights, but
it is fascinating that there are more dangerous violations to workers’ rights that are
happening in those factories that subcontract. And you know what—
Rizwana took a big pause before finishing her sentence.
Okay, this is mind-blowing…so to some extent, it used to be a taboo to speak about
subcontractors in the global north. Additionally, around American-based labour groups
such as the ILRF—these organizing spaces would not allow people to address the subject
of subcontractors. Why? Because those North American based organizations are trying to
push the western brands to take responsibility. However, it is quite an easy fix for brands
like Gap and Zara to avoid the responsibility by saying something like: “It is not our fault
that subcontractor is messing everything up. These subcontractors are not regulated, and
it is the fault of the Bangladeshi government. Therefore, we, the brands did not know that
the company we were contracting from, subcontracted the order to another smaller firm.
We had nothing to do about that.” It is an extremely popular excuse used by those local
North American brands. Therefore, the North American Labour Rights Activists used to
get mad when someone mentioned subcontractors as it disrupted their agendas.
If you go to Bangladesh. I mean subcontractors, they were a huge problem!!
Subcontracted factories are not regulated. It is interesting that those factories that are
already under ACCORD and Alliance are receiving massive amounts of attention from
the global community. A lot of them have improved their building and fire safety and so
on . . . but subcontractors are basically staying out of the whole thing. So, it is interesting
that in Bangladesh this is a huge issue. I mean talk to those local garments labour rights
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organizers; they will tell you that subcontractors are a huge problem. But in North
America, it is like “we don't talk about that,” (laughs).
This is certainly how Miah Bhai characterized things as well. He described the state of
Bangladeshi garments workers in 2021 as characterized by abnormally low salaries (wages are a
key issue for him and other activists). Yet, within the Bangladeshi national garments sector,
salaries in EPZs were slightly higher and they provided better (but by no means perfect)
environmental conditions for workers. Subcontracted factories were comparably much worse.
Miah stated that:
Labour laws bolte kichui nai (there is no such thing as labour laws here). Of course, that
does not mean that conditions are particularly good in the employers’ organization
regulated factories, just that the subcontracted factories are especially dangerous and
exploitative. Of the four thousand factories currently under BGMEA’s occupancy (aside
from all the factories that are subcontracted), the majority do not follow proper labour
rights. Overall workers are treated like slaves. The workers receive zero breaks for using
the toilet or at all, additionally, the toilets are extremely far away and distant. All that
seems to truly matter here is what the government wants (which is fulfilled by garments
factory owners).”
Then, I asked, who are these garments factory owners?
Factory owners in Bangladesh are part of a complex chain of relationships, and many of my
informants shared that the garments factory owners and employers’ groups function as
alternative governments; in a sense, the factory owners are the state (Antara and Sultan 2021, 2).
In 2005, as the Bangladeshi garments industry was flourishing, most of the apparel factories
were owned by Bangladeshi manufacturers in partnership with South Korean, Chinese, and
Indian business investors (Karim 2014, 54). Heaps of South Korean capital was invested in
building and expanding the fast fashion industry in Bangladesh during the era of trade
liberalizations (Lewis 2019, 1964). That capital investment helped lure in western brands
beguiling them with cheap and replaceable labour; practically no oversight by governmental
entities; and little or no room for labour organizing (Kang 2021; Karim 2014, 54). At the same
time, the labour movement in Bangladesh has been fractured since the 1990s, when it was torn
into two visible groups: NGO-affiliated activists on the one hand, who often had ties to national
and international players, and local activists and grassroots organizers on the other hand, who
were much more clearly based in local communities. The NGO-affiliated group has typically
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been well-funded, and their agendas have focused on issues of corporate responsibility and the
role of brands and international actors in the supply chain. NGO-affiliated groups have been the
key promoters of international policies such as the ACCORD (and, in an earlier moment, the
Harkin Bill) (Kang 2021; Karim 2014). By contrast, local labour activists and grassroots
organizers have remained largely independent of NGOs and international support. They are
comprised mainly of independent activists who are locally situated, and their efforts are focused
on raising inter-class awareness amongst all Bangladeshis to inform others of working conditions
in the factories. They are less concerned with international policy or corporate actions; instead,
their primary goal is to build a local labour movement, and they thus share concerns with
traditional labour movements and trade unionists, even if they have expanded their efforts to
consider the full range of economic and social issues facing garments workers. Local activists
seek to hold corporations and factory owners responsible for the treatment of workers and, above
all, to hold the Bangladeshi government responsible for fulfilling its obligations to its citizens
(Kang 2021; Karim 2014, 59). In Chapter Four, I will elaborate on the fragmented sromik
andolon in Bangladesh.
Factory owners are known to disapprove of both sorts of labor organizers and
movements, although, the NGO modes of activism can at times resonate with the national
government’s own rhetoric, and the idea that external agencies (NGOs and civil society, the
market) should take up the role and function of the neoliberal state (cf. Lewis 2019; Anner 2019;
Harvey 2006; Sassen 2002). This can be described as ‘denationalization’ (Sassen 2007).
Nevertheless, as I learned during my fieldwork, there is considerable overlap in the roles and
responsibilities of factory owners and government officials. Factory owners (similarly to
employers’ groups) are known for barring workers from organizing and publicizing their
demands. These state-led players argue that these demonstrations (or fulfilling these rights for
workers) will lead them and the Bangladeshi state to lose the garments industry and thereby go
bankrupt (Karim 2014). The evidence is critical—Bangladeshi factory owners are extremely
wealthy in comparison to apparel factory workers, whose labour produces the profits for the
industry (and the nation). Nonetheless, the earnings of factory owners are comparable to petty
change next to the large profits made by transnational corporations and brands such as Gap,
Walmart, or H&M (Karim 2014, 59).
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The intermediary economic position of factory owners helps explain why they resisted
the ACCORD, which they argued was awfully expensive for them, alongside fulfilling all other
factory running costs. Nevertheless, Bangladeshi bebshashis were obligated to comply with these
regulations and maintain good relations with western corporations to maintain trade relations.
Bangladeshi state players like garments factory owners are often presented as repressive and
patriarchal, and post-colonial states like Bangladesh are vilified in the news and on western
media and are presented as suffering in perpetual states of ‘crisis’ (cf. Ahmann 2018). While it is
true business owners are seeking to accumulate profit, nevertheless, the positionality of
Bangladeshi factory owners is more complex, as they are trying to uphold the country’s export
relations and maintain jobs for garments workers. Observations collected from the experiences of
informants during and following the capitalist disasters that shook the Bangladeshi garments
industry show how western corporations respond to these events with abstract policies that do
not listen to the demands of national or local players and with a discourse that depicts the
industrial failures as “Bangladesh’s problem” while playing a hands-off role when it comes to
fulfilling workers’ rights (Tanjeem 2017). Meanwhile, the western media and internationally
funded groups were criticized by locals for circulating terrifying post-disaster imageries and
narratives of those who suffered losses from these factory ‘incidents’ (Lewis 2019), which
according to local activists diverts attention away from grassroots organizers from conjoining
their efforts and demanding remittances, rights, and improved wages for workers. Rather, the
corporations are seen shifting away to further lucrative regions and seeking cheaper sources of
labour to avoid criticism and hide from public scrutiny by elongating the distance between the
producers and consumers in the industry (Anner 2019). The intention of the fast fashion supply
chain is not to provide economic opportunities for disadvantaged communities such as
Bangladeshi women garments workers; rather, it is to secure ongoing sources of profit for
transnational corporations (Tanjeem 2017). Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government,
employers’ organizations, factory owners, and other third-party players such as subcontractors,
are afraid of losing the industry to other competitive post-colonial states where the profit margins
are higher and the condition of work for employees is similar or worse than in Bangladesh.

87

3.5. Concluding thoughts on National Players, Industrial Crisis, and
International Policies
In this chapter, I presented the roles and responsibilities of the key national players who are
present in maintaining this lucrative economy—the Bangladeshi garments industry. The
narratives I have highlighted disclose how post-colonial states’ representation are exploited by
global brands and institutions to portray Bangladeshi sromik as passive recipients of aid, and
national factory owners and governmental actors as corrupt and patriarchal oppressed from
whom the workers need ‘saving’ (Lewis 2019; cf. Said 1978). However, as the data I have
presented discloses—not all politically powerful players in Bangladesh are corrupt; rather these
actors are attempting to maintain an economic sector that employs millions of vulnerable groups
in the region. Transnational corporations continue to avoid taking responsibility for workers,
meanwhile, western institutions and NGOs can avoid addressing more critical matters such as the
dominance of subcontractors in the Bangladeshi apparel industry. International players fixate on
policies like the ACCORD and Alliance that are intended to ‘fix’ or ‘remedy’ disasters, but these
policies add tremendous costs of maintaining factories that national factory owners are
compelled to fulfill, thereby driving even more of them to turn to subcontractors. Meanwhile,
these policies do not attend to the demands of workers who are seeking improved wages, job
security, and better treatment as citizens and labourers. The opportunity for wage work in
factories as presented in case of the fast fashion industry is exploitative, it manipulates the labour
executed by colonized, racialized, and gendered groups. The association of ‘value’ within this
industry differs significantly based on the subject group. Therefore, it is vital to take a ground-up
approach and listen to locals, such as labour activists in Bangladesh who are intimately familiar
with the intricacies of factory work and continue to mobilize the demands of wage labourers.
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Chapter 4:
Bangladeshi Labour Activists in the face of “Crisis”: Theories of
Global Capitalism from the Ground Up
In the previous chapter, I presented the roles and responsibilities of the key national players who
are present in maintaining the Bangladeshi garments industry. In this chapter, I will pursue a
‘contrapuntal’ ethnographic approach (Daswani 2019; cf. Li 2020; Said 1993), to highlight gaps
in the global and national scales, based on the narratives I have collected from informants who
are familiar with the conditions of Bangladeshi workers or sromik on the ground. A ‘contrapuntal
perspective’ can make visible the hierarchical power relations amongst players in a system
(Daswani 2019; cf. Li 2020; Said 1993), specifically in the apparel supply chain, in this case.
Additionally, I will emphasize the desperate call for listening to local voices, workers, and
activists, to gather a nuanced understanding of what is needed to improve the conditioning of
lives of Bangladeshi citizens and wage workers in similar circumstances. The gaps between
players from different scales materialized as I delved deeper into my conversations with
informants, the local activists, and thinkers who are at the forefront of advocating for labour
rights and demanding increased wages for workers. Local activists are well-versed in the social,
cultural, political, and economic underpinnings of the lives of Bangladeshi factory workers.
Therefore, they have a nuanced understanding of the needs of garments workers, and wage
workers more generally. International policies like the ACCORD are negotiated between a
secluded group of players in the global supply chain, driven by transnational corporations, and
forwarded by NGOs, and other state-led actors such as employers’ organizations (BGMEA), who
claim to represent Bangladeshi workers on a global scale. As I have been arguing throughout this
thesis, the case of the Bangladeshi garments labour movement illustrates that some of these
players are unfamiliar with the nuances on the ground, whereas others are actively ignoring
certain issues through their political and economic stance that warrants ignorance toward certain
parts of the system. However, these complexities are what define the lives and livelihoods of
apparel factory workers and lifelong labour activists who dedicate their time to demanding equal
rights for wage workers, locally and globally.
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Actors at the global level tend to perceive labourers through NGO-driven modes of development
and all-too-often they reiterate the equivocal yet enticing imagery of western actors like George
Harrison and western agencies like UNICEF, with their focus on “saving” global south players,
specifically poor and uneducated Bangladeshi women (Chowdhury 2018; Siddiqi 2009; cf. Said
1978). For example, following the Rana Plaza collapse, the ILO raised $30 million in voluntary
donations provided mostly by global brands, enabling brands to blend ‘soft regulation,’,
business, and corporate social responsibility, all while, reproducing a top-down western saviour
complex (Blair cited in Prentice 2021, 14). Consequently, the ‘universalization’ of labour
standards and supply chain capitalism takes the place of the Bangladeshi state’s responsibility for
its citizens, including garments workers (Prentice 2021, 14). As a result, NGOs come to embody
a necessary role within the state by upholding the rights of access to food, water, healthcare,
education, and other basic necessities to Bangladeshi citizens (Lewis 2019; Karim 2014). Yet, as
we have seen in the previous chapters, the responses from global and national players amidst
crises have time and time again appeared as ineffective and inadequate in serving and protecting
apparel factory workers; these band-aid solutions failed to address that people’s rights can only
be fulfilled at a local level (Lewis 2019). Now, let us take a closer guise at the engagements and
commitments of localized approaches to labour activism, that get stronger following moments of
rupture, however, the efforts of local organizing are not only limited to moments of rupture.
Localized activism goes beyond providing crisis relief, rather, it intends to see long-term and
fiscal development and improvement in the conditioning of Bangladeshi labour rights, and attain
higher wages for workers, whether the garments industry remains in Bangladesh or not. The
rights and treatment of Bangladeshi wage workers and citizens are central to local labour
activists.

4.1. From Disaster Capitalism to Localized Activism: The Rana Plaza
Collapse and the Formation of Sromik Sheba
The conversations I had with my informants—Onik, Maisha, Salma Apa, Joy, and others—
altered the way I think, speak, define, and understand the garments industry. Additionally, their
words highlighted for me the fragmented labour movement in the industry, and the voices that
get buried under abstract policies and discussions about capitalism and neoliberalism. An
ethnographic approach recognizes the strength and passion behind localized approaches to labour
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activism that can completely emasculate those former conceptions about Global South players
and garments factory workers. How do Bangladeshi labour activists talk about their encounters
with the state and how they experience capitalism? Anthropological research promotes groundup methods of conducting research, where I learned that local activists are pragmatically focused
on wage workers at a physical level. They are informed by and aware of how national and
international scales may be influencing the local situation. Local activists are not absorbed by
abstract policies or theoretical generalizations about ‘neoliberalism, ‘gender equality,’ or ‘human
rights’—they have greater, more fundamental concerns to administer, such as whether garments
workers are able to feed their families, or if they can safely transit to and from work. Capitalism
seeks to turn ‘work’ into abstract labour measured in time and paid (if at all) in wages, but this
results in the erasure of the worker’s skills and aptitudes (Millar 2018; Federici 2017; Harvey
2006; Graeber 2001). Capitalist relations thus turn meaningful social relations into abstract
things that can be commodified. In the case of the apparel industry, as the product (garment)
moves through the supply chain, it ends up further and further away from the particular people
and place where it was produced.
To move beyond dominant western representations of post-colonial states and Global
South actors, then, it is necessary to work against this abstraction and reification and to focus on
the local level, on the narratives of those who have tackled these capitalist disasters, and on the
concrete realities of time, place, memories, and lived experience. Additionally, how activists
describe their efforts, and the condition of garments work can be applied to develop a critical
theory of global capitalism and the commodification of colonized labour at large, by those who
have daily encounters with the industry. The further one shifts away in the supply chain from the
local towards the national or the global, the more abstract those experiences of the worker and
activist become. It is these experiences that continue to ‘haunt’ the global industry as a
continuation of colonial and patriarchal subjugation of Global South wage workers, specifically
women (Akhter 2021; cf. Kilroy-Marac 2018, Gordon 2008). In my analysis, I draw on
anthropological modes of investigation that can show the ambiguities and contradictions between
the various scales within the industry—the global, national, and local. Additionally, as my
conversations with informants will highlight, these scales and players are deeply entangled and
inseparable—they continually influence one another in the maintenance of this neoliberal supply
chain.
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Global and national players can be observed avoiding taking responsibility for workers
and prohibiting workers from collectivizing as their main intention is to practice extractive
capitalism and accrue profit. Sustainability or ethical production and consumption are not the
goals of these corporate chains. Based on the ethnographic data I have collected, I will highlight
the significance of listening to local actors including Bangladeshi apparel workers and labour
activists, to recognize their hopes, dreams, and demands. In this chapter, I will shift my tone
from the previous chapters, as I drift away from the dominant narratives about the fast fashion
industry, to make space for the voices of those who have direct experience with the garments
industry and who can clearly identify and define the needs and demands of Bangladeshi
garments workers. In what follows, I will present the lived experiences of local actors who have
nuanced knowledge, analytic understanding, and direct and intimate familiarity with the gaps,
meaningful silences, demands, and intricacies that are found in the crevasses of this large-scale
industry. Moreover, while listening to local voices, I will emphasize the ‘politics of refusal’
practiced by my informants and myself as we deny the dominant narrative of Bangladesh and
Bangladeshi people as ‘defenseless,’ ‘hopeless,’ and in a constant state of ‘crisis’ (cf. Simpson
2007). As anthropological research shows, the whole picture is much more complex, as are the
lives of Bangladeshi garments sromik. I will begin with a short synopsis of some of my
encounters with informants, the majority of whom are Bangladeshi labour organizers who were
present during the Tazreen factory fire in 2012, the Rana Plaza collapse, the Tung Hai factory
fire in 2013, the Tuba crisis in 2014 that led to 1,500 workers going on a hunger strike, and many
other moments of crisis. Local activists continue collaborating their efforts to produce relief
funds to aid and support Bangladeshi apparel workers, their families, and the victims of factory
disasters. As I hope to show, moments of crisis can be mobilized by local activists to bring about
meaningful change that is reflective of the needs of Bangladeshi garments workers (cf. Ahmann
2018).
Onik’s Memories from April 24, 2013 – The Rana Plaza Collapse
On that day, I was heading home from a friend’s place which is about an hour away from
the site of the event where the eight-story garments building called the Rana Plaza
collapsed. I was five minutes far from that place and then suddenly—there was this—I do
not recall exactly, however, the ground began to shake, and momentously, everything
stopped, including the traffic. And as I started going towards the source of it, where people
were pointing, I saw white ashes. The entire area had already filled up with cloud-like
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smoke from the crashing piles of cement falling from the building. Bodies of dead workers
laid bare, some of them looked like—if there is a bag full of puffed rice and someone were
to poke a hole in the bag, how the rice would look falling from that hole—that is how the
insides of workers appeared falling from the holes and gaps in their skin and bones. I
witnessed tons of workers jumping from the fourth floor in an attempt to save their lives.
The sheer detail with which Onik described his memories reminded me of the vividness of the site
of the collapse. I tried to capture his words as I continued scribbling down anything I could on my
notepad. At times I paused, simply to take in the depth and dread with which Onik made his
decision to attend to the victims of the disaster.
At the time, I had my camera with me, but I could not capture any images that day. I
could not find it in me to think to take any photographs on that first day. There were
thousands of people going inside trying to find their loved ones. By the end of the night, I
began to get some of my senses back, then I started thinking about photographs and those
sorts of things. One of the things that haunt me to this day is that I could not eat. That
day, the next day, and for many days to come, I could not eat. Especially bhaat (rice), I
could not tolerate the sight of rice, even though it is a staple food in Bangladesh.
Those who rushed in to help at the site of the collapse experienced forms of persistent
trauma that have lasted longer than the media’s attention or the international
community’s concern. For those on the ground, those most directly impacted by the
disaster, the Rana Plaza collapse inspired a new generation of grassroots activists to join
together, to work to provide for those injured or affected by the disaster, and to hold the
perpetrators responsible for their inactions. Local organizers and labour activists
continued their conjoined efforts for six months following the collapse, working to offer
immediate and temporary relief for those who lost their family members, those who were
injured, or affected by the event whatsoever.
After Rana Plaza happened on April 24th, for over six months I was there every day. Most
nights I crashed at my friend’s place nearby. What would happen is every day around 2
pm, I would go to the restaurant that is a few minutes away from the Rana Plaza. Then
every time I ordered some food, whether it was fast food or otherwise, I would just vomit.
Especially the rice, just by looking at bhaat, I would vomit, because of the amount of flesh
I saw that day—open flesh—that every time I would see rice, I would just recall the flesh.
I could not fathom anything else. And everything would begin to smell like flesh. At the
end of the day, when I would get up to leave, the scent would still linger with me throughout
the one-hour ride home. That is how intense the whole event was.
After going back and forth a few times, I decide to ask Onik, “At the time you were attending
Pathshala (post-secondary school in Bangladesh) for photojournalism. What happened after that,
how did this event—the Rana Plaza collapse—impact your own life?”
Onik continued:
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Well, I was not able to attend any classes for six months. Then I tried to upcycle the
photographs that I had taken for the classes I had, but I was not personally ready to accept
that “I want to photograph in this way” because this [reusing photographs from disasters
like the Rana Plaza collapse] looks like trauma porn, for me at least.
I wanted a unique way to express myself through photography. So, I quit school. I was
not able to continue any longer. I collected these objects I found from the collapse site,
such as human skulls, people’s used vanity bags, teapots, and all sorts of things such as
lipstick, bra, undergarments, and an entire skull with hair still attached. So many things
that I collected, I gathered all of them and kept them in my bedroom. I kept all this for
about six months after the Rana Plaza collapsed. Then, I photographed them. I tried to tell
a story in this way. But of course, this is such a massive event.
This is when Onik decided to share with me the story of a close comrade. He told me:
I know someone personally; his name was Himu. After Rana Plaza, he committed
suicide. He was so mental. He was one of the people who went inside and cut someone’s
sleeve to get them out of the building. He was not a doctor or anything. He just saw a
common handsaw, like a child’s tool, it was not meant for cutting through a bone. It was
not electric or anything. So, he had to go through that, which later killed him. So
regardless, the number of people killed that we see publicized, “1,134” is not even
accurate. For there were so many passive killings. So many families will never stand up
and it will take them a few generations to get back from that loss… So, all these things
were very heavy for me. I could not even go out for six months. I completely changed the
style of my photography; I dropped out of doing any kind of journalism work. I used to
do photojournalism work for various outlets prior to the collapse, but after that, I stopped.
Words failed to define how I was feeling while Onik described what he witnessed at the site of
the Rana Plaza collapse. That day, I learned about activists like Himu who saved the lives of
those attempting to escape the collapse site, only for the trauma of the event to result in him
committing suicide. The idea of lives that are lost in this way being passive, as in they are
unaccounted for when the media reiterates the memory of “1,134 deaths” only, had not occurred
to me before this. Nevertheless, I wished I could reduce the pain that Onik and his counterparts
endured. Yet, all I could do was take a pause in silence and ponder, how many Himus have been
lost in this way?
My initial memories of learning about the disastrous conditions of factory work in the readymade
garments supply chain began with a case study of the Rana Plaza collapse. Thus, it made sense
for me to begin my inquiry there as well. While there are countless events like the Rana Plaza
collapse, some receive coverage while most are deliberately swept under the rug. In some cases,
these horrific tragedies may only receive annual recognition on the calendar date they occurred.
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However, for those who have direct experience with these disasters, their take on the matter is
drastically different. The informants I spoke with cannot choose to disassociate from the
memories of these events, nor can they put aside the socioeconomic, political, or health
implications that such disasters imposed on them. Onik, who was attending Pathshala—South
Asian Media Institute in Bangladesh—dropped out of school shortly after witnessing the Rana
Plaza massacre. Speaking with Onik was one of the most emotional and enlightening encounters
of my life—the honesty and conviction with which he shared his story and the tragedy of what
he had witnessed, was trembling. Shortly after our interview had ended, I recall quickly putting
my laptop away and crying to myself while laying with my head facing the pillow. Whilst I did
not want Onik to see me this way, my heart was breaking while he described to me the losses,
memories, and traumas, as well as the common humanity that brought everyone together to give
a lending hand during a disaster. Something so life-changing had happened to these people. I
commemorate my opportunity to speak and learn from Onik, and all my informants. These
individuals, and the Sromik Sheba team, gathered around to assemble relief projects aimed to
provide aid to all the victims of the disaster, including the workers and their families.
As mentioned earlier, shortly following the collapse, once they reached a death toll of
500, the authorities, including the BGMEA, made an announcement that the search was over and
that there were no more bodies left at the site. Miah Bhai says that the authorities were
uninformed and lazy because following their announcement Miah uncovered two skeletons with
his own hands. Sromik Sheba, along with the average civilians who gathered out of sheer
humanity, continued to count the number of dead bodies until they reached 1,134. Although it is
believed that many more lives were lost to that collapse. On that day in April, 1,300 people went
missing, and 1,134 names were declared by the ground teams including Sromik Sheba. To this
day it is believed that several hundred people remain missing, in addition to the 1,134 dead
bodies that were collected. There are no certainties of whether these missing persons are dead or
alive.
I recall my conversation with another activist, Joy, who is a Bangladeshi American
academician. Joy was exceptionally critical of the western news and media outlets following
these disasters that depicted Bangladesh as “a pathological place where terrible things happen.”
Accordingly, western media fails to address the efforts and contributions of local activists who
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work(ed) tirelessly to provide on-the-ground support to fast fashion workers. Onik alongside
Sromik Sheba contributed their skills and tools, they gathered at the site of the collapse for six
months, providing small aid and relief to the victims and their families. Whether it was providing
some money to a former worker to enable them to pay for their daughter’s dowry, or to buy a
new Singer sewing machine for a victim’s family to produce passive income, the Sromik Sheba
team assisted in any way possible. The dominant media representation of these catastrophic
events can appear rigged once these local points of view are considered. According to grassroots
organizers, the western media’s representation of Bangladeshi sromik as weak and defenseless,
the NGO-based “band-aid fixes” that repeatedly follow disasters (and that fail to prevent
workplace calamities), and the production and implementation of unaudited international policies
such as the ACCORD, all fail to acknowledge workers’ demands or recognize the role of local
activists.

4.2. Grassroots Advocacy: Localized Approaches to Disaster Relief and
Combatting Ordinary Violence
In this section, I will answer the following questions, how do local activists organize following
these disasters? How do their efforts vary from the promises and avoidable regulatory policies
that are introduced by the global and national players and NGOs? I will begin by going back to
my interview with Onik, who was a young undergraduate student at the time of the Rana Plaza
collapse. This disaster radically altered Onik’s life, alongside the lives of tens of thousands of
innocent people. I present Onik’s memories of the formation of Sromik Sheba after the Rana
Plaza collapse and the mobilization of localized activism and reflect on the contributions of these
actors—including my informants, Onik, Miah Bhai, Salma Apa, and the other members of
Sromik Sheba team some of whom are labour activists, anthropologists, academicians, scholars,
and advocates for Bangladeshi wage workers, including garments sromik. Taslima Akhter,
Rehnuma Ahmed, Moshrefa Mishu, Saydia Gulrukh, and Shabujul Islam, to name a few, are the
activists behind the revolutionary efforts formulated by groups like Sromik Sheba. These names
may be recognizable to those familiar with Bangladesh’s sromik andolon labour movement. The
Sromik Sheba team united their efforts and worked tirelessly for the next six months to assist the
victims of the Rana Plaza collapse. Some of these same individuals worked on relief projects
following the Tazreen factory fire, the Tuba crisis, and other industrial disasters.
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Local Labour Rights Movement and Involvement from Sromik Sheba
International and national aid efforts failed to reach many of the victims who were immediately
impacted by the collapse event. However, local activists like Onik, Miah Bhai, Salma Apa, and
others, worked tirelessly to raise funds and provide relief to those garments sromik who were
injured and to the families of those who lost their loved ones to the disaster. This highlights the
discrepancies involved in international aid and policy interventions, as local activists are the ones
aware and familiar with the ordinary needs of apparel workers, and how to assist them during
moments of crisis (cf. Beckett 2020; Ahmann 2018; Schuller 2012). However, a significant
matter of account is that the Sromik Sheba team did not limit their focus only to the Rana Plaza
collapse. Rather, they expanded their movement to address the chain of disasters that have
occurred in the Bangladeshi fast fashion industry and to hold state-led actors accountable for the
lives of garments workers.
I asked Onik to describe to me how the independent activists, local organizers, and labour
advocates, decided to collectivize and conjoin their skills and efforts. He responded this way:
The second day after the Rana Plaza collapse, I met this anthropologist and teacher from
Jhangirnagar University for the first time. I knew of her work for a long time. In
Bangladesh, she is one of the leading female voices against all sorts of atrocities. Her
name is Rehnuma. She was very delighted to meet me and was very jolly-minded. We
were discussing how we can ‘archive’ all this and what we can do. On the second day,
there were thousands of people all around the building searching for their family
members and loved ones. All the photostat stores where you can get a Xerox copy
done—were all overcrowded. People who are lining up, printing flyers stating “Shondhan
Chai” which means “I’m looking for” this and this person, from this address, please
contact me if seen, etc.
What was more intense was that some of these flyers did not even have a phone number,
because the person who printed them was in such a hurry that they could not even
remember to include a phone number or leave any contact information. They mostly saw
that this is what others are doing in search of their loved ones, therefore like everybody
else, they also began printing and thought it would help. At the sight of this, Rehnuma
turned to me and said, “we should document this,” and then immediately at the thought of
documenting all of this clicked in my mind that, “oh, I should photograph all the fliers.”
So, from that night onwards, I began photographing every single unique flyer.
In the beginning, I would look for unique flyers but later, I just could not keep track of
what unique was anymore. All the names began to get blurry and started to sound the
same to me. I was unable to identify what was unique anymore. So, I started
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photographing some things repeatedly. I took around 3,050 individual photographs over a
few months. Soon, a group of dozen [Sromik Sheba] was formed of people from different
means of life, including anthropologists, artists, politicians, advocates, teachers, and
myself being the youngest member. We all got together and started sorting things. We
were trying to provide information to those who needed it and assisted with all sorts of
things. Later, we formed a website with a list of names of missing persons called “24
April.” This was our direct involvement. This took around six months to construct.
We communicated with many victims. We called them and talked to the families. We
investigated whether any information was still missing. Additionally, we developed
another section of our work focusing on how many people are still missing after three to
four months. This went on for a long time. At the same time, when I was not doing that, I
would just ask my friends, friends’ friends, and relatives, for money and donations. With
what we collected, we would go immediately to those families and ask them directly,
“what do you need?” Someone would need a sewing machine, another needed money to
get their daughter married, one survivor needed mental and psychological help as they
had been continually cutting themselves since surviving the collapse, and we assisted
them in accessing psychological therapy.
That was one of the aspects where I tried being directly involved. But of course, those
efforts are so random. Not everybody or even a percentage of people was able to receive
help like that. It is so individual, here and there.
Onik’s memories from the efforts that he and the Sromik Sheba team performed following the
disaster and for the months and years to follow, were similar to how some of the other
informants also described their experiences. Local activists made it their goal to hold national
players accountable like the government of Bangladesh, employers’ groups, and national actors
who only figuratively represent workers but promote international policies (as these actors are
more reachable and less abstract than the international players). The Sromik Sheba team
confronted the normalization of disasters and mistreatments facing workers, especially the
victims of these industrial massacres (cf. Perrow 2004; Rajan 2019). Furthermore, rather than
focusing solely on the Rana Plaza aftermath, the local organizers found it crucial to represent the
garments workers and speak against the ongoing normalcy of violence and passivity associated
with the lives of wage workers, while centering their agendas around demanding higher wages
and improved treatment for Bangladeshi citizens.
Onik described their work this way:
Our website came out. Two people from our group, Saydia Gulrukh and Shabujul Islam,
went and fought the cases regarding the Tazreen fashion fire in 2012. While they were
doing that, everybody was contributing in their own way, by collaborating independent
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efforts. Rehnuma would write something, Taslima Akter, she is a photographer and
politician—she was constantly joining protests. I was still photographing and then
showcasing them. I organized exhibitions and even recommended that exhibition called
“1,134 Lives Not Numbers” which happened at my school, Pathshala South Asian Media
& Institute. I was the one who proposed the idea to Taslima Apa that we should host an
exhibition, in 2014. We collaborated with a few institutions and scholars, to host art
installments and crowdsource donations. Overall, these efforts created a bit more
awareness. I guess.
However, when I met people on the East Coast in the USA, I quickly learned that very
few people are aware of these issues. This is not only Bangladesh’s matter, it is
everybody's matter. Bangladesh is producing an excessive number of garments to satisfy
the pressures and demands coming from the top of the supply chain. In attempting to
fulfill those pressures, this [Rana Plaza] destruction happened.
Onik’s account of the efforts of the members of the Sromik Sheba team challenges the empty
promises made by national and global players in the industry. The $30 million that brands
donated through the ILO covered wages that would have been paid to workers had Rana Plaza
remained intact (Prentice 2021). Nevertheless, no further compensation was provided for the
pain, suffering, and trauma endured by the families of the deceased workers (Prentice 2021, 14).
Additionally, my informants mentioned that how much of these donations and compensations
make it to the pockets of workers remains uncertain. Meanwhile, local activists in Bangladesh
aid workers and their families at an immediate and more intimate level, sometimes even of out
their own pockets. They are familiar with the needs of workers and assist victims of industrial
disasters and their families in accessing those needs—whether it be money, food, or help with
securing a simple doctor’s appointment.
Initially, when I first began the interview with Onik, I was taken aback by the depth and
definition that his contrapuntal perspective provided regarding the ongoing forms of crises as
visible in the Bangladeshi apparel industry. His experiences and knowledge made for a nuanced
and critical vantage point that differed drastically from what I had read in the textbooks or
watched on the news. I decided to ask Onik about his viewpoint on (inter)national NGOs and
their presence in the Bangladeshi apparel industry. I asked: “Can you tell us a little bit about your
understanding of the NGO sector in Bangladesh, how the NGO-players are contributing to labour
activism, and what your thoughts are on the matter?”
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Onik responded: “Personally, I think, and I do not know if this has any value, but I will
speak through photography. The way the National Geography channel approaches wild animals,
the Western media’s depiction of trauma in “third world countries” is also the same.” He
continued:
Consider the event of 9/11 and how it is represented in media. Half the number of lives
that were lost during 9/11 was the death toll from Rana Plaza (alone). So, it is a big event.
However, the representation is drastically different.
In Rana Plaza, corporations are some of the main players. As for the NGO, it has no
proper structure in Bangladesh, whatsoever. The amount of money they can spend, that is
how they define the progress; however, NGOs cannot meet any needs or requirements for
Bangladeshis. NGOs do not have the power to criticize anything, the change that is
needed, it is not grants or resources, it is policy that needs changing. Therefore, we do not
need NGOs. We need someone who can point out accountability. Someone who can
recognize that yes, Rana Plaza occurred, and we need to hold the criminals responsible.
Put aside the foreign players, we can address that later. Let us begin with Bangladesh.
Why don’t they strip their wealth and money by seizing their assets, liquidate it to cash,
and hand it out to those who deserve it? The Bangladeshi government was not providing
much funding or aid post-Rana Plaza collapse.
The reason that I had to go through that six-month process is that I do not even know if
that helped in any way or not. Since we are unable to hold those who are responsible
accountable, we as in a few individual independent activist groups in the corner of
Dhaka.
Onik’s statement on NGOs defining their progress based on the amount of donations they could
collect or spend was a critical one, as it resonated with the way Anu Muhammad had described
the national government’s perception of the garments industry as successful sheerly due to the
amount of GDP it accumulates. In the capitalist supply chain, the evaluation of any system or
enterprise is based on the profits generated by corporations, disassociating workers from their
rights as citizens and commodifying their skills and labour. The lack of accountability and
displacement of factories to unaudited territories where the rights of workers can be easily
overridden in favour of capitalists, is an indispensable tool manipulated by corporations to
dominate the neoliberal transnational economy (Tanjeem 2017; cf. Ong 2007). Meanwhile,
labour activists, and grassroots organizers display their agency as they refuse to follow
international agendas to promote transnational policies. Instead, they continue fighting for the
demands of garments sromik and working to provide a voice for ordinary Bangladeshis. While
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contributing their own time, efforts, and skills, activists contribute deeply to uphold the local
labour movement in Bangladesh. Although, they feel uncertain and doubtful about how much
impact their contributions will have, given that a majority of the pocket-holders in the industry
act in self-interested ways and manipulate the imagery of needy garments factory workers to
sustain the oppressive industry.
Onik paused for a moment, before recalling another story from the Rana Plaza collapse:
On the first night, I went to the school where all the dead bodies from the collapse were
lined up. It was a scene of genocide. Thousands of people with passport-size photos or
flyers, walking around and calling their family members by their names, in hopes one
will respond. They were going through the dead bodies to search for their loved ones,
however, some of the dead bodies did not even have a face. Some did not have a head
attached, others were missing limbs. All the bodies were covered. The whole place
smelled just like genocide to me.
When I went inside to the computer room, I noticed that they were counting the dead
bodies—and deciding who was taking it or not taking it. Since every time you take a dead
body home, they are given, it is not more than 10,000 taka or $120. The administrators
were keeping tallies on a blackboard at the school with chalk. You can always erase it
and there is no proof. Sometimes the news would come that somebody took the wrong
dead body, or fraudulently claimed a body to retrieve the money.
All sorts of chaos were taking place and we decided we needed to do something to aid
matters. However, the NGOs and non-profit players were absent at this time. They were
not there. Nor do they have the resources or nuanced awareness of how to set up a camp
and help assist in these processes during disastrous events like the collapse. Therefore,
NGOs cannot help when needed. When do they come? They come later to do some
statistical studies and display model help.
Disasters such as Rana Plaza happen repeatedly across the Bangladeshi garments sector, even if
the various disasters are not all as large or as devastating. Therefore, there should be dedicated
funding to help prevent disasters and provide aid during the aftermath of “normal accidents” (cf.
Perrow 2004). This might include, for example, having a dedicated hospital for garments
workers to receive medical attention. These prevention strategies can be implemented by the
government. However, according to local organizers, NGOs do not produce tangible and
permanent solutions. Onik wrapped up his thoughts by stating that “western NGOs, they give
painkillers. They do not solve cancer. Even though cancer, in this case, is very much curable. Of
course, we cannot prevent earthquakes or tsunamis. But before that, there are so many things like
Rana Plaza that could easily be prevented. Yes. 1,134 people should not have died.”
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Furthermore, he added that although he does not feel he is in the position to speak on behalf of
garments workers, he defined the current state of Bangladeshi sromik as “backboneless.” By
providing local structures that enable garments workers and their children’s access to education,
food, residence, and healthcare, “their backs can be strengthened, therefore when things fall
down, it will not be as horrific as Rana Plaza.”
I stumbled upon repetition across my conversations with informants, regarding the
influence of NGO-based activists and trade unionists who represent Bangladeshi garments
workers on the global front and are criticized for overshadowing the demands of local activists
and labourers. Some of these activists and unionists recognize the flaws in their field and choose
to organize independently and contribute to efforts such as Sromik Sheba. Nevertheless, certain
NGO activists receive a greater platform due to their various affiliations and funding relations
with western actors, as well as their fluency to speak and negotiate in English. Furthermore, the
global media and news repeatedly represents Bangladeshi workers as feminized and helpless, by
reiterating the number of lives lost or making sromik repeat their narratives of trauma, rather
than emphasizing the ongoing forms of violence workers are facing in the industry. A localized
approach steps away from speaking for the workers and instead positions the workers as the
agents of change. These actors are locally situated, regularly meet with wage workers, converse
with them in Bengali, and ensure that workers are included in organizing the sromik andolon.
Since publicizing workers’ demands can lead to threats and abuse, workers generally speak
through local organizers and labour activists who willingly risk their lives to mobilize grassroots
agendas that may be perceived as a threat by the national government and state led players. By
highlighting the demands of sromik—including increased minimum wages so that workers can
afford food, shelter, health care, and other ordinary needs and necessities for themselves and
their families—local activists make it their goal to treat workers as rightful citizens and agentive
thinkers. Localized activism often emerges in moments of rupture, but it also surpasses the
events of disaster. Indeed, local activism always looks beyond the disaster, and aims instead to
consolidate worker support and workers’ rights. Local activists argue that wage workers deserve
to continue living adequately beyond moments of crises, and even after the garments industry
shifts away.
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In the next section, I will draw out some of the main themes expressed by Onik to show
how what he is describing is a split or fragmentation in labour activism and the representation of
garments workers. The fragmented labour movement in Bangladesh is described in this way:
there are two identifiable groups of garments and labour activists that are distinguished by my
informants, the local labour activists. The first group includes NGO-represented, Englishspeaking players who are more familiar with policies like the ACCORD and the Alliance and the
differences between the policies; the second group is made up of local labour activists and
groups like Sromik Sheba and is known for challenging the Bangladeshi government, employers’
organizations, and other national players. The second group of activists evoke fear amongst
national players who are highly opposed to criticism, and “have laws refuting critique” according
to Miah Bhai. Meanwhile, local organizers amenably refuse to take funds from western players
even if that means less recognition for them, as NGO affiliation is criticized for overshadowing
local agendas, movements, and workers’ demands.
Fragmented Labour Movements: NGOs vs. Localized Activism
In conversation with Onik, I asked him, to explicate the gap between those who represent
Bangladeshi apparel workers on an international scale and those who are holding up the demands
of workers on a local pragmatic scale. Onik replied: “Very few researchers spend time studying
who is the leader of this whole movement. That is where western media, NGOs, and trade unions
fail. Some activists are comparable to celebrities on tour, traveling to spread the one selective
message that they have been endorsed for. Bangladesh has a few of these activists who are very
smart, talented, and have good intentions, however, they enter these western realms, receive
honorariums, and their policies immediately change.” While garments workers are protesting on
the streets demanding fair wages and bathroom breaks, these “poster children” activists, as Onik
described them, are most often expected to advocate for the same western policies that, like the
ACCORD and the Alliance, do not ‘listen’ to locals. These celebrity activists or poster children
and NGO activists maintain positive relations with governmental players, whereas local activists
are the ones openly criticizing the state’s inactions toward garments works, and defaming
ministers and employers’ groups for corruption.
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Onik described to me the sorts of players whose agendas receive the national and international
spotlight, versus local voices that get left out of the equation:
There are draconian laws by the Bangladeshi government that forbids criticism against
state players. Their fear includes more people finding out, feeling angry about it, and
protesting. Moreover, there are great leaders in the apparel industry who are not NGObased or internationally famous. Amazing and dedicated leaders. But they do not have
that English-speaking power. Some of these independent activists were former garments
workers that have dedicated their lives to labour activism. One of them is Shabujul Islam,
or Shabuj Bhai from Sromik Sheba.
Labour activists and workers in Bangladesh feel as though they have no room to breathe or speak
up, whatsoever. In the next section, I will investigate the forms of mistreatment facing
Bangladeshi garments workers by referring to a key thinker and activist from the field named
Taslima Akhter (popularly as Lima Apa by many). I did not have the opportunity to interview
Lima Apa, who was described to me as an extremely busy individual by my informants.
Nevertheless, it was a pleasure for me to extend my research upon Akhter’s exemplary
contributions as a leftist politician and labour activist with a large following across Bangladesh
and beyond. Taslima Akhter was one of the founding members of the Sromik Sheba team. She
continues to play a leading role in providing immediate relief for apparel factory workers during
ongoing crises—like hunger or wage-lessness—and following disasters like the Rana Plaza
collapse and the Tazreen Fashions factory fire.

4.3. Local Activists Define Crises: Taslima Akhter and Sromik Sheba
Disasters produce moments of possibility for collective organizing, as shown by the work of the
Sromik Sheba team post-collapse as well as by the work of other local labour activists whose
efforts I will refer to in this section, including Taslima Akhter (Lima Apa), and Maisha who was
one of my informants. The Rana Plaza collapse was one of the dozens of events that affected the
fast fashion industry, however, it also become a touchstone event leading to new forms of
activism.
I learned quite a lot during my interviews with Bangladeshi and North American academicians
and activists. They shared with me their knowledge regarding the fragmented labour movement
that they have observed, how the activist groups developed, and whose voices and which issues
receive global attention vs. what gets overshadowed. My informants guided me in depicting for
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my readers the issues affecting Bangladeshi garments workers as presented in the global context
and media, in comparison to the ongoing demands of garments workers based on how the
industry functions on the ground. Through my conversations with informants, I repeatedly heard
about “turf wars” and disputes between various groups seeking to represent Bangladeshi apparel
workers. Local activists like Onik and others described certain NGO-funded groups (whether
they were operating at the national or international level) as “celebrity activists.” Those highly
visible activists were continually featured in news and media stories. One example that people
often referred to when talking about this mode of activism is Kalpona Akter, whom I formerly
discussed. Akter is famously known for confronting western brands post-Rana Plaza collapse,
and campaigning outside of the Children’s Place Headquarters in the US, while touring the states
to promote the ACCORD. Akter—who is a former child labourer turned activist—was present
during the formation of the Harkin Bill in the 1990s. Today, she is the chair of the NGO called
the BCWS, additionally, she is one of the only women trade unionists in Bangladesh. Akter is
described by local activists as having close funding relations with western donors, and through
her NGO, she performs initiatives intended to promote workers’ rights and improve factory
conditions.
In contrast to the more well-funded, highly visible activists who work with NGOs, there
is another kind of activism at the local level, one that is characterized by independent,
community-driven efforts and may be found affiliated with committees like Sromik Sheba. Some
of the known names of labour activists in Bangladesh include Taslima Ahkter, Moshrefa Mishu,
Shabujul Islam, Saydia Gulrukh, along with others. These individuals regularly protest and
organize to aid Bangladeshi workers in attaining rightful wages, fulfilling their daily survival
needs, and in holding national players accountable. However, the second group of activists are
not nearly as popular or renowned as Kalpona Akter from an international point of view.
Shabujul Islam or Shabuj Bhai was a shishu sromik (child labour). Nevertheless, since he did not
“fit” to represent the gendered garments industry in the 90s and early 2000s, his story did not
receive the same amount of recognition as someone like Kalpona Akter. Still, Shabuj bhai
continues to promote labour rights within and across Bangladesh, often by risking his life and
wellbeing. Shabujul was one of the founding members and key organizers behind the Sromik
Sheba team, which was formed of various independent actors and activists who gathered from
different social positions, classes, and professions. The organizers all shared a similar passion
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and desire to promote workers’ rights and reach rightful compensation for the loss workers have
endured. Many of these activists have other occupations, careers, and hobbies, and in forming the
Sromik Sheba, these members collaborated on their ideas to develop strategic plans—with what
limited time, money, and resources they could access—to provide immediate relief to the victims
of disasters like the Rana Plaza collapse, along with other ordinary disasters and forms of
violence (cf. Beckett 2020).
Taslima Akhter for example is a local activist who attends to the needs and demands of
workers on the ground. Akhter and other grassroots activists prioritize goals and initiatives that
do not receive international attention or funding. Local activists follow a different agenda—
moving away from what they see as a fixation on brands and international policies like the
ACCORD and focusing instead on the inadequacies of national authorities and governments.
However, these critical differences can become difficult to translate for non-local players, as
some people can stumble over minor details, such as the similar last names between these
completely differently positioned activists. Nevertheless, local activists like Lima Apa and
Sromik Sheba demand changes that are feasible and that can be implemented at the local scale
where they will directly benefit apparel factory workers and promote their well-being. These
activists focus on the ordinary, day-to-day needs and requests of garments workers. This includes
workers’ access to healthcare, food, shelter, education, and anything that resonates with the
realities of everyday life for workers and their families.
Maisha Recollections: Local Activists Refute Addressing ACCORD’s (Il)legitimacy
Maisha is a Bangladeshi American woman working as a professor at a university in Denver,
Colorado. She traveled to Bangladesh to conduct fieldwork for her Ph.D. dissertation on the
garments industry, and what she discovered on the ground was shocking. At the time, Maisha
was representing a USA-based organization named United Students Against Sweatshops
(USAS), which assigned Maisha the task of filming a video of local activists speaking about the
ACCORD. However, when Maisha landed in Bangladesh and connected with the local activists,
she learned that locals were uninterested in addressing their concerns to Western brands
regarding signing the ACCORD. Rather, the local activists were determined to promote their
agenda where they intended to hold the national players such as the Bangladeshi government,
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MPs, and local factory owners, accountable for the wages and remittances they owed workers
and their families.
Maisha described the situation this way:
I remember the very first day of my fieldwork in Bangladesh. There was a rally that was
organized by a group of organizers called the AA—Activist Anthropologists—consisting
of academicians, activists, journalists, and development professionals. At the time, they
were working with the Tazreen fire survivors, and they were trying to put pressure on the
government so that workers receive their compensation. I knew that there would be a
rally held in front of the Jatiya (National) Press Club, so, I went there, and I met a few of
the activities and workers. I went ahead and interviewed them.
The whole rally was about compensation. Workers were talking about how they were
suffering. They are not getting the money to pay their bills and since they are ill, they
cannot work and are suffering, and so on. When I was asking about the suffering, they
were talking about their health problems, their food insecurity, job insecurity, and all
these other things. They were not talking about the building and fire safety right away.
The workers were not talking about brands—they were describing how the factory owner
closed the door and there were no fire exits, so they had to resort to jumping out of the
window resulting in injuring themselves. They kept reiterating that the factory owners are
horrible, the Bangladeshi government is horrible, and there was not one mention of
brands.
Later, I met one of the organizers of Activist Anthropologists—I went up to her [and]
introduced myself. I expressed that I went to work in solidarity with them so, whether it
would be possible for them to connect. She said to me “so, you’re like one of those folks
who are basically advocating for ACCORD?” I said yes. She replied, “can I ask what it is
exactly that you’re trying to do?” I said, well I thought ACCORD is a good thing, but
what do you think?” Then, she mentioned to me that this entire “ACCORD thing” and
talking solely about the X number of fire exits—that differs tremendously from the
workers and their priorities are. Additionally, whenever this ACCORD is talking about
how to ensure safety and security such as through fire exists, oftentimes those garments
factories following the ACCORD will just install a ladder and call it an exit. This was
around 2013–14 when the ACCORD was still formulating. So, the AA (Activist
Anthropologists) organizer said, the ACCORD has no clue what they mean by building
and fire safety. There is so much international attention and pressure put toward the
implementation of the ACCORD, so much money and energy being invested towards it,
yet look at these workers, she said. The workers, they do not have food, they do not have
jobs, they are suffering. Meanwhile, this ACCORD is hurting our movement.
When Maisha returned home, she reflected upon the difference between the matters she was
asked to highlight for the international campaign she was representing, compared to the issues on
the agenda for Bangladeshi garments workers and labour activists and their demands. Maisha
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found that most local activists—minus the NGO-led activists like Kalpona Akter or Najma Akter
who are promoters of the ACCORD—were confused about the difference between the ACCORD
and the Alliance. Local leftist labour organizers spoke critically about the ACCORD and the
Alliance and did not distinguish between them. Maisha said that local activists would frame
things as “the ACCORD and Alliance are doing x, y, and z and it is overshadowing our
movement. ACCORD and Alliance are getting so much energy that it is hurting our cause.”
While NGOs and international organizations acknowledged the ACCORD as much better
compared to the Alliance, at the local level, both policies were viewed as equally bad and equally
problematic. As of 2022, the ACCORD and Alliance have both been suspended, making evident
the insufficiency of the western corporate social responsibility approach to making a visible and
quantifiable impact in the lives of the same people the policies intended to benefit and protect.
Certain NGOs support westernized policies like the ACCORD and receive funding from
the ILO and ILRF (International Labor Rights Forum) to promote their agendas. In North
America, Bangladeshi garments workers were represented by these ‘celebrity activists’ as Onik
described them. Comparatively, activists like the members of Sromik Sheba do not share the
same kind of network and they do not receive the same funding or media coverage. Still, it is
these local activists who are the ones who have been working tirelessly since the beginning of
the COVID-19 pandemic to attend to those workers who lost their jobs (at least the ones they
could reach) and to aid them in any way possible. Meanwhile, NGO-led activists are condemned
for their provisioning of band-aid solutions and for reiterating the narrative of Bangladeshi
women and sromik as ‘needing saving,’ which normalizes the promotion abstract policies that
have limited impact on the ground. Additionally, the role of NGOs makes room for the entry of
external actors to fulfill the role of the Bangladeshi state. Very few individuals outside of
Bangladesh, specifically in North America are aware of the efforts of independent organizers like
Sromik Sheba, who refuse to accept funding from international human and labour rights groups.
“When you are not in that kind of western funding relationship, your name, your exposure, the
kind of work that you're doing, the local context, it doesn't get highlighted in the Global North,”
Maisha explained. While Maisha was in a meeting with members of the Activist Anthropologist
group and the matter of foreign funds was raised, these local political organizers quickly
“refused” to work with western NGOs such as the USAS (cf. Simpson 2007).
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My informants disclosed that local activists are at times approached by larger
organizations, but they actively refuse international funding as it could cost them to lose their
agendas while their demands get overwritten by western policies. Western donors expect
submission in exchange for funding—they want local activists to prioritize the agendas of
international brands and governments rather than enabling apparel factory workers and activists
to vocalize their demands (cf. Bernal and Grewal 2014; Schuller 2012). Western actors attempt
to keep the labour movement immobilized and direct attention towards (pointless) debates that
will keep people occupied (for example, the debate over whether the ACCORD is better than the
Alliance). However, locals are aware that both policies are ineffective in the context of
Bangladesh, especially since both the policies and the NGOs who back them completely
overlook the role of subcontractors, who are notorious for employing workers under hazardous
conditions. North American organizations continue to reproduce the image of helpless
Bangladeshi people (recycling colonial tropes in the process), all while focusing attention on
western policies that have limited impact on the ground. Abstract discussions of human rights
and gender equality can shift attention away from the demands of actual workers and activists.
By contrast, local activists prioritize holding Bangladeshi state players, such as factory owners
and Ministers of Parliament, responsible for the suffering and exploitation that garments workers
face. Maisha’s academic activism led her to conclude that “Bangladesh will eventually lose the
garments labour market—cheap labour is not sustainable unless we think about alternative
economies. We should be investing in and initiating knowledge economies.”

4.4. Concluding Thoughts: Shifting Towards a Localized Representation
of Bangladeshi Garments Workers
In this section, I will address some of my concluding remarks from the data I collected, that
reiterate the main objectives behind the localized labour movement in Bangladesh that seeks to
attain sustainable growth and development by improving the rights and treatments of apparel
factory workers, and wage labourers more generally. In this chapter, I aimed to highlight how
moments of crisis such as the devastating Rana Plaza collapse, can be mobilized by local
activists. These collaborative efforts of independent local organizers can bring about significant
and meaningful changes that reflect the needs of Bangladeshi garments sromik. Onik who was a
young man when the Rana Plaza collapsed, was devastated by the tragic aftermath, to the point
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where he dropped out of post-secondary school while continuing to attend to the lives of apparel
factory workers. Onik and the Sromik Sheba team returned to the site of the disaster for six
months to provide aid and relief to the victims. By way of contrast, most international and
national aid funds did not reach garments workers; instead, NGO-based activists focused on
promoting the ACCORD over the Alliance. As Maisha’s research and fieldwork shows, most
local activists were unfamiliar with or did not care about the differences between those policies,
and they criticized them unanimously for sidelining the localized labour movement in
Bangladesh. As I have shown above, local activists had differing agendas that included holding
accountable certain national players such as the Government of Bangladesh, employers’
organizations, and other actors who only figuratively represented workers. By confronting the
state, the Sromik Sheba team like other local labour activists, challenge the normalcy of violence
that garments workers and other wage workers in the country face regularly. Additionally, they
continually show up and provide relief and aid following disasters and crisis. Some activists,
such as Onik, suggested that since disasters have become commonplace and many are unaccidental in the fast fashion supply chain, there should be dedicated funding provided by the
Government of Bangladesh that permits garments workers to access health care and education, in
addition to better wages so they can live dignified lives.
Here, I want to shift slightly to describe my conversations with Salma Apa, a Bangladeshi
scholar, social scientist, and a key figure in the local labour movement. Salma Apa is a Professor
of Political Science at a leading university in Bangladesh. Her focus is mainly on labour
movements and protests, and she self identifies as an activist herself. Additionally, Salma is
heavily involved in theatre, and along the way, these three aspects—research, activism, and
theatre—collided in her life, although this was not always the case. Salma Apa has worked
extensively in the garments industry and intimately connected with garments workers to gather a
nuanced perspective about the condition of factory work in Bangladesh and the demands of
garments sromik. We met over a Zoom call in the first week of August 2021, where she shared
with me her various involvements within the garments sector and her research, specifically on
gendered labour in the industry. I asked Salma Apa to describe to me how her involvement
initially began with the apparel sector, to which she responded that her journey started similarly
to many other Bangladeshis. The ongoing inhumane conditions facing factory workers and the
repetition of “accidents” (cf. Perrow 2004) and human-caused disasters in the Bangladeshi
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apparel manufacturing industry have pulled the heartstrings of many. Salma Apa was amongst
those who found it pivotal to centralize these issues and bring the matters to the forefront, even
though her familiarity was with environmental justice movements, not labour movements. In
2012, around the same time that Salma Apa wrapped up her Ph.D. Viva, the Tazreen Factory fire
transpired.
Salma reflected on the Tazreen Factory event and told me:
At the time, I was in England when I saw the news on social media. I felt incredibly
angry about this whole situation then how the workers are never treated as humans rather
than as numbers. I returned to Bangladesh in December 2012. As I was working on
making minor corrections on my Ph.D. thesis and I was involved in theatre, I have a
group for whom I wrote a play on the Tazreen fire. That play was a truly angry place, we
were all angry at the time.
Shortly after Salma Apa’s return, in January 2013, another “accident” appeared—the SMART
Export Factory in Mohammadpur, DHK caught fire, resulting in seven sromik fatalities (AlMahmood 2013). Salma Apa noted that the Tazreen Factory that was in Ashulia (on the outskirts
of Dhaka) was quite well documented, but the fire at the SMART Factory did not receive the
same level of attention. Following these events, Salma Apa and her team conducted their first
show for the play based on the Tazreen incident. The show began in April 2013; it was a street
play that required Salma Apa to conduct a significant amount of research. She contacted activists
who were present at the site of the fire, spoke with community players, and more. Within a few
weeks of the show, the Rana Plaza collapse took place.
Following the collapse, Salma Apa went to the site as an activist, alongside other
members of groups she is a part of including some of her friends and colleagues, and other
activists. She told me: “We were all devastated, shocked, and angry. We did a lot of work on
Rana Plaza, even though it was difficult to decide where to start working.” This is when Salma
Apa began to think about matters of human rights violations, labour rights, and vulnerabilities of
women garments workers, more specifically. She wrote small pieces of articles for different
magazines and journals. Later, she was part of a team that was commissioned to conduct a study
on the vulnerabilities of women garments workers in Bangladesh. The investigation lasted
between 2013–16. Their team attempted to capture a total picture of the Bangladeshi apparel
industry from the ground. Salma described the work this way:
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We tried to cover all types of factories—small, medium, large and jute, sweater, trousers,
etc. This was a project for which we worked extensively on garments workers from 20132016. Additionally, I was writing up some things so that the activists could benefit from
those writings. I did a review of the laws of Bangladesh that were supposed to be
upholding the rights of labourers, and addressed how and where they failed, and those
sorts of things.
In 2016, Salma Apa and two colleagues published a book based on the findings of their research.
After that, Salma continued working on labour rights. She was involved with projects related
both to garments workers themselves as well as the washing practices in the factories and the
issues of water usage, sanitation, and hygiene-related issues. Salma and her team worked with
apparel workers in Tongi—a suburban factory town outside of Dhaka—enabling workers to
produce their own play based on their take on these matters. These events were all documented
and shown to buyers and retailers in the West, according to Salma Apa. These are the different
modes of activism pursued by local activists like Salma in face of disasters that appear in the
Bangladeshi garments industry. NGO-based representation of the fast fashion industry is
explicitly feminized; meanwhile, portraying the industry as a woman-dominated sector and the
passivity associated with women’s lives, has normalized the succession of violence facing these
already “weak,” “vulnerable,” and “impoverished” groups. While the nationalist representation
of the Bangladeshi apparel industry is depicted as an economic boon to the country, local
activists continually emphasize that the sector is selectively profitable for only a handful of
players at the expense of safety and security for workers. As we were wrapping up our Zoom
conversation, I finally asked Salma Apa to comment on what she thought had changed, if
anything, since the Tazreen factory fire and Rana Plaza collapse. She told me:
There were changes, I would not say that there were not, there were changes.
Our survey was done after the Rana Plaza and obviously after Tazreen. We had found
that at least none of the floors where the factory workers were working in our sample,
were locked from the outside. So, this is something that has changed since Tazreen.
Since, during Tazreen, the workers were locked from outside. However, we have seen
that in other non-apparel factories, these similar hazardous practices have continued.
I thought about all that she had told me. I said: “Yeah, I heard similar things about the Shezan
Factory fire that happened in the Narayanganj District in Bangladesh in July 2021, that killed
three workers and injured more than 50 people.”
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She replied: “Yeah. So there, there were doors that were locked from outside. So, perhaps some
of the reasons why the apparel industry has started following those protocols is due to the
pressures from the retailers from the West, the ACCORD and Alliance, and the aftermath of
those. Some of the factories had to improve their safety measures and had to take some steps.
However, if you think in terms of their decision-making capability or the vulnerability of
garments workers, that has not decreased. Workers’ wage-related vulnerabilities are still there.”
After that, Salma Apa shifted to describe to me how garments workers experience factory work.
She told me that experiences are “buried,” yet, when one speaks with women garments workers,
interacts with them, or just seeks to learn from their experience, what can be learned through
those interactions is extremely different from the corporate point of view or even the perspective
of factory owners and supervisors. Since the majority of apparel factories are located in rural
districts and factory towns, garments workers move away from their families to live in dingy
rental apartments with dozens of others. She said:
The life that these women have, their lives are so precarious, their vulnerability is so
much that it hurts because their wages are exceptionally low, and their living conditions
are unbelievably bad.
And often [they] have to depend on the bariwalas landlords who are often connected with
the owners. Workers experience a secondary layer of exploitation because these landlords
are immensely powerful, and they decide who lives in one place and how. They can
throw out any woman anytime they want. The living expenses are remarkably high, even
months before their real wages increase, the cost of amenities and bills increases. Their
lives are very precarious, and our research shows that there is a lot of micronutrient
deficiency, the toilets are in a terrible condition. On average, 20 women use one toilet,
and they often have health hazards, or health problems that you would not normally find
elsewhere. When we were doing the survey, first we wanted to use the WHO industrial
Worker’s Health Index, so that we would have certain kinds of health ailments and
diseases that we expected Industrial Workers to have. But in our pilot, we found out that
none of what was outlined were the cases for these women.
The health implications of working in hazardous factories are a familiar concern for garments
sromik in Bangladesh, one that can be traced back to what maquiladora workers in Mexico faced
in the mid-20th century (Domínguez et al 2010). Consequently, as I was collecting secondary
research, I found it more accessible to find data and articles outlining the health and physical
concerns associated with working in factories for garments industry workers, as highlighted by
many international institutions and NGOs. However, it was rather difficult to find data on the
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social, political, and economical underpinnings that lead young women to seek employment in
industries where they are undervalued (cf. Saikia 2004). Nevertheless, the issues facing
Bangladeshi garments sromik are regionally specific. The data Salma’s team collected sampled
mainly young women and girls and based on those narratives they made takeaways regarding the
condition of factory work in Bangladesh. Currently, there can be found second and third
generations of young women who are employed in garments factories.
Salma continued, telling me more about the specific health and safety issues facing workers:
The garments workers we sampled from were noticeably young, at least for the most part.
And so, they did not show hypertension, heart-related, problems or other big issues. Their
health issues were not very fatal ones, but they would have to spend a lot of money to
buy medication, over the counter for things such as headaches, indigestion, and problems
that you cannot easily fix. For example, if they were suffering from issues that required a
one-stop surgery to fix, however, what they are facing cannot be fixed with surgery.
These are issues that are persistent, they continue, and they do not have proper treatment.
Over-the-counter drugs are something that they can access therefore they continue
purchasing them to aid with minor relief, as they cannot afford to lose work for illnesses
or feeling unwell. They suffer from issues like headaches, gastrointestinal problems, or
UTIs, these are illnesses that are not quite common among other industrial workers.
However, malnutrition and working condition related vulnerabilities were there, and we
found unmistakable evidence of it. Additionally, we found that their mobility was always
dependent on how safe they felt when they went to work. While in our sample it was
insignificant in terms of statistical importance when it came to the number of women who
said they were sexually harassed inside their workplace, however, there was a significant
reporting of sexual harassment experienced on the way from home to work. There was
harassment such as verbal abuse by superiors which is quite rampant. Moreover, women
workers felt safer in larger factories than in medium-sized sweater factories. For example,
because medium-sized sweater factories are more of a seasonal kind of factory (often
subcontracted), in those factories, workers are more marginalized than in others. In
sweater factories they do receive an income for the season, however they are not formally
employed. Therefore, their employment-related security is lower in medium-sized
sweater factories where there are about 100–200 of sromik working.
The factory owners’ conception and statements about women workers always appeared
negative. They never wanted workers to speak out. In one of our interviews, one owner
said to me the reason they choose to hire particularly young women is because they have
good eyesight but also because they are more likely to follow instructions and not skip
any steps in the process of production. So, I asked him, “Why do you think it's only the
women that do not skip steps?” to which he replied, that men always skip steps and argue
that they understand things better, and of course, women do not argue, they work.
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Women work more calmly and are more likely to listen to and follow instructions,
according to this owner.
Which I think says a lot about why these women are truly recruited. Furthermore, we
found that most women are recruited through their own social networks, like their cousins
or women from the same village who has been working. Additionally, a good percentage
of these women who are working in the factories are below the age of 18. Although that
percentage is greater in earlier studies, we think it is still an important part to highlight.
We know that these women are put into the factories forging their real birthdays and
everything. However, many self-reported that they were below the age of 18. So, these
are sort of my experiences from the survey.
While the legal age of employment in Bangladesh is 14 years old, many families are
compelled to send their children to work due to hunger, starvation, and poverty. Therefore, there
is a prevalence of shishu sromik child labourers in Bangladesh, including in the apparel sector.
Being a woman in a post-colonial state has its own set of cultural, patriarchal, and economical
obligations that one must overcome or fulfill to be considered an acceptable member of society.
However, in many instances, it is the post-colonial, capitalist system that continues to hinder
women and reproduce detriments to their access to health, wealth, food, and shelter, and
subjecting women of colour to cycles of generational suffering and trauma. Nevertheless,
Bangladeshi women garments workers display tremendous courage, strength, will, and resilience
when they decide to return to the site of factory work. In Chapter Three, I argued that the
narrative of third-world women needing saving has been continually manipulated by western to
justify exploitative economic development schemes. The Rana Plaza collapse brought this
“paradox of suffering” to light that chains women garments workers to a system of oppression
where they are burdened by corporate and global patriarchy, as well as familial and kinship
responsibilities (Chowdhury 2018, 48). By drawing on the analytical language used by
Bangladeshi labour activists who are pragmatically situated and familiar with the nuances of
experience of factory work and conditions facing apparel workers, I argue that an ethnographic
approach to defining capitalism can emerge. According to Salma Apa, the age and social
conditions of young women and girls get manipulated by international and state players to
extract profits, as young girls are trained to be less combative and not speak out of turn.
However, the feminization of the garments sector is deeply problematic, as it diverts attention
away from the more crucial areas that require attention, such as creating a knowledge economy
so that workers can be skilled and independent, and raising the minimum wage to enable workers
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to live dignified lives. Furthermore, by investing on the healthcare, education, and salaries of
workers, the government of Bangladesh could produce a stronger economy that is more
sustainable in the long run.
I want to end, then, with a consideration of the issue of gender in the garments sector and
amid garments factory workers, to address the current trends that were highlighted in my
conversation with informants. Local activists consider it important to resist the western-centric
imagery of poor Bangladeshi women workers needing saving. As a framework, that view fails to
capture the ingenious and meticulous ways these workers survive in an industry that seeks to
commodify their body and labour. Bangladeshi garments sromik are not voiceless victims;
rather, their voices, demands, and the forms of ordinary violence they experience regularly are
deliberately overshadowed and prohibited by national and international players, so that factory
owners and transnational corporations can continue to accumulate profits at the expense of
precarious modes of production. I will draw on the work of my informants, especially Salma
Apa, to explore the issue of gendering in the Bangladeshi apparel industry.
Workers in Bangladeshi garments factories are often expected to suffer silently, and any
attempt to protest is immediately resolved by firing the employee. Recall for example the case I
discussed in Chapter Three of Rehana, who was fired by his factory manager for posting a
Facebook status about his unpaid wages. Workers are also exposed to hazardous conditions in
factories (Akhter 2022, 7). Meanwhile, subcontractors are left out of most discussions by
governmental agencies, corporations, NGOs, and trade unions, although subcontracted factories
are notorious for hiring child labourers and paying lower than the national wage (Tanjeem 2017).
In a single fiscal year, the Bangladeshi garments industry witnessed 28% growth and went from
being worth $15.54B in 2021 to $19.9B in 2022, it is likely that the industry will continue
growing (Akhter 2022, 6). However, these surges in value do not reflect the staggeringly low
wages offered to workers amidst the rising costs of household staple items such as water, grains,
and gas—making survival unaffordable for workers (Akhter 2022, 6). This raises the question,
who are the workers currently employed in Bangladeshi garments factories, and how are their
lives evaluated in this capitalist industry? (cf. Millar 2018; Graeber 2001).
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Currently, four million workers are recognized as working in the garments sector (by
employers’ organizations/ACCORD, etc.), although this data is missing the other additional six
million workers who are indirectly linked to the industry (Akhter 2022, 9), including those
workers in subcontracted factories. One key aspect to highlight as we shift away from the
dominant NGO representation that presents the apparel industry through a feminized and
exploitable lens is the subjecthood and gendering of workers. Garments workers in factories in
countries like Bangladesh are spending 12-14+ hours producing “micro-trend” items for
American shoppers most of which is likely to experience a short lifespan before ending up in
landfills in other countries, disclosing a chain of oppression and violence (Voyles 2015; Wright
2013; Rajan 2019).
The suffering and sacrifices of women of color are essentialized in economies like the
Bangladeshi garments sector, even as the position of women in the industry is applied to amplify
nationalistic ideas of progress and economic transformation (Karim, 2014; Wright 2013; Spivak
2003). Historically, the Bangladeshi garments industry has been unequivocally gendered and
women made up majority of the workforce between the 1990s and 2000s; these ‘female workers’
were perceived as ‘boons’ to lure in profitable business (Karim 2014). Nevertheless, throughout
the new millennium, Bangladeshi women’s labour distribution has shifted. Where the industry
once witnessed an 80% female dominant workforce, in 2022, the gender distribution has shifted,
with only 58% of Bangladeshi apparel workers being women and girls (Akhter 2022, 9). The
issue appears when one gets closer to the ground to recognize how the two opposing forms of
activism can impede the growth and prosperity of workers in Bangladeshi factories. While local
organizers are aware and attentive to the gendered needs of workers in the industry, the western
activists continue to address the industry as “women dominated” and “feminized” to gather
funding and increase dependence rather than promoting workers’ agency. Meanwhile, these
depictions of “unskilled workers” can hinder progress in terms of endorsing labour rights or
raising the minimum wage for workers. As my research reveals, the continued gendering of the
garments sector results in the normalization of violence and disasters facing workers rather than
enabling workers to organize and mobilize independently.
Voiceless or Un-Voiced? The Dismemberment of the Bangladeshi Garments Worker Identity in
the Global Supply Chain
117

While garments workers may be globally represented by NGOs using old colonial tropes, and at
times they get misrepresented because those same NGOs assume they understand the workforce,
but do not, local activists explicate their strength by holding the national players accountable.
The rights of citizens can only be provided at the state level, and yet neoliberal development
models reduce the authority of the national government over its citizens and expect NGOs to fill
the gaps and administer the needs of workers. The women workers are depicted as producing
‘value’ for the economy while being represented as being ‘saved’ by this neoliberal industry that
flourishes through exploitation (Chowdhury 2018; Siddiqi 2009; cf. Millar 2018; Abu-Lughod
2013; Bauman 2013). Historically, as presented in the case of Saikia’s (2004) research on
Bangladeshi women’s contribution to the liberation movement—it is evident that the narratives
of racialized women often get overwritten and tactically erased to maintain patriarchy (cf. Spivak
2003; Mohanty 1984). Therefore, it is crucial to produce opportunity and space where women
workers, and wage labourers in general, can vocalize and speak freely about their needs and
contributions. This is what local activists are working towards.
For now, there is an open empirical question of why the gender dynamics are shifting and
what that means for the women who are leaving. Additionally, workers are further prohibited
from organizing, collectivizing, or voicing their rights and demands without receiving threats,
harassment, or other forms of violence from their employers. This controversial issue of
discrimination against gendered workers depicts how the fast fashion industry reproduces
broader ways that women are commodified and represented, not as themselves speaking their
own voices. Rather, they are claimed through the capitalist use of their bodies to generate value
for corporations, by colonial-humanitarian-NGOs whose concern is to save them, and by the
nation’s historical claim of the role and place of women’s bodies in the founding of Bangladesh.
Let us now listen to a woman who has done extensive research on the gendered role of
Bangladeshi women in the garments industry and speak about the matter more explicitly.
Local activists such as the Sromik Sheba team and activists such as Taslima Ahkter, Moshrefa
Mishu, Shabuj Shahidul Islam, Saydia Gulrukh, along with others, provide a voice for ordinary
Bangladeshis and forward the localized labour movement. The activists I have named and those I
had the privilege of interviewing and learning from, contribute their own time, efforts, and skills,
and are passionate about upholding Bangladeshi workers’ labour rights. Although, at times these
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activists encounter doubts and uncertainties, specifically considering that majority of the pocketholder in this lucrative industry can be found acting in self-interested ways, repeatedly, at the
cost of lives and well-being of ordinary sromik in global factories. Meanwhile, the imagery of
the vulnerable and poverty-stricken worker at times of crisis gets manipulated by global actors to
assert the need for this domineering neoliberal supply chain that is “providing jobs” to workers.
One of the key characteristics of this transnational economy that I have mentioned includes the
lack of accountability and the easy dislocating of factories to unaudited areas, such that, capitalist
players can bend the rules in their favour to acquire profits (Tanjeem 2017). In contrast, local
labour activists and grassroots organizers such as Saydia Gulrukh, and my informant Miah Bhai,
are found risking their lives to mobilize the demands of workers for higher wages and proper
remittances, while being abused and harassed by state-led players. Nevertheless, local labour
activists continue fighting for the rights of all Bangladeshi wage workers and make it their goal
to provide a voice for average Bangladeshis. They refuse to accept external funding that will
cause them to become sell-outs to western agendas, even if that comes at a cost of losing the
spotlight to other highly visible NGO-based activists. The demands of garments workers are not
specific only to their needs; rather, it is suggestive of a vision for national economic
development, one that can continue when the garments industry moves on, as seen in the case of
Mexico and the Dominican Republic.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
The Bangladeshi Garments industry in the 2020s
In this thesis, I have presented the case of the Bangladeshi garments industry and the various
disasters that have occurred in the sector over recent decades, to demonstrate how moments of
crises have both contributed to and disrupted the localized labour movement and the installment
of adequate labour rights in the country. What we gained from this analysis was to listen to and
learn from the efforts of local activists who are at the forefront of the Bangladeshi labour
movement. This provided insight into the gaps in the system and answered why the apparel
supply chain fails to provide for garments workers and is labelled as an unethical and
unsustainable industry by many. Furthermore, one significant takeaway is that the national and
international players can benefit from listening to the perceptions of local activists and pursuing
a ground-up approach to achieving labour rights. My informants argued that following disasters
such as the Rana Plaza collapse, the global news and media attempted to distract workers by
intentionally making them reiterate their narratives of suffering and poverty. This dismissed the
urgency for collectivizing and organizing amongst the working classes following a moment of
rupture that appeared as a large industrial scandal. Global capital, however, manipulates
moments of disaster for its own ends, to extend capital accumulation and worker exploitation by
relocating to lesser audited areas where workers’ rights can be easily compromised. These
disasters have become commonplace, much like the ordinary forms of violence that garments
sromik are struggling with each day—which induces their hunger, illnesses, unsafe living
conditions, poverty, and more. In this concluding chapter, I will turn to my conversation with a
few activists who are differently situated to provide some closing remarks regarding how local
activists envision the future of the Bangladeshi garments industry to unfold.
While capitalist players in the industry weaponize moments of rupture to make matters worse,
local activists use these moments to make demands before national governments and state
players, seek ethical rights for Bangladeshi citizens and sromik, and lastly, occupy space on
before the media to advance the sromik andolon/labour movement which centers around the
long-term needs of wage workers. Nevertheless, the minimum wage in Bangladesh remains
staggeringly low, a condition that places workers, many of whom are coming from marginalized
communities, at the bottom of the supply chain where their rights as workers and citizens both
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get dismissed. Following a disaster that signifies the volatility of the apparel industry,
international players are more concerned about saving face and avoiding blame, rather than
taking accountability for the lives that were disrupted. This resulted in the production of certain
westernized policies such as the ACCORD or, in an earlier moment, the Harkin Bill. These
policies do not prohibit disasters or discriminatory labour practices from taking place; rather, the
policies protect western corporations from any blame and place the responsibility of attending to
workers entirely upon national governments and factory owners. Furthermore, these moments of
crisis are critical in shaping the industry, as was in the case of the Harkin Bill, which contributed
to the entry of NGOs that intended to stop child labour in the region. Those NGOs founded a
handful of activists, trained them to speak and negotiate in English, and applied to promote the
policies that are mentioned above. These activists came to represent Bangladeshi garments
workers on a national and global scale. Nevertheless, local activists distinguished this as a key
issue that resulted in “turf wars” and suppressed their agendas, as local organizers do not engage
in the same funding relations which result in the promotion of western-centric policies. Instead,
local organizers focus primarily on establishing workers’ rights and raising the minimum wage
in Bangladesh.
Consider this rough snapshot of the situation, as described in the preceding chapters.
National players express great pride in the garments industry, arguing that it provides jobs for
millions of workers (albeit at a larger unspoken cost). In the global supply chain, national players
thus become key brokers who take on the role of mediating the industry, making Bangladeshi
workers available for global corporations. Whenever a disaster takes place, these actors including
the factory owners and employers’ organizations such as the BGMEA, work their level best to
hide the magnitude of these disasters, as Miah Bhai recounted. Moreover, national players are
given the responsibility of firing thousands of workers whenever there are cutbacks, such as
following the COVID-19 pandemic, and for threatening workers to come back when the industry
begins running again, as Saira described. The Bangladeshi garments industry was feminized
from its initial entry into the region, and as Salma Apa argues, the trope of the South Asian
women’s submissive role gets manipulated by these capitalist players to normalize violence
against wage workers, all while permitting corporations and corrupt nationalist players to
accumulate wealth. The Bangladeshi national players take considerable pride in distinguishing
the garments industry as prospering when speaking in front of global news outlets, yet they
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strictly focus on the GDP and national economic growth, ignoring the demands of garments
sromik and the activists who represent them. For example, following the Rana Plaza collapse, the
minimum wage was raised to $67 per month, although workers had demanded $100 (Karim
2014, 54). Since then, the country’s labour rights situation has not witnessed much improvement,
and it is plausible that the apparel industry has become more volatile and repressive for workers,
and for women. This could be one possible explanation for the noticeable drop in the number of
women enlisted to work in garments factories, as some of my informants had mentioned.
Moreover, the Rana Plaza collapse case revealed the lack of usefulness of western-centric
policies like the ACCORD, which was criticized for creating additional expenses for national
factory owners, much of which they could not fulfill. This led garments beshashis
(businessowners) to turn to subcontractors. Subcontracted factory conditions are far more
dangerous and exceptional, where workers’ rights are nowhere to be found. Most western and
national actors are criticized by local activists and thinkers for overlooking these critical issues
such as the role of subcontractors, by fixating on abstract policies that do not meet the needs and
demands of Bangladeshi apparel factory workers. Local activists, as Maisha quoted, are
extremely critical of these western policies and argue that these movements subsequently
dominate and overwrite their agendas and demands on the ground. Additionally, the case of the
COVID-19 pandemic illustrates how garments workers in Bangladesh are experiencing a
significantly increased workload compared to the pre-pandemic era (Antara and Sultan 2021;
Tanjeem 2021).
Looking at the garments sector through punctuated moments of crisis can provide a vital analytic
lens for understanding not only how global players and international institutions reacted to
disasters, but also how local activists and workers utilized these moments to defend their
agendas. The latter can include matters of raising the minimum wage, providing health and social
benefits to workers, having dedicated funds for emergency responses whenever factory disasters
transpire, training garments workers with soft and hard skills that can be transferable beyond the
apparel industry, creating spaces for people from different classes to organize and demand equal
rights for citizens, and more. As embodied by the actions pursued by the Sromik Sheba team,
localized activists emphasized that the lives lost to these industrial massacres, such as the
number that continued circulating following the Rana Plaza collapse, “these are 1,134 lives, not
numbers,” which was the headline for their subsequent project. This number does not begin to
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cover what Onik described as the “passive lives” that were lost and went unaccounted for
following the disaster, such as the death of his comrade, Himu. Maisha shared with me that local
activists refuse to affiliate with western NGOs or name-brand institutions as they tend to pull
focus away from what workers need on the ground. Although it can be assumed that the
garments industry will likely shift away to a cheaper site of labour, the millions of workers will
remain. Thus, local activists make it their central goal to hold the national and international
actors accountable, and demand improved wages, rights, and treatments for wage labourers, such
that, Bangladeshi citizens can live dignified lives, as deserved.
What, then, can we do? The two main stances that appeared from my field research are
these; 1) a dystopian truth about hyper-exploitation where the corporate dominates all ends of the
supply chain, and 2) a feeling of hopelessness, fixated on the dreams of a better future and the
dying hopes of workers as they continue suffering from ordinary forms of violence. There is a
space in between these, however, where political action and tangible solutions are being
produced and provided at a more intimate and grounded level—the space of localized activism.
The global situation is frightening in scale and scope and seems unapproachable from every
angle. Transnational corporations and powerful states have designed the global economic system
to be such that they are hard to pin down or hold accountable. Therefore, the other scale, the
local, and the efforts appearing at that level are crucial to strengthen the wage worker movement
in Bangladesh, and to mobilize the garments worker movement internationally. Thus, the
localized labour movement is a key place where workers can organize to bring forth quantifiable
changes. Of course, there remain very real structural limitations. Fast fashion is a repetition of
this dystopian, colonially driven exploitative system. It continually shifts away, moves around
the world, and repeats harm in various places, across the bodies of those who are rendered
abstract labour power, sites merely for the generation of corporate profit. This violence is
intrinsic to the system, to the global supply chains, and to these colonial and imperial institutions.
Localized activism challenges this sense of colonial supremacy.
Even though the debates over abstract western policies and the NGO-level work can at
times overshadow the wage labour movement in Bangladesh, local actors are active and engaged
in attending to garments workers at a more intimate level. This is because people organizing on
the ground are familiar with and aware of the inequalities that are intrinsic to these systems.
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They know quite well how the industry treats workers as objects and as instruments of
accumulating profit, not subjects. By individualizing their struggles and making them repeat their
sorrows on the news, western media erases the larger systemic issues that are oppressing
workers, such as stolen wages, long working hours, receiving zero breaks, the role of
subcontractors, and the dominance of westernized activism in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, in the
local, we shift away from that top-down sentiment that makes the workers seem distant; rather,
in the local, workers are the champions of their tales and can voice their demands. Garments
workers and labour activists work to address these ordinary demands of workers by holding
national players accountable, increasing the minimum wage, giving workers breaks, and
fulfilling their rights as citizens. In this final concluding chapter, I want to turn to an excerpt
from my conversation with Salma Apa, who has conducted extensive research on the
Bangladeshi garments industry where she gathered incredible insider knowledge on how
workers, specifically women workers, survive day-to-day. This will highlight the ordinary
struggles that workers in the supply chain endure, and what appears to be central to the localized
labour movement in Bangladesh that aims to fulfill the rights of all wage workers.

5.1. Male Husbands and Female Workers: Eating Chicken Feet as Bonus
Listening to garments workers and their demands becomes crucial when building initiatives or
projects aimed at benefiting those on the ground. Moreover, before I wrap up this thesis, it is
important that I turn back to the issue of gendering in the apparel industry. There has existed a
long history of women’s participation in the garments industry due to several social, cultural,
economic, and political conditions, and the continued mistreatment and feminization of the
garments industry requires further condemnation. Even though number of women garments
workers in Bangladesh may have slowly decreased, the industry remains women dominant.
However, it is significant to recognize that this shift in gender enrollment in the industry could
be the result of further precarity, patriarchal oppression, and vulnerability facing Bangladeshi
women workers. The forms of violence women and girls face while working in these factories
are multifaceted. Women tactically seize selective opportunities to survive mindfully in this
exploitative industry that seeks to loot their labour for profit at the expense of their bodies and
then present them as passive victims needing saving.
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There exists a double standard in the way that women are used or claimed as making an
essential contribution to the nation. On the one hand, women are seen as essential (to the nation
itself and to the national economy); on the other hand, women are rendered as passive, and
denied their subjectivity and voice. Recall, for example, the case of the civil war in Bangladesh,
with women’s memoirs being selectively addressed when the government and national players
wanted to promote nationhood and solidarity amongst Bangladeshis. However, women’s
accounts of the war and their demands for repatriation or recognition received limited space, as
Saikia (2004) highlighted. Similarly, in the garments industry, the booming status of the industry
in terms of bringing in profits for national players and growing the GDP is promoted while
describing the Bangladeshi garments sector. However, the demands of workers get sidelined, or
even brushed off, while the efforts of labour activists get challenged by state-led players who
fear losing the industry. Bangladeshi women and apparel factory workers contribute
tremendously to the symbolic and material value of the nation. Perhaps it is time that we listen
more closely to them. I turn, again, to Salma:
These women have learned, and they also train others to remain more passive, and not
talk back to men in the area. And their stories are amazing, we did this play on based on
their stories and it had to do with water-related issues. The neighborhood did not have
enough reliable sources of fresh water. The women have a lot going on, just to get their
rights as citizens or as tenants of those houses that needed water supply. But using that as
a sort of weapon, the workers reported to us that the landlords sexually harassed them,
and made improper proposals to them, such as: if you listen to me, I will give you water,
if you do not listen, then I will not.
Think about the fact that the landlords will count the number of shoes outside, and they
might actually charge you for having too many people over at home. Everything gets
charged. A major part of their vulnerability is their income because they earn so little,
and if you compare it with the amount that they have to spend to get all the things that
they need even to survive…it is absolutely amazing how they survive and they survive
only on rice and daal (lentils) and shukti (dried fish). And that is like the nutrition that
they get. And it will be fixed [a good meal] if they can get chicken legs. Not like
drumsticks. But the feet.
You would see, if you go to their marketplaces, you will see people selling chicken feet,
which are not really a product most people will buy from the market. So, this is
something that is sort of waste, people will throw out. And that is what is being sold in
those markets, and they are quite prominent.
Another thing I always find interesting in these neighborhoods is [that] women must
marry to keep themselves secured. They pay their husbands to remain their husbands.
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During our first study, we met women who paid their husbands to remain their husbands.
Because without husbands, they will be vulnerable to other predators. But husbands are
kind of like a seal or a shield that will protect them from other men approaching them
with bad intentions. This is also something I was really stunned to find, but it has been
going on for a long time as I always see this.
There was a case where the woman reported to us that her husband left her in the village
with three children and came to Tongi to work. She followed him and came to Tongi and
saw that he was staying with another woman, and she was devastated but she had to stay
here because she could not go back. So, she got a job and then tried to get her husband
back, but he did not come back. However, he contacted her recently before we were
interviewing her, maybe two or three days before we met. So, he called her and asked her
if she can afford to pay him 2,000 Takas per week, then he will come back from that
other woman and be her husband, which is interesting. It is quite evident among many of
the women that I have seen, and I have talked to.
Women garments workers in Bangladesh have developed nuanced and resilient ways of
surviving and coping with the layers of violence and struggles that they face day to day. They
strategically outsource their safety by trading portions of their income and paying for men in
their work towns to fulfill the role of “husbands” so that they can continue earning an income
despite the malicious intents of sexual predators. The representation of the garments industry as a
feminized sector is weaponized and manipulated by brands and factory owners to ensure the
production of cheap and exploitable labour, propel the exploitation of women, attempt to erase
women’s voices, and normalize the accidents, disasters, and mistreatments facing workers in the
global supply chain (Karim 2014; Saikia 2004). Nevertheless, in contrast, local activists like
Salma Apa make it their fundamental goal to ensure the voices of women garments workers and
their experiences receive a platform for their voices. Listening to women workers will not only
improve the condition of this feminized industry, but it will also ensure that all wage workers in
Bangladesh are receiving their full rights as citizens and labourers. Bangladeshi apparel factory
workers are severely underpaid, their salaries do not cover basic survival needs, especially with
the rising cost of living in 2022. The income workers are receiving can barely afford to buy them
chicken feet from the market, something everyone else had discarded. This is a moral concern
for not only the garments workers, local labour activists, and factory owners, rather, it is a human
rights issue that must be addressed by everyone in the supply chain, including global brands and
western consumers. Bangladeshi garments workers and women wage labourers are producing
fast fashion for the global supply chain, therefore, their voices, rights, and demands should be
addressed and adhered to accordingly by the players in the national and international sphere. To
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shift away from top-down narrative, in this thesis, I have tried to give as much space as possible
to women workers and to their own ideas, desires, and accounts of their lives and of the garments
sector. I have done that by foregrounding the stories of prominent grassroots activists who do not
just speak for workers but also speak with and listen to them. As activists and workers have
continually noted—and as I have argued throughout this thesis—we can only hope to fully
understand the realities of garments workers’ lives and of the garments sector within the global
capitalist system if we listen closely to those most directly and immediately impacted by that
system, the sromik (workers).

5.2. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, my research on the Bangladeshi garments industry highlighted the significance of
listening to local actors and activists who are familiar with the ins and outs of the living
conditions of garments workers and their demands from their employers. With the changes
apparent in consumption habits and the expansion of capitalism that permits transnational
corporations to accumulate wealth, wage workers such as garments sromik in Bangladesh under
a continuous state of exploitation led by capitalism. Meanwhile, in the era of instant gratification
as the newest, trendiest, quickest, cheapest, and most accessible commodities are circulating,
companies that can produce the most products for the least costs, are winning, against all other
competitors. Most small to medium scale companies cannot stand a competition against
corporate giants such as Amazon, Walmart, and in the more recent years, the growth of the
Chinese fast-fashion retailer, Shein, which has placed thousands of companies out of business.
By 2021, Shein had surpassed Amazon in sales. The company has also reconfigured capital
accumulation and modes of production in the global apparel industry, and it has been continually
criticized for exploiting workers and paying them slave wages (Holmes 2022). As I have shown
with the case of the Bangladeshi garments industry, the expansion of capitalist relations of
production has prompted a certain devaluation of labour that is most profitable only for a select
few, such as transnational corporations compared to the overworked garments sromik in
Bangladeshi factories. Beyond Bangladesh, the case of Shein and the promotion of fast fashion
illustrates clearly how the global garments sector is built based on modes of capital accumulation
that suppress wages, exploit precarious workers, and reproduces (and even intensifies) colonial
forms of subjugation of the poor, people of colour, women, girls, and other marginalized subject
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groups. While corporations practice hands-off tactics to avoid responsibility and appear as
“distant” and “unaware” as possible, national governments like the Bangladeshi employers’
groups, factory owners, Ministers of Parliament, and more, are expected to fulfill the role of
overcoming that distance and attending to the needs of workers. However, since this is a
capitalist supply chain, the corporations have hired buyers who make countries like Bangladesh,
China, and Vietnam, compete to offer the cheapest labour. Miah Bhai shared that in Bangladesh,
“buying houses” appeared where buyers that represent western brands and clientele, make local
factory owners and producers compete and auction off the most inexpensive labour, the cheaper
the labour cost the more likely to attract business. As a result, the labour movement gets
suppressed and the demands of garments workers get overwritten by media outlets and NGO
activists who are promoting westernized policies that are deemed ineffective by locals.
The western hegemony and colonial haunting are prevalent in Bangladesh, which enables the
maintenance of skeptical imagery depicting Bangladeshi women as needing saving, rather,
Bangladeshi women workers deserve a higher living wage with which they can fulfill their own
needs and the needs of their families and their communities. Nation-states that are in a perpetual
state of coloniality (cf. Brown 2010) are dominated by corporate monopoly and western
investment. Thereby, governmental (and certain non-governmental players) observe and comply
with top-down demands, which distances wage labourers in the supply chain, outlawing their
access to citizenship, rights, and generational growth. In Bangladesh, for the government,
employers’ groups, NGOs, and other state-led actors, maintaining the lucrative apparel industry
is crucial to maintain export-led revenue production, while simultaneously forbidding workers
from participating in the sromik andolon.
By controlling workers via their stomachs, starving them, and threatening them with the
fear of joblessness, factory owners, employers’ groups, and other national players ensure
workers continue returning to work. Whenever workers organize or attempt to mobilize their
demands, these national groups like the BGMEA are known to stop these protests by “letting out
the police” like dogs to chase down the protestors. The national sphere and central actors are
afraid of losing the economy; however, workers must receive the space to mobilize and publicize
their demands and speak up about the deplorable conditions they are expected to work in.
Bangladeshi garments workers are asking for the bare minimum in many ways; these workers are
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not unskilled, rather they are the most profitable workers in the entire supply chain. Many of
them are working beyond 12–15 hours a day with no toilet breaks while facing major wage
undercuts and receiving threats of getting fired for speaking up. Recalling the narrative of the
young woman, Rehana, who was fired for posting about their stolen wages as a Facebook status,
this depicts the limited space for labour organizing in Bangladesh, and the unsafe, precarious
conditions Bangladeshi sromik are placed in. Garments workers are routinely reminded by their
employers that they are prohibited from organizing, much like millions of wage workers across
the globe. By controlling people’s wages, producing distance between players, and weakening
the labour movement, major corporations continue dominating the markets and industries and
alter them to their advantage. When crises or disasters appear, like the case of the Rana Plaza
collapse, corporations are quick to act as though they were unaware of these “unforeseeable
events” and “normalizing accidents” that were preventable in the first place (cf. Perrow 2004;
Beckett 2020). In short, the system creates disasters that are then manipulated to reproduce the
system, enabling corporations to shift their production to cheaper, lesser audited areas, such as
the rapid uprise in the number of subcontracted factories that have appeared since the ACCORD
regulations took place in Bangladesh.
By contrast, local activists, scholars, and thinkers use moments of crisis to generate new forms of
organizing and to mobilize to collectively address the needs and demands of Bangladeshi sromik.
Additionally, these activists who are marching alongside garments workers, providing them with
food, money, and aid, in any form possible, are the true producers of achieving labour rights in
Bangladesh and beyond. Moreover, Bangladeshi labour activists recognize the strength, wit, and
power of Bangladeshi sromik, specifically in their unity. Through fieldwork, I observed that
Bangladeshi sromik, specifically women labourers, are highly agentive thinkers and players in
the global labour market. Although, the number of women enlisting in the garments industry has
slowly decreased over the last few years and increased in terms of men’s participation. There
could be an array of reasons driving this change in gender dynamics. Nevertheless, my research
addresses the significance of listening to garments workers and providing them livable wages
with which they can survive to escape the layers of misogyny and violence that faced
Bangladeshi women and wage workers. Local activists challenge the neoliberal state and
national actors and demand improvements in Bangladesh’s labour rights.
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In this thesis, I have argued that it is essential to adhere to the demands of the localized
labour movement in Bangladesh. Local organizers such as the Sromik Sheba team, consider the
sromik andolon on the ground pivotal for providing a basis for collective action, bargaining, and
organizing, for Bangladeshi wage workers. Recalling Rehana’s story, the young woman who
faced immediate repercussions for voicing their concerns about unfair wages over social media,
and was fired by their employer, it exemplifies the limited room for workers to mobilize their
demands virtually or in person, without risking their safety or source of income. Consequently,
workers and activists, even certain advocates who are NGO-affiliated but organize independently
outside of their work, find it difficult to openly criticize certain matters or address the forms of
corruption that is visible across the national supply chain. This is because the Bangladeshi
government alongside other state led players, perceive the garments industry as and intertwined
with the country’s progress and development, and thus, they resort to punishment or intimidation
tactics to suppress those who are viewed as a probable ‘threat’ to the economy. In this way, the
precariousness affiliated with the export-led garments industry in the post-colonial state of
Bangladesh, becomes visible, where seeking justice for workers and demanding labour rights is
considered threatening to the maintenance of national revenues (cf. Ong 2007; Harvey 2006;
Sassen 2002). In this context, local activists play a crucial role, as they defend the rights and
demands of workers who receive little to no room for political organizing, while holding national
players accountable for the mistreatment facing Bangladeshi citizens. Local committees and
independent political labour organizers such as Sromik Sheba, conjoin their efforts during and
after moments of crisis to combat structural violence. Local actors hope to see the labour
movement get stronger and grow its roots in Bangladesh such that wage labourers can lead better
lives and receive adequate compensation. Grassroots activists continue marching forward with
their efforts by addressing and recognizing the limitations of the nation-state, holding the
government accountable, and generating awareness about systemic barriers to labour organizing
through inter-class solidarity. By mobilizing the demands of workers, the local sromik andolon
in Bangladesh aims for the advancement of worker’s rights for all wage labourers across the
country, and across the transnational garments supply chain.
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